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The evolutionary success of our species is bound to our sociality—the tendency to 
engage in and benefit from social interactions. On a conceptual level, this sociality 
has been parsed into two facets, namely the proclivity to like and seek social 
interactions (social motivation) as well as the cognitive abilities needed to 
coordinate with others socially (social cognition).  
While numerous studies have assessed social motivation and social cognition 
in young children, our current understanding of both facets is still far from 
conclusive. First, the exact ontogeny of social motivation and cognition remain 
largely unclear. Second, the degree to which either facet of sociality is shaped by 
cultural input remains poorly understood. Finally, interindividual variation in social 
motivation and cognition has yet to be examined, without which we can neither 
understand the construct validity of either facet, nor their potential interplay. In this 
dissertation, I present three studies addressing these issues by focusing on 
developmental, cross-cultural, and interindividual variation in three phenomena 
previously linked to sociality: Overimitation and collaboration as indicators of social 
motivation, as well as Theory of Mind as a proxy for social cognition. 
In the first study I assessed whether children’s overimitation would be shaped 
by age, culture, and the social presence of an adult model. I found that children 
across three diverse populations showed more overimitation with age and selectively 
in the presence of the model. I also documented cross-cultural variation in children’s 
overimitation. On an individual level, children’s overimitation did not predict their 
tendency to reengage a co-player in a collaborative activity.  
In study 2, I found children’s overimitation to vary systematically between 
two populations utilizing a procedure with reduced cognitive task demands. Here, 
age did not predict children’s overimitation and variation across populations was 
only observed in how much, but not whether, children would overimitate.  
In study 3, I documented systematic variation in children’s social motivation 
for collaboration as well as their Theory of Mind across three populations and across 
the age range tested. On an individual level, indicators of social motivation were 
ontogenetically linked and predicted children’s Theory of Mind.  
In the general discussion, I propose an integrative model of social motivation 
and cognition to embed and expand the current findings. Accordingly, the interplay 
of socialization goals and practices, social motivation, and social cognition builds 







The ecological success of the human species is immense. Humans are one of the only 
species that has managed to occupy and transform almost every region across the 
globe. As a consequence, individuals need to be able to adapt to vastly different 
environments in order to survive. To do so, they rely on our species-specific propensity 
to use and refine information from others via social learning. 
To explain the psychological mechanisms upon which the human propensity 
for social learning is built, scientists have suggested that sociality—our tendency to 
engage in and benefit from social interactions—is key (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 
2014, 2016). On a conceptual level, human sociality has been argued to be rooted in a 
species-typical set of motivations and cognitive abilities facilitating social 
interactions. Childhood marks a critical period in the ontogeny of sociality given that 
young children are particularly reliant on social learning to become competent 
members of their society. Accordingly, the ontogeny of social motivation and social 
cognition in young children is crucial for our understanding of the foundations of 
human sociality. 
Developmental psychologists have identified various phenomena that have 
been interpreted as early emerging indicators of sociality. Overimitation, or children’s 
faithful imitation of others’ actions regardless of their causal relevance, provides a 
powerful learning mechanism to acquire novel behaviors while facilitating affiliation 
with others. Their propensity to collaborate with others allows children to obtain 
resources they could never achieve by themselves. Their emerging skills to theorize 
 
 
about the thoughts, beliefs, and desires of others help them to coordinate social 
interactions with high efficiency. The early ontogeny and pervasiveness of these 
phenomena across various scientific studies have led researchers to interpret sociality 
as a characteristic feature of our species’ psychology, being deeply rooted in our genes 
and relatively unaffected by cultural input (Tomasello, 2014; Tomasello, Carpenter, 
Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 
2007; Levinson, 2006, 1995). Therefore, sociality has been hypothesized as a human 
universal that is expressed similarly across diverse social and environmental contexts. 
However, the evidence in support of such claims is strongly limited since the vast 
majority of developmental research assessing such phenomena comes from 
participants from Western, industrialized populations (Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & 
Legare, 2017). Whether such evidence also applies outside such contexts is currently 
unknown.  
To address this shortcoming, this dissertation investigates the motivational 
and cognitive roots of sociality in children across diverse cultural contexts. As proxies 
for Western, urban-dwelling populations, I assessed children from Leipzig (Germany). 
German children are typically equipped with high levels of psychological autonomy in 
that the awareness and exploration of personal desires and beliefs is seen as a central 
socialization goal (Keller & Kärtner, 2013). At the same time, parents structure 
children’s social learning through active scaffolding and child-centered pedagogy. In 
today’s Western societies, childhood is typically perceived as a time of preparation, 
rather than active involvement (Morelli, Rogoff, & Angelillo, 2003), so that young 
children are typically not tasked with household chores or other responsibilities.  
 
 
Hai||om children from Farm 6 and Ondera (Namibia) were investigated as their 
hunting and gathering subsistence style, including its social and psychological 
covariates, most closely resembles the circumstances under which humans have 
evolved. In accordance with other contemporary hunter-gatherer populations, the 
Hai||om emphasize children’s autonomy from early on (Widlok, 1999; Terashima & 
Hewlett, 2016). Peer interactions provide an important opportunity for social learning 
among the Hai||om. These opportunities are, compared to Western pedagogy, less 
structured by adults but rather embedded in daily subsistence activities in which 
children are given the chance to participate and contribute (Lew-Levy, Reckin, Lavi, 
Cristóbal-Azkarate, & Ellis-Davies, 2017; Lew-Levy et al., 2019; Boyette & Hewlett, 
2017; Hewlett & Roulette, 2016). Third, rural Ovambo children from Oshivelo 
(Namibia) were tested as proxies for small-scale farming populations in which 
socialization goals and practices typically highlight interpersonal relatedness and 
obedience (Zimba & Otaala, 1993; Zimba, 2002; Barry, Child, & Bacon, 1959). Among 
the Ovambo, learning opportunities are typically embedded in daily activities and 
child-centered pedagogy is given little emphasis as compared to Western, 
industrialized populations. 
Importantly, culturally-specific socialization goals and practices in either of 
the three populations need to be perceived as evolved and specialized adaptions to 
the social and ecological conditions of each population. Cultural differences between 




For the purpose of this dissertation, I conducted three cross-cultural studies 
assessing social motivation in children’s tendency to (over)imitate actions of an adult 
model (study 1 and study 2), their social motivation to collaborate with peers (study 1 
and study 3), as well as their social-cognitive skills as indicated by their performance 
on a set of Theory of Mind tasks (study 3). 
Study 1 — Being observed increases overimitation in three diverse populations 
In the first study, I tested (a) whether an adult model’s presence would increase 
children’s overimitation across populations in a similar pattern, and (b) whether 
individual differences in children’s overimitation would relate to a second proxy for 
social motivation, namely their reengagement of an interactant in a collaborative 
activity. In a within-subjects design, three- to eight-year-old children from the three 
populations (German, Hai||om, Ovambo) engaged in two overimitation scenarios. In 
one scenario, the adult model turned away from them after performing irrelevant 
actions on a puzzle box. Children were thus not observed when given the chance to 
overimitate (model-unobserving condition). In the other scenario, the model 
remained present and attentive when the participants were given the chance to act on 
the box (model-observing condition). In either condition, children’s copying of 
causally irrelevant actions was coded as a proxy for overimitation. In the 
reengagement task, the model stopped contributing to a collaborative activity with 
the child (e.g., building a tower using wooden toy blocks). Children’s subsequent 
behavior was then coded with regards to their active attempts to reengage the 
recalcitrant interactant to the activity. 
 
 
Children across populations showed higher levels of overimitation in the 
model-observing condition as compared to the model-unobserving condition. 
Furthermore, children from either population showed more overimitation with 
increasing age. While these findings support the view that overimitation is a 
functionally universal phenomenon with recurrent developmental trajectories, 
children’s persistence on overimitation varied across populations: German children 
copied irrelevant actions with more precision than both Hai||om and Ovambo children. 
Furthermore, German children showed more reengagement attempts than their 
Hai||om and Ovambo counterparts. On an individual level, however, children’s 
overimitation did not predict their reengagement behaviors.  
Study 2 — Cultural variation in how much, but not whether, children overimitate 
To conceptually replicate and add to the findings of study 1, I assessed overimitation 
among Hai||om and German children using a modified overimitation task. Children 
between three and seven years of age were shown the retrieval of candy from four 
different boxes. In deviation from study 1, the experimenter introduced more familiar 
and simplistic boxes in order to reduce cognitive task demands on attention and 
memory. 
As in the previous study, German children showed overimitation more 
persistently than their Hai||om counterparts. Interestingly, the rates of children 
showing no overimitation at all were similar in both populations. In either context, 
the majority of children showed overimitation at least once throughout the four tasks.  
In contrast to study 1, children’s overimitation did not increase with age in this study. 
 
 
Study 3 — Collaboration and Theory of Mind in three diverse populations 
My objectives for study 3 were threefold: First, I wanted to assess potential effects of 
age and cultural context on children’s social motivation to engage in peer 
collaboration. Second, I wanted to relate different components of social motivation in 
order to assess the construct validity of the phenomenon. Third, I wanted to examine 
potential ontogenetic links between social motivation and social cognition in order to 
shed light on the composition of children’s sociality more broadly.  
In a within-subjects design, three- to eight-year-old children played a game in 
which they could retrieve a reward either by engaging individually or through 
collaboration with a peer. After some trials, children were given the choice to decide 
themselves whether to play individually or in collaboration with their peer. As a first 
indicator of social motivation, children’s positive emotional expressions throughout 
the first eight trials were coded and averaged separately for each condition. Children’s 
forced-choice behaviors were assessed as a second proxy for social motivation. 
Children were additionally tested in a battery of Theory of Mind tasks to assess their 
social-cognitive skills.  
Across ages and populations, children expressed more positive emotions during 
collaborative as compared to individual trials. This tendency was most pronounced 
among Germans, intermediate among Ovambo, and weakest among Hai||om children. 
In regards to their explicit choices, only German children across the age range showed 
a robust preference for collaboration. In contrast, Hai||om children preferred to play 
individually at all ages tested. In contrast, Ovambo children underwent a 
developmental shift in their preferences. While younger Ovambo robustly preferred 
 
 
to collaborate, older children favored the individual option. With regard to the 
construct validity of social motivation, I found that children’s positive emotional 
expressions during collaboration only predicted their forced-choice decisions at 
younger ages. With increasing age, the two components dissociated from one another. 
Finally, children’s emotional expressions during collaboration predicted their Theory 
of Mind skills across cultural contexts.  
Taken together, these results highlight both cultural variability and 
homogeneity in children’s social motivation and social cognition. While the ontogeny 
of social motivation and cognition is strongly shaped by cultural context, some 
patterns appear cross-culturally recurrent. Both facets of sociality are rooted early in 
ontogeny and are consolidated within social interactions. Social motivation, social 
cognition, and culture work in parallel to shape the quality and quantity of social 
interactions—providing children with the learning opportunities they need to grow 








Der ökologische Erfolg der menschlichen Spezies ist außergewöhnlich. Kaum eine 
Spezies außer uns hat es geschafft, nahezu jede Region auf der Erde zu bewohnen und 
sie nach ihren Vorlieben zu gestalten. Eine Konsequenz dieser Expansion ist, dass sich 
Menschen in aller Welt an die unterschiedlichste Lebenswelten anpassen müssen. Um 
dies zu schaffen, ist das Lernen von anderen unabdinglich. 
Um die psychologischen Mechanismen zu erklären, auf denen die menschliche 
Neigung für soziales Lernen fußt, haben Wissenschaftler vor allem unsere Sozialität 
hervorgehoben. Sozialität, definiert als die Tendenz soziale Interaktionen einzugehen 
und aus ihnen Nutzen zu ziehen, setze sich demnach sowohl aus motivationalen, als 
auch aus kognitiven Dispositionen zusammen (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, 2014, 
2016). die erst in ihrer Kombination spezifisch-menschliche Interaktionsformen 
ermöglichen. Der frühen Kindheit kommt dabei eine besondere Rolle zu, da die 
Wichtigkeit von sozialem Lernen insbesondere in dieser Phase zentral ist: Kinder 
müssen innerhalb kürzester Zeit alle essentiellen Informationen und Anforderungen 
ihrer Umwelt erlernen. Demnach kommt der frühkindlichen Entwicklung von sozialer 
Motivation und sozialer Kognition eine entscheidende Rolle für das Verständnis von 
menschlicher Sozialität zu. 
Viele verschiedene Phänomene wurden bislang von Entwicklungspsychologen 
als frühe Indikatoren von Sozialität identifiziert. Überimitation, oder die Neigung, 
Verhaltensweisen anderer selbst dann zu imitieren, wenn diese keinerlei kausale 
Relevanz beinhalten, bietet einen wichtigen Lernmechanismus. So können bislang 
 
 
unbekannte Verhaltensweisen erlernt werden, während das Verhalten auch die 
Möglichkeit zur Affiliation mit dem Modell schafft. Die kindliche Neigung zur 
Kollaboration erlaubt Kindern weiterhin den Zugang zu Ressourcen, die sie alleine 
nicht erreichen könnten. Die Fähigkeit zur mentalen Perspektivenübernahme (Theory 
of Mind), bei der die Gedanken und Wünsche anderer als solche verstanden und 
antizipiert werden, ermöglicht es Kindern weiterhin, soziale Interaktionen effizient 
zu gestalten und zu koordinieren.  
Die frühe Entwicklung und die Durchgängigkeit dieser Phänomene in diversen 
Studien hat Wissenschaftler dazu verleitet, Sozialität als ein Charakteristikum der 
menschlichen Spezies zu verstehen, welches tief in unseren Genen verwurzelt und nur 
sehr eingeschränkt durch kulturellen Einfluss geprägt sei (Tomasello, 2014; 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, 
Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Levinson, 2006, 1995). Dementsprechend sei Sozialität 
universell und unter fast allen sozialen und ökologischen Bedingungen 
gleichermaßen zu beobachten. Empirische Evidenz zugunsten dieser Annahmen ist 
bislang jedoch stark limitiert, da die überwältigende Mehrheit an 
entwicklungspsychologischer Forschung zum Thema bislang lediglich Kinder aus 
westlichen, industrialisierten Populationen betrachtet hat (Nielsen et al., 2017). Ob 
solche Ergebnisse sich auch auf andere Kontexte übertragen lässt, ist folglich 
weitestgehend unerforscht. 
Aus diesen Gründen behandelt diese Dissertation die motivationalen und 
kognitiven Ursprünge von menschlicher Sozialität in Kindern aus diversen kulturellen 
Kontexten. Kinder aus Leipzig (Deutschland) wurden als Stellvertreter für westliche, 
 
 
urbane Lebenswelten erfasst. In Deutschland genießen Kinder üblicherweise eine 
hohe Menge an psychologischer Autonomie. Dies bedeutet, dass das Bewusstsein über 
persönliche Wünsche und Überzeugungen in der Kindeserziehung stark verwurzelt ist. 
Weiterhin sind in Deutschland Lernumgebungen stark durch Erwachsene strukturiert, 
die Kindern Hilfestellungen geben und gezielte, pädagogisch-aufbereitete 
Information bereitstellen (Keller & Kärtner, 2013). Wie in vielen westlichen 
Populationen wird Kindheit hier typischerweise als eine Zeit verstanden, in der Kinder 
auf das Erwachsenenleben vorbereitet werden, anstatt darin selbst aktiv 
teilzunehmen (Morelli et al., 2003). Dementsprechend sind heutzutage Kinder aus 
westlichen Gesellschaften nur selten in elementare Aufgaben zum Lebensunterhalt 
oder im Haushalt eingebunden oder verantwortlich.  
Zudem wurden Hai||om-Kinder in Farm 6 und Ondera (Namibia) getestet. Ihre 
traditionelle Lebensweise als Jäger und Sammler, inklusive der typischen sozialen- 
und psychologischen Eigenheiten die typischerweise assoziiert mit dieser 
Lebensweise sind, charakterisieren die Hai||om als moderne Vertreter des 
Subsistenzsystems, welches die Spezies Mensch evolutionär am stärksten geprägt hat. 
Wie bei vielen anderen Jäger-Sammler-Kulturen genießt auch bei den Hai||om die 
Autonomie von Kindern eine enorme Wertschätzung (Widlok, 1999; Terashima & 
Hewlett, 2016). Für Hai||om-Kinder bieten Interaktionen mit Gleichaltrigen eine 
wichtige Umgebung zum sozialen Lernen. Im Vergleich zu westlichen Kulturen sind 
Lernumgebungen bei den Hai||om deutlich weniger aktiv von Eltern strukturiert oder 
vom Alltag separiert. Stattdessen lernen Kinder bevorzugt in alltäglichen Aktivitäten 
 
 
und nehmen aktiv an diesen Teil (Lew-Levy et al., 2017, 2019; Boyette & Hewlett, 
2017; Hewlett & Roulette, 2016).  
Als dritte Population nahmen Ovambo-Kinder aus Oshivelo (Namibia) an zwei 
von drei Studien dieser Dissertation teil. Die Kultur der Ovambo ist stark geprägt 
durch ihre traditionelle Lebensweise als Kleinbauern. Dies beinhaltet typische 
Erziehungsziele und -praktiken bezüglich sozialer Beziehungen und Gehorsamkeit 
gegenüber Autoritäten (Zimba & Otaala, 1993; Zimba, 2002; Barry et al., 1959). Bei 
den Ovambo werden Lernmöglichkeiten für Kinder typischerweise in den Alltag 
integriert. Pädagogische Interventionen, die speziell auf den Lernerfolg von Kindern 
hinzielen, nehmen im Vergleich zu westlichen Erziehungspraktiken einen deutlich 
geringeren Stellenwert ein.  
Ein wesentlicher Zusatz hierbei ist, dass die kulturspezifischen 
Sozialisationsziele und -praktiken in jeder der drei angeführten Populationen 
gleichermaßen als evolvierte und spezifische Adaptionen an die sozialen und 
ökologischen Bedingungen der jeweiligen Kultur zu verstehen sind. Kulturelle 
Abweichungen zwischen den Populationen sollten dementsprechend keinesfalls als 
Unterschiede bezüglich der Qualität oder Modernität der jeweiligen Populationen 
interpretiert werden. 
Innerhalb dieser Dissertation stelle ich drei kulturvergleichende Studien vor, in 
denen ich die soziale Motivation von Kinder durch deren Tendenz zur Überimitation 
von erwachsenen Modellen (Studie 1 sowie Studie 2) sowie durch deren Bereitschaft 
für kollaborative Interaktionen mit Gleichaltrigen (Studie 3) operationalisiert habe. 
 
 
Des Weiteren habe ich die sozial-kognitiven Fähigkeiten der Kinder durch eine Reihe 
von Theory of Mind-Aufgaben erfasst (Studie 3). 
Studie 1 — Beobachtung führt zu Überimitation in drei Populationen 
In der ersten Studie testete ich, ob (a) die Präsenz eines erwachsenen Modells das 
Auftreten von Überimitation bei Kindern aus verschiedenen Populationen 
gleichermaßen erhöhen würde, sowie ob (b) interindividuelle Unterschiede in 
Überimitation mit dem Re-engagement von Kollaborationspartnern zusammenhängt. 
Innerhalb der Studie wurden drei- bis achtjährige Kinder aus den drei 
Populationen (Deutschland, Hai||om, Ovambo) in je zwei Versionen eines 
Überimitationsparadigmas getestet. In der ersten Version drehte sich das Modell vom 
Kind weg nachdem es die kausal irrelevanten Aktionen gezeigt hatte. Die Kinder 
wurden daher nicht beobachtet während sie die Aktionen selbst nachahmen konnten 
(Bedingung ohne Beobachtung). In einer anderen Bedingung blieb das Modell 
anwesend und zugewandt während das Kind Gelegenheit hatte, das Model 
nachzuahmen (Bedingung mit Beobachtung). In der Re-engagement-Aufgabe 
interagierten Kind und Erwachsener zunächst in einer kollaborativen Aktivität (z.B., 
gemeinsames Bauen eines Holzturms). Plötzlich stoppte der Mitspieler während des 
Spiels, wonach hin die Versuche des Kindes zum Re-engagement des Mitspielers 
kodiert wurden. 
Kinder aus allen Populationen zeigten gleichermaßen mehr Überimitation in 
der Bedingung mit-, als in der Bedingung ohne Beobachtung des Modells. Außerdem 
zeigten die Kinder mit wachsendem Alter mehr Überimitation. Während diese 
 
 
Ergebnisse suggerieren, dass die soziale Funktion sowie die Entwicklungsverlauf von 
Überimitation möglicherweise universell sind, dokumentiert die erste Studie 
kulturübergreifende Differenzen in Überimitation: Deutsche Kinder zeigten mehr 
Überimitation als sowohl Hai||om- sowie Ovambo-Kinder. Gleichermaßen zeigten die 
deutschen Kinder auch mehr Re-engagement als die Hai||om und Ovambo, wobei 
beide Verhaltensweisen auf individueller Ebene nicht miteinander kovariierten.  
Studie 2 — Kulturelle Unterschiede in wie viel, aber nicht ob, Kinder überimitieren 
Um die Ergebnisse aus Studie 1 konzeptuell zu replizieren und zu ergänzen, erfasste 
ich in Studie 2 Überimitation bei Hai||om- sowie deutschen Kindern mit einem 
modifizierten Paradigma. In der Studie sahen drei- bis siebenjährige Kinder wie ein 
Modell Süßigkeiten nacheinander aus vier verschiedenen Kisten entnahm. Im 
Unterschied zu Studie 1 war das Modell ein einheimischer Erwachsener, der überdies 
dieses Mal deutlich einfachere und familiärere Behältnisse einführte um die 
kognitiven Anforderungen der Aufgabe bezüglich Aufmerksamkeit und 
Erinnerungsvermögen zu minimieren.  
Auch in dieser Studie zeigten die deutschen Kinder mehr Überimitation als die 
Hai||om. Interessanterweise waren jedoch der Anteil der Kinder, die keinerlei 
Überimitation zeigten, bei beiden Populationen fast identisch: Die Mehrheit der 
Kinder in beiden Populationen zeigte Überimitation bei zumindest einer der vier 





Studie 3 — Kollaboration und Theory of Mind in drei diversen Populationen 
Für die nächste Studie waren drei Ziele maßgebend: Zunächst wollte ich ermitteln, ob 
und wie Alter und kultureller Kontext sich auf die kindliche soziale Motivation für 
Kollaboration mit Gleichaltrigen auswirken. Um die Konstruktvalidität von sozialer 
Motivation näher zu beleuchten wollte ich zudem herausfinden, ob verschiede 
Komponenten dieser sozialen Motivation auf individueller Ebene zusammenhängen. 
Drittens wollte ich untersuchen, ob die Entwicklung von sozialer Motivation und 
sozialer Kognition auf individueller Ebene zusammenhängt, um die Struktur von 
Sozialität als solches zu erfassen. 
In der Studie spielten drei- bis achtjährige Kinder ein Spiel, in dem sie 
Belohnungen sowohl alleine, als auch via Kollaboration mit gleichaltrigen 
Spielpartnern gewinnen konnten. Nach einigen Durchgängen durften die Kinder noch 
einmal wählen, ob sie alleine oder zusammen mit dem gleichaltrigen Kind agieren 
wollten. Als erster Indikator von sozialer Motivation wurde der positive emotionale 
Ausdruck der Kinder während der ersten acht Durchgänge kodiert und separat für jede 
Bedingung gemittelt. Die Präferenzen für oder gegen Kollaboration im finalen 
Durchgang dienten als zweiter Indikator für soziale Motivation. Außerdem wurden die 
Kinder mit einer Reihe von Theory of Mind-Aufgaben getestet, um ihre sozial-
kognitiven Fertigkeiten zu ermitteln. 
Kinder jeden Alters und über alle getesteten Populationen hinweg zeigten 
positivere Emotionen, wenn sie gemeinsam mit den Mitspielern spielten als wenn sie 
alleine agierten. Diese Tendenz war am stärksten ausgeprägt bei den deutschen 
Kindern und am schwächsten bei den Hai||om, während die Werte der Ovambo-Kinder 
 
 
zwischen denen der anderen beiden Populationen lagen. Die deutsche Stichprobe war 
zudem die einzige, in der die Kinder mehrheitlich und über das gesamte 
Altersspektrum hinweg Kollaboration präferierten. Hai||om-Kinder jeden Alters 
zeigten dagegen eine Präferenz für die Solo-Option. Bei den Ovambo zeichnete sich 
ein Alterseffekt ab: Während jüngere Ovambo-Kinder Kollaboration präferierten, 
bevorzugten die älteren Kinder es, alleine zu agieren. Das Zeigen positiver Emotionen 
während Kollaboration konnte die Präferenzen der Kinder vorhersagen. Jedoch war 
dieser Zusammenhang nur bei jüngeren Kindern zu sehen, während beide Indikatoren 
von sozialer Motivation bei Kindern höheren Alters nicht kovariierten. Außerdem 
hingen auf individueller Ebene die positiven Emotionen im Kontext von Kollaboration 
mit der Performanz bei Theory of Mind-Aufgaben zusammen. 
Zusammengefasst lässt sich sagen, dass diese Ergebnisse sowohl kulturelle 
Variabilität in sozialer Motivation und sozialer Kognition, als auch 
kulturübergreifende Gemeinsamkeiten bezüglich beider Facetten von Sozialität 
zeigen. Während die Entwicklung von Sozialität demnach stark durch Kultur geprägt 
ist, scheinen manche Muster durchaus universell. Die Grundlagen für Sozialität 
werden in der frühen Kindheit und innerhalb sozialer Interaktionen gelegt. Soziale 
Motivation, soziale Kognition und Kultur prägen gemeinsam die Qualität und 
Quantität frühkindlicher sozialer Interaktionen. Dieses Zusammenspiel erlaubt es 
Kindern, alle essentiellen Fähigkeiten zu erlernen, die sie auf ihrem Weg ins 
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Compared to the physical, sensual, and even some cognitive abilities and capacities of 
other species, humans are not particularly impressive. Carnivores run, swim, or fly 
faster to catch their prey than we would ever be able to. Their sharp teeth and claws 
are deadly weapons, and they can digest a variety of food sources. Herbivores 
recognize olfactory and visual cues to track food from long distances. As a protection 
against predators, some of them grow big, run fast, and jump high. Others make use 
of shells, spikes, and poison to defend themselves. Some species can perceive 
sensations that we are not even aware of, such as ultrasonic echoes (e.g., bats), 
magnetism (e.g., birds), and pressure gradients (e.g., fish). Our nearest relatives, the 
chimpanzees, may even possess higher memory capacities (Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007) 
and cognitive flexibility than we do (Pope, Fagot, Meguerditchian, Watzek, et al., 2019; 
but see Pope, Fagot, Meguerditchian, Washburn, & Hopkins, 2019).  
In the light of these limitations and weaknesses, the ecological success of our 
species appears puzzling. Humans have managed to conquer and control the planet 
within just a few millennia of expansion. We divide the world up amongst ourselves, 
decide which species to rear and which to render extinct. It is needless to say that 
humans have developed extraordinarily abilities to do so—but which ones? 
One prominent idea to explain what makes us so peculiar is our reliance on 
social learning: Like no other species, we modify and optimize our behaviors and 
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thoughts through social interaction with and observation of others (Boyd, Richerson, 
& Henrich, 2011; Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Henrich, 2015). Social learning helps us to 
circumvent the costs and risks of individual learning and allows us to rapidly adapt to 
almost any change in the environment. We do not need to run like cheetahs or gazelles 
in order to reach our destination on time—we have invented cars and bicycles 
generations ago and make use of these tools today. We do not need sharp teeth and 
claws to get sated—we invented guns, knives, and traps instead. We do not need to 
track fruit or vegetables in the wild—we cultivate them in gardens and fields or 
purchase them at the grocery store. It is not only “cold” cognition that enables our 
species’ ecological success. No individual could ever come up with all these skills and 
innovations just by herself (Henrich, 2015). We rely on learning from others—we 
share, use, refine, and rely on social information every day. Other animals may be 
experts in running and killing, but humans are experts in using, sharing, and 
accumulating information gained through social interactions. As such, our species’ 
success depends on the motivational and social-cognitive dispositions that set the 
stage for social interactions and social learning (Boyd et al., 2011; Henrich, 2015; 
Heyes, 2012; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Sociality, defined as the tendency to 
engage in and benefit from social interactions with others, constitutes what makes 
humans outliers when compared to other species. 
Numerous psychological phenomena and behavioral dispositions have been 
discussed as manifestations of uniquely-human sociality: We form joint goals with 
others and pursue them through cooperative efforts (Alcalá, Rogoff, & López Fraire, 
2018; Tomasello, 2019; Tomasello & Hamann, 2012). We understand and predict 
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others’ behaviors based on their mental states and use this ability to coordinate our 
actions with them (Herrmann et al., 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005; Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). We are not just social, but genuinely prosocial 
such that we care about others’ needs and well-being (Hepach & Warneken, 2018; 
Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). We share information with others through 
communication (Astington & Baird, 2005; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008; 
Sperber et al., 2010) and anticipate if information can be taken for granted or if we 
should be skeptical instead (Koenig & Harris, 2005; Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Mascaro 
& Sperber, 2009; Sperber et al., 2010). We build long-lasting relationships (Engelmann 
& Rapp, 2018; Over, 2016) and are loyal to people with whom we are affiliated with 
(Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2016). We adhere to social norms (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 
2013; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008) and conform to the behaviors of those 
around us (Asch, 1956; Bond & Smith, 1996; Haun & Tomasello, 2011).  
To fully understand human sociality, it is not sufficient to consider each of 
these phenomena independently. Instead, it is important to assess whether they are 
rooted in similar motivations and cognitive abilities that, on a conceptual level, form 
the foundations of sociality. To fully understand the conceptual homogeneity of these 
phenomena, the combination of comparative, developmental, and cross-cultural 
perspectives presents a promising avenue (Liebal & Haun, 2018; Nielsen & Haun, 
2016). Furthermore, doing so allows to balance the limitations while utilizing the 
strengths of each perspective in parallel. 
Comparative perspectives are of interest because they help us to gather insights 
on whether and how human psychology differs from that of other species. Doing so is 
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inevitable for understanding the evolutionary roots of our psychology and behavior 
(Liebal & Haun, 2012; MacLean et al., 2012; Rosati & Warneken, 2016; Whiten & 
Watson, 2018). Sociality has been ascribed the role of a fundamental fitness trait 
among primates in general (Amici & Widdig, 2019), as it can generate benefits for the 
survival of each individual by mutual cooperation. Comparative perspectives on 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (Pan paniscus) are of particular interest 
given that these species are our nearest relatives among the great ape lineage. In this 
dissertation, I will mainly focus on the differences and commonalities between 
humans and chimpanzees since comparative research on bonobos is far from 
comprehensive. Whenever such information is available, I will also summarize 
evidence on sociality among bonobos.  
One central differences between humans and other primate species is that 
human ontogeny is characterized by an extraordinarily prolonged period of time in 
which, before reaching sexual maturity, young individuals are still taken care of by 
their social group—childhood (Bogin & Smith, 1996). The adaptive value of childhood 
is that it allows children to develop and acquire an immense amount of skills and 
behaviors that will later be needed in their adult lives (Bogin, 1997; Kuzawa et al., 
2014). Second, I will thus focus on how human psychology develops throughout 
childhood. Developmental approaches provide us with valuable information on this 
period by describing how physical maturation and socio-cultural input together shape 
human behaviors (Bjorklund, 2018; Bjorklund & Blasi, 2015; Legare, 2017; Legare, 
Clegg, & Wen, 2018; Liebal & Haun, 2018). Given that the vast majority of 
developmental research stems from investigations of participants from Western, 
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industrialized populations (Nielsen et al., 2017), I will first focus on evidence gained 
from such populations when discussing the ontogeny of sociality in children. 
To balance out this shortcoming while introducing a third perspective on 
sociality, I will then describe cross-cultural evidence on whether and how young 
children’s sociality varies systematically across populations. The ecological and social 
environments in which children grow up are extremely diverse. Instead of merely 
adopting our genes to those circumstances, we depend on cultural input from early 
on. As a consequence, human psychology and behavior varies systematically across 
individuals and populations, rendering generalizations outside the investigated 
populations insufficient, if not inadequate (Henrich, 2015). The examination of the 
differences and similarities of cultural contexts is essential for creating valid and 
generalizable conclusions about human psychology (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010; Jones, 2010; Rad, Martingano, & Ginges, 2018). Only recently have researchers 
started to systematically assess whether the ontogeny of sociality follows comparable 
trajectories across human populations (Nielsen & Haun, 2016; Amici & Widdig, 2019; 
but see Madsen, 1971). 
Describing cultural heterogeneity in human psychology is not just important 
to account for variation in psychology and behavior. Variation is not some 
unsystematic noise that needs to be controlled for by applying methodological rigor 
or testing larger samples. Instead, culture itself is a defining characteristic of our 
species and the result of evolutionary processes (Henrich, 2015; Heyes, 2019). It is thus 
not just the detection of universal or variable patterns in psychology and behavior that 
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is needed for a comprehensive understanding of what defines our species, but also the 
assessment of how culture interacts with how we think, perceive, and behave. 
Importantly, neither of these approaches fully captures the peculiarities of 
human sociality. A combination of comparative, developmental, and cross-cultural 
perspectives is needed to fully understand the motivations and skills enabling social 
interactions (Liebal & Haun, 2012, 2018; Nielsen & Haun, 2016; Nielsen et al., 2017). 
In the following sections, I will focus on three phenomena that have previously 
been discussed as hallmarks of human sociality. First, I will discuss the role of 
imitation on shaping social interactions (Heyes, 2016; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; 
Meltzoff, 1988; Nielsen, 2012; Tomasello et al., 1993). In particular, I will focus on the 
exact imitation of visibly irrelevant behaviors, a tendency which has been coined 
overimitation (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007; see also Horner & Whiten, 2005; Hoehl et 
al., 2019). Second, I will discuss the role of cooperation and collaboration in human 
psychology (Melis & Semmann, 2010; Melis & Warneken, 2016; Tomasello, 2009). 
While cooperation refers to all behaviors that aim to benefit others (Melis & 
Semmann, 2010), those actions in which two or more individuals jointly work toward 
a shared goal will henceforth be labelled collaboration (Tomasello & Hamann, 2012). 
Collaboration is especially relevant for the purpose of this dissertation as it requires 
social partners to voluntarily share their attentional focus, which has previously been 
interpreted as a hallmark of human sociality (Tomasello et al., 2005). Third, I will focus 
on our understanding of others as mental agents who act in accordance to their 
beliefs, desires, and emotions. This Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) has 
long been described as a defining trait of our species (see also Call & Tomasello, 2008).  
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For each phenomenon, I will first describe its significance in scientific debates 
in both evolutionary psychology and anthropology. Second, I will summarize current 
knowledge from comparative psychology on whether and how humans differ from 
non-human great apes regarding the respective phenomenon. Third, I will discuss how 
each phenomenon emerges throughout early ontogeny and how it relates to other 
developmental milestones both concurrently and longitudinally. Next, I will describe 
evidence on cross-cultural variability and homogeneity regarding each phenomenon. 
In the remaining chapters of this introduction, I will then discuss possible links 
between overimitation, collaboration, and Theory of Mind, before drawing 
conclusions on the motivational and cognitive underpinnings of the three 
phenomena. 
Overimitation 
Imitation, defined as the exact copying of others’ behaviors, is ubiquitous in human 
social learning. Engaging in imitation allows individuals to avoid the costs and 
dangers of trial-and-error learning or innovation. Instead, copying a model enables 
the imitator to directly benefit from others’ skills. Imitation has been ascribed a 
central role in the accumulation of cultural knowledge (Legare & Nielsen, 2015; 
Whiten, 2019). Our proclivity to imitate others in order to learn about the world 
becomes obvious when looking at our tendency to overimitate others by copying even 
actions that are clearly causally irrelevant (Lyons et al., 2007; see also Horner & 
Whiten, 2005). Overimitation has been hypothesized as a particularly important 
mechanism for human-unique forms of social learning, which is why the focus of this 
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dissertation will primarily be on the ontogeny of overimitation. Since overimitation 
can be considered a special case of imitation due to its reliance on exact copying, I will 
mention studies on imitation whenever corresponding conclusions can apply to 
overimitation as well. Overimitation stands in opposition to emulation, which is 
defined as the copying of the outcome (as opposed to the means) of others’ goal-
directed actions (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & 
Hopper, 2009). 
In the large repertoire of social learning strategies that humans possess, 
imitation is arguably the most puzzling one. At first glance, copying others’ actions 
may fall behind other social learning strategies with regards to efficiency. Yet, it can 
serve as a powerful function to acquire complex skills (Heyes, 2012a, 2013, 2016; 
Legare & Nielsen, 2015) and may thus support the accumulation of cultural 
information with small error rates. A behavioral tendency to overimitate has thus the 
potential to boost social learning of culturally-specific but functionally opaque 
behaviors (e.g., rituals and conventions), which may guarantee the transmission of 
such information within and across generations. 
In addition, imitation (and overimitation in particular) can serve a social 
function between individuals and has thus been discussed as a “social glue” of cultural 
learning (Nielsen, 2018; see also Užgiris, 1981; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Over & 
Carpenter, 2013). The exact imitation of even causally irrelevant actions can present 
a communicative signal to display affiliation with the model. Overimitation is thus 
not only a mechanism for social learning, but also a tool for establishing and 
maintaining social interactions.  
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Overimitation Across Species 
There has been a long debate on whether and how chimpanzees learn through 
imitation. Some studies have identified imitation of facial movements in neonatal 
chimpanzees (Bard, 2007; Myowa-Yamakoshi, Tomonaga, Tanaka, & Matsuzawa, 
2004). Together with documentations of imitation among both wild (Hobaiter & 
Byrne, 2010) and human-raised chimpanzees (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2007; Horner & Whiten, 2005), these observations suggest that imitation 
may be an innate mechanism with deep phylogenetic roots. However, when being 
confronted with novel behaviors, it appears that imitation is only one amongst several 
strategies of social learning that chimpanzees use and that emulation is typically 
preferred when choosing how to learn from others (Call, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2005; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2006). With regard to overimitation, current evidence 
suggests that neither chimpanzees (Horner & Whiten, 2005) nor bonobos (Clay & 
Tennie, 2018) imitate causally irrelevant actions as soon as they are aware of more 
efficient means to reach a goal.  
The Ontogeny of Overimitation 
The foundations for (over)imitation are laid early in human ontogeny. Some 
researchers have even argued that children are born with an innate instinct to imitate 
others’ actions (Meltzoff, 1988; Meltzoff et al., 2018). However, this assumption has 
been challenged by studies failing to replicate such findings in larger samples 
(Oostenbroek et al., 2016; see also Heyes, 2016) or failing to find long-term 
consequences of interindividual variation in neonatal imitation (Redshaw et al., 2019). 
Others found parenting practices to predict imitative behaviors among one-year-old 
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infants, suggesting that the behavior responds to social input from early on (de Klerk, 
Lamy-Yang, & Southgate, 2019). Regardless of whether scientists hypothesize 
imitation to be innate or learned socially, there is an overarching consensus among 
developmental psychologists with regard to the pervasiveness and importance of 
imitation for social learning in early childhood (Heyes, 2012a; Legare & Nielsen, 
2015).  
The developmental onset of overimitation is located around children’s second 
year of life (Nielsen, 2006). From this age onwards, the behavior becomes more 
frequent well into adulthood (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; Whiten, Allan, 
et al., 2016), while interindividual differences in overimitation appear 
developmentally stable and robust (Yu & Kushnir, 2019). Given the absence of 
overimitation among chimpanzees and bonobos, its potential role in human ontogeny 
has been discussed intensively. Overimitation may serve the transmission and 
manifestation of group-specific behaviors, such as rituals and other conventions 
(Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009; 
Whiten, Caldwell, & Mesoudi, 2016). As a consequence, overimitation has been 
ascribed an important function in our propensity to accumulate cultural knowledge 
across generations (Heyes, 2012a; Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Nielsen, 2018).  
Given that children are unlikely to be aware of these implications, the question 
arises why children show overimitation even in situations in which emulation would 
be more efficient. Two main accounts have been put forward to explain the early 
occurrence of overimitation in young children. First, overimitation may be a mere by-
product of children’s lack of causal understanding necessary to determine and skip 
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irrelevant actions. According to this cognitive account (Lyons et al., 2007), 
overimitation is a manifestations of a human-specific tendency to perceive 
intentionally communicated information as causally relevant (see also Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009).  
A second account emphasizes the social function of overimitation as an 
affiliative signal in interpersonal contexts. This social account (Nielsen, 2008; Over & 
Carpenter, 2012, 2013) assumes a specific motivation to interact and affiliate with 
others as a driving force behind overimitation. Overimitation allows individuals to 
display affiliation and similarity to the model. In support of this account, children 
imitate others’ actions more precisely in the presence of the model (Marsh, Ropar, & 
Hamilton, 2014; Nielsen & Blank, 2011) and after being primed with social exclusion 
(Over & Carpenter, 2009; Watson-Jones, Whitehouse, & Legare, 2016).  
Importantly, the two accounts do not stand in strict opposition to each other. 
Instead, it is most plausible that a combination of both social and cognitive factors 
constitutes whether and how much children overimitate (Over & Carpenter, 2012, 
2013; Schleihauf, Graetz, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2017). However, recent research suggests 
that the social function of overimitation becomes increasingly important with age 
(Clay, Over, & Tennie, 2018; Gellén & Buttelmann, 2019).  
 Overimitation Across Cultures 
Given that imitation has been interpreted as a driver of the accumulation of cultural 
information, it is not surprising that this form of social learning has been discussed 
with regards to its ontogeny across populations (Legare, 2017; Legare & Nielsen, 
2015). Among Aka hunter-gatherer children from central Africa, imitation is 
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particularly important for acquiring novel skills in children’s first years of life (Salali 
et al., 2019). Up from middle childhood, Aka children predominantly learn from peers 
through play. While these results highlight ontogenetic variation in children’s 
tendency to imitate others, they also highlight the importance of imitation as a cross-
culturally recurrent driver of social learning in young children (Hewlett, Fouts, 
Boyette, & Hewlett, 2011; Terashima & Hewlett, 2016). 
To which extent the same applies for the development of overimitation is much 
more controversial (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Clegg & Legare, 2016; DiYanni, Corriveau, 
Kurkul, Nasrini, & Nini, 2015; Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli, & Whiten, 2014, 2016; 
Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Nielsen and Tomaselli (2010) documented comparable 
levels of overimitation among urban Australian children and children from recent 
hunter-gatherer populations in South Africa, the Khwe and the !Xun/!Kung. Further 
studies replicated and extended these findings, documenting comparable levels of 
overimitation among children from Australian aboriginal communities as well as 
other non-Western, traditional populations (Nielsen et al., 2014, 2016; Nielsen, 
Tomaselli, & Kapitány, 2018). A key message to conclude from these studies is that 
the function of overimitation is that of a “social glue” that contributes to social 
learning of cultural, ritual-like behaviors across a wide range of cultural contexts 
(Nielsen, 2018; see also Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Nielsen & Haun, 2016; Nielsen & 
Tomaselli, 2010). 
Claims on the universality of overimitation have only been challenged recently 
by studies documenting systematic variation in overimitation across populations. Berl 
and Hewlett (2015) found almost no overimitation among Aka hunter-gatherer 
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children from the Central African Republic. Their behaviors differed strongly from 
those of neighboring horticulturalist children who overimitated an adult model with 
much higher fidelity. In contrast to Aka children, Aka adults overimitated the model 
at much higher rates. While documenting that overimitation is within the behavioral 
repertoire of the Aka, this study was the first to report cross-cultural variability in the 
early ontogeny of overimitation.  
Clegg and Legare (2016) were among the first to study how social contexts 
affect overimitation in diverse populations. In their study, children from urban U.S. 
and Ni-Van children from rural Tanna (Vanuatu) observed an adult modelling actions 
by either framing these normatively (e.g., using normative instructions referring to 
group norms) or instrumentally (e.g., highlighting the instrumental goal of one’s 
actions). In the normative condition, children from both populations showed high 
rates of overimitation. When the imitation task was framed instrumentally, however, 
Ni-Van children imitated at higher rates than their U.S. counterparts. The researchers 
explain this finding with reference to conformist values that are emphasized in Ni-
Van socialization goals. Therefore, these children may have perceived the 
instrumental instruction as a normative request for imitation, whereas the same 
framing may have led children from the more independent U.S. to skip irrelevant 
actions.  
In another study, DiYanni and colleagues (2015) confronted children from 
either European-American or Chinese-American backgrounds with two versions of an 
overimitation task. While children from both groups imitated at comparable rates 
when the actions were modelled by one single adult, the two populations diverged 
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when being confronted with a group of multiple adult models. In the latter scenario, 
Chinese-American children were more likely to overimitate than their European-
American counterparts. DiYanni and her colleagues explained this effect with regard 
to the cultural emphasis on conformity and obedience among Chinese-American 
participants. The emphasis on independency and autonomy among the European-
Americans may, in contrast, have led to lower overimitation in this condition.  
Critically, the psychological mechanisms underlying cross-cultural variation in 
children’s overimitation are still discussed. Cognitive accounts may explain this 
variation with reference to cultural differences in children’s capacity to differentiate 
between irrelevant and relevant actions. However, two findings challenge this 
hypothesis: First, after observing a model manipulating toys, 18-month-olds’ from 
urban Germany imitate more actions than same-aged infants from rural Cameroon, 
even if these actions are functional (Borchert, Lamm, Graf, & Knopf, 2013). It is thus 
unlikely that the lower levels of imitation outside Western contexts stem from a better 
causal understanding in those communities. Second, the occurrence of overimitation 
among Aka adults, but not children, indicates that cognitive maturation leads to 
higher, rather than lower rates of overimitation (Berl & Hewlett, 2015).  
Instead, it seems more plausible that the social context in which overimitation 
is typically assessed selectively facilitates the use of overimitation among children 
from Western populations and those from cultural contexts emphasizing obedience 
and conformity. In Western contexts, dyadic and child-centered pedagogy is 
commonly used to scaffold social learning. Western children learn that overimitation 
results in positive outcomes, such as affiliation and praise by adults. In populations 
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emphasizing obedience and conformity, overimitation may be used to display 
similarity and respect to the model while avoiding innovations. In populations in 
which children’s autonomy in social learning is more emphasized, their reliance on 
overimitation may be markedly lower due to a more flexible selection of social 
learning strategies (Berl & Hewlett, 2015).  
In sum, overimitation appears to be a pervasive strategy for social learning that 
is rooted early in ontogeny and increases with age. Even though chimpanzees and 
bonobos share the cognitive capacities needed for imitation, they do so only if there 
is no easier solution available. Evidence from cross-cultural studies highlights the 
importance of culture on shaping if, at which age, and under which conditions children 
overimitate. An interplay of cultural emphasizes on obedience, autonomy, and direct 
pedagogy may affect the emergence of and reliance on overimitation in young 
children. 
Collaboration 
While overimitation provides us with a useful mechanism for social learning, 
collaboration has also been identified as a key constituent of the acquisition and 
transmission of cultural information (Tomasello, 2016). Our propensity to cooperate 
and collaborate with others enables us to create payoffs we could never attain 
individually. Collaboration is so ubiquitous among humans that it has often been 
considered a universal cornerstone of sociality (Apicella & Silk, 2019; McLoone & 
Smead, 2014; Melis & Semmann, 2010; Melis & Warneken, 2016; Tomasello, 2009; 
Tomasello & Hamann, 2012).  
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With collaboration, I will henceforth refer to social interactions in which two 
or more partners work jointly and interdependently toward a shared goal. 
Collaboration can thus be considered a special case of cooperation, which is broadly 
defined as all behaviors aiming to benefit others (Melis & Semmann, 2010). The focus 
of this dissertation will primarily be on collaboration because of the necessity to 
coordinate actions with collaborative partners both behaviorally and psychologically. 
I will, however, also include evidence based on studies assessing cooperation 
whenever such information adds to our understanding of collaboration. 
Collaboration Across Species 
The evolutionary roots of cooperation and collaboration dig deep. A wide range of 
species, including elephants (Plotnik, Lair, Suphachoksahakun, & de Waal, 2011), 
spotted hyenas (Drea & Carter, 2009), dolphins (Kuczaj, Winship, & Eskelinen, 2015), 
and keas (Heaney, Gray, & Taylor, 2017), are capable of collaborating with conspecifics 
under experimental conditions (see also Pitman & Durban, 2012, for observational 
evidence on collaborative hunting techniques in killer whales). It is thus not surprising 
that collaboration has also been observed among non-human great apes (Bullinger, 
Melis, & Tomasello, 2011; Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Rekers, Haun, & Tomasello, 2011; 
Rosati, DiNicola, & Buckholtz, 2018). Wild living chimpanzees engage in collaborative 
hunting to chase prey (Boesch & Boesch, 1989) and they build coalitions to defend 
themselves against aggressors (Newton-Fisher, 2006). Experimental studies have 
revealed that chimpanzees also collaborate with conspecifics in controlled, lab-based 
setups (Bullinger et al., 2011; Hirata & Fuwa, 2007; Rekers et al., 2011). Chimpanzees 
recruit and invest in collaborators depending on the necessity of collaboration for 
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obtaining a reward and based on whether the collaborator is capable of fulfilling his 
or her role in the joint enterprise (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006).  
It is thus without much doubt that our nearest relatives are capable of 
collaboration. However, chimpanzee’s collaboration is fragile. For example, low levels 
of social tolerance among chimpanzees can impede collaboration, especially with 
regard to hierarchy-based conflicts between conspecifics (Hare, Melis, Woods, 
Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007; Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006). Interestingly, bonobos 
perform better (though not at ceiling) in such tasks due to their heightened social 
tolerance and egalitarian group structures (Hare et al., 2007). In line with these 
findings, interindividual differences in chimpanzees’ social tolerance predict whether 
they are able to establish mutual cooperation with social partners (Melis et al., 2006). 
Interestingly, chimpanzees are more likely to collaborate with conspecifics if doing so 
leads to higher yields for both contributors (Bullinger et al., 2011; Rekers et al., 2011). 
Without fair payoffs being ensured for either interactant, dominant individuals 
typically start monopolizing the spoils instead of sharing them with their 
collaborative partner (John, Duguid, Tomasello, & Melis, 2019). As a consequence, the 
collaborative partner typically loses interest and the collaborative activity is not 
continued (Melis et al., 2006).  
In sum, it appears that the cognitive foundations for collaboration are present 
among both chimpanzees and bonobos. However, collaboration is fragile and 
restricted by situational constraints, such as whether resources can be monopolized 
or whether collaborators are socially tolerant with one another. 
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The Ontogeny of Collaboration 
Children start to engage in collaborative interactions with adults between their first 
and second year of life (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006). At this age, collaborative 
activities are often structured and supervised by adult caregivers. With increasing age, 
children become more autonomous in their collaborative activities. Up from their 
second year of life, children are capable of engaging in dyadic collaboration with peers 
without external supervision (Brownell, Ramani, & Zerwas, 2006). From now on, they 
start forming joint commitments, coordinate actions, and switch roles flexibly to 
guarantee stable and beneficial instances of collaboration with both peers and adults 
(Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello & Hamann, 2012).  
This evidence illustrates that the cognitive milestones necessary for 
collaboration are already present at around two to three years of age. Importantly, 
children are also motivated to engage in collaborative activities from early on. When 
an adult stops participating in a reciprocal task, 18-months-olds wait and try to 
reengage their interactant until the joint activity is continued (Warneken et al., 2006). 
Notably, such reengagement behaviors occur regardless of whether children could 
principally complete the task at hand with or without the support of their co-player 
(Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Warneken, Gräfenhain, & 
Tomasello, 2012).  
Peer collaboration seems to be rewarding as well: When given the choice to 
obtain a reward either alone or together with a peer, three-year-old children prefer to 
collaborate (Rekers et al., 2011). Even the mere opportunity to collaborate with a peer 
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increases children’s persistence in and liking of tasks (Butler & Walton, 2013; Master, 
Butler, & Walton, 2017). 
Collaboration Across Cultures 
Cross-cultural evidence on children’s collaboration is sparse. Some studies suggest 
that children from diverse populations are capable and motivated to collaborate with 
both adults (Callaghan et al., 2011) and peers (Alcalá et al., 2018; Corbit, McAuliffe, 
Callaghan, Blake, & Warneken, 2017; Correa-Chávez & Rogoff, 2009; Mejía-Arauz, 
Rogoff, Dexter, & Najafi, 2007). However, this does not mean that their tendency to 
collaborate is not shaped by cultural context. In a classic study, dyads of urban U.S. 
children showed difficulties to agree on collaborative strategies in order to solve a 
social dilemma with their interactant. Rural Mexican children, in contrast, were better 
at finding collaborative strategies to solve the dilemma for mutual benefit (Madsen, 
1971; see also Mejía-Arauz et al., 2007). It thus seems that culture “impact[s] the 
degree of collaborative tendencies, but not their presence” (Slocombe & Seed, 2019, 
p. R473). 
In sum, the foundations for children’s collaboration with peers and adults are 
laid early in ontogeny. In Western populations, collaboration first emerges under adult 
supervision. Even though the ontogeny of collaboration among non-Western 
populations remains largely unknown, some studies indicate that culture may shape 




Theory of Mind 
Given the ubiquity of social interactions across human societies, understanding and 
predicting the behaviors of social partners can be of utmost value. A powerful tool in 
this regard is to ascribe the same cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes 
that guide our own behaviors to others. This Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978) is crucial for almost any aspect of social interactions and social functioning. It 
allows us to predict others’ behaviors and to coordinate with them efficiently 
(Grueneisen, Wyman, & Tomasello, 2015). Theory of Mind supports the acquisition of 
language (Astington, 2006; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007) and is an ontogenetic 
driver of moral reasoning based on intentions (Lane, Wellman, Olson, LaBounty, & 
Kerr, 2010). It is a central constituent of cultural learning (Tomasello et al., 1993), 
selective trust (Brosseau-Liard, Penney, & Poulin-Dubois, 2015; DiYanni et al., 2012; 
Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; Vanderbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 2011) and deceptive 
communication (Ding, Wellman, Wang, Fu, & Lee, 2015). Thus, Theory of Mind is 
ubiquitous in almost any aspect of social interactions. 
Theory of Mind Across Species 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked the seminal question whether chimpanzees 
would understand their conspecifics by utilizing a Theory of Mind. Since then, this 
question has led to numerous studies investigating the social-cognitive abilities of 
humans and other species, including non-human great apes (see Call & Tomasello, 
2008; Krupenye & Call, 2019, for reviews). Initially, comparative studies yielded little 
evidence for such skills outside the Homo lineage (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Krachun, 
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Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). Chimpanzees seem to lack the social-cognitive 
skills needed to theorize about the mental states of others (Herrmann et al., 2007).  
However, recent research has challenged these findings. Chimpanzees 
understand the goals and intentions underlying their conspecifics’ behaviors 
(Buttelmann et al., 2007; Myowa-Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa, 2000). They are able to 
consider others’ knowledge states in order to either coordinate with them 
(Grueneisen, Duguid, Saur, & Tomasello, 2017) or to deceive them (Hare, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2006). According to a recent study, chimpanzees may even be capable of 
using (implicit) false-belief reasoning to predict others’ behaviors (Krupenye, Kano, 
Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2016; Buttelmann, Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2017; but see Call & Tomasello, 1999; Krachun, Carpenter, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2009). 
One potential cause of the inconsistent evidence regarding Theory of Mind in 
chimpanzees concerns the social context in which the phenomenon is typically 
assessed. Competitive contexts have been argued to be more ecologically valid for 
assessing Theory of Mind in chimpanzees given that social interactions with 
conspecifics typically imply competition about resources (Grueneisen et al., 2017; 
Lyons & Santos, 2006). If so, chimpanzees may be more motivated to mentalize 
selectively during competitive interactions, whereas they may be less inclined to do 
so during cooperative endeavors.  
The Ontogeny of Theory of Mind  
Young children’s Theory of Mind emerges within social interactions (Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2004), leading to distinct developmental trajectories in the acquisition of 
 
 22 
Theory of Mind (Wellman & Liu, 2004). In their first year of life, infants already 
understand that agents act based on their personal goals (Woodward, 1998). During 
their second year of life, toddlers consider common ground and shared experiences in 
interpreting others’ behaviors (Moll & Kadipasaoglu, 2013; Moll & Tomasello, 2007). 
At the same age, they are able to engage in visual perspective taking (Sodian, 
Thoermer, & Metz, 2007) and understand that others have desires that may differ from 
their own ones (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). Until five years of age, they typically 
master other social-cognitive milestones, such as understanding that others may have 
different beliefs than themselves, that knowledge depends on access to information, 
and that others act according to the beliefs they have about the world even though 
these beliefs may be objectively false (Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Between five to seven years of age, they start to understand deception (Mascaro & 
Sperber, 2009; Stengelin, Grueneisen, & Tomasello, 2018) and make use of higher-
order, recursive mindreading skills (Grueneisen et al., 2015; Miller, 2009).  
From infancy to late childhood, Theory of Mind undergoes a constant 
refinement. Recent research, however, has raised doubt on the importance of 
ontogeny in shaping young children’s Theory of Mind. Building upon novel paradigms, 
some researchers have pointed out that the fundamental abilities of mindreading are 
already evident during infancy, suggesting an early emerging and potentially innate 
understanding of others’ behaviors based on implicit mentalistic reasoning 
(Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott, 
Baillargeon, Song, & Leslie, 2010; Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010; see 
Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; for a review). However, theories claiming such an 
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innate predisposition for Theory of Mind have been challenged both theoretically and 
empirically. First, failed replication attempts have taken the existence of such implicit 
mindreading abilities beyond publication biases into question (Poulin-Dubois et al., 
2018; Sabbagh & Paulus, 2018). Second, claims on the existence of mindreading skills 
in infants do not prove that such abilities are necessarily innate. Both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal studies have shown that Theory of Mind does not emerge in isolation. 
For example, attending to and engaging in social interactions facilitate children’s 
reasoning in both implicit false-belief tasks (Burnside, Wright, & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; 
Roby & Scott, 2016) as well as in explicit tasks on false belief and other indicators of 
Theory of Mind (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Charman et al., 2000; Nelson, Adamson, 
& Bakeman, 2008). Parental interaction styles and conversations about mental states 
have been shown to precede and shape children’s Theory of Mind at later ages 
(Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). 
Theory of Mind shows developmental continuity in that certain milestones 
precede others at later ages. For example, attention to goal directed action in infants 
predicts their mastery of explicit false-belief tasks at later ages (Aschersleben, Hofer, 
& Jovanovic, 2008; Brink, Lane, & Wellman, 2015). The same applies to children’s 
ability to understand others’ visual perspectives, which precedes the explicit 
understanding of false-beliefs at four years of age (Yeung, Müller, & Carpendale, 
2019).  
Regardless of whether some abilities linked to Theory of Mind are innate or not, 
there is not much doubt that social experience plays a central role in the ontogeny of 
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Theory of Mind. Like any other theory, Theory of Mind requires data-driven validation 
and is thus necessarily founded within social interactions.  
Theory of Mind Across Cultures 
In line with this overwhelming evidence for the emergence of Theory of Mind in 
children from Western, industrialized populations, some studies yielded little 
variation in Theory of Mind across populations (Avis & Harris, 1991; Barrett et al., 
2013; Liu, Wellman, Tardif, & Sabbagh, 2008; Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 
2004; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, recent studies have challenged this 
perspective markedly. 
First, researchers have documented that even though some skills linked to 
Theory of Mind may be culturally recurrent, the developmental onsets and trajectories 
of these skills may differ across cultural contexts (Kuntoro, Saraswati, Peterson, & 
Slaughter, 2013; Liu et al., 2008; Shahaeian, 2015; Shahaeian, Nielsen, Peterson, 
Aboutalebi, & Slaughter, 2014; Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011). 
Others have highlighted even more substantial variation regarding children’s Theory 
of Mind (Dixson, Komugabe-Dixson, Dixson, & Low, 2017; Mayer & Träuble, 2015, 
2013). In the pacific archipelago of Samoa, for example, children hardly pass false-
belief tasks until they reach ten years of age (Mayer & Träuble, 2015, 2013). 
Accordingly, it appears that the ontogeny of Theory of Mind relies on whether or not 
such reasoning is considered appropriate and on the degree to which mental states 
are considered the major determinants of behavior (as opposed to, for example, faith; 
Dixson et al., 2017; McNamara, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2019).  
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In sum, children across a broad range of cultural contexts develop a thorough 
understanding of others’ minds throughout middle childhood. This does not mean 
that the ontogeny of Theory of Mind is not shaped by cultural input. Instead, children 
(and chimpanzees) learn to understand and predict others’ thoughts and behaviors 
gradually and mediated by social interactions. Given the importance of culture on 
shaping the quality and quantity of young children’s social interactions (Keller, 2007; 
Rogoff, 2003), the cultural nature of Theory of Mind becomes ever more evident. 
Shared Roots of Sociality 
Taken together, evidence gained from comparative, developmental, and cross-cultural 
psychology suggests that neither are children “ultra-social” (Tomasello, 2014) from 
birth, nor are overimitation, collaboration, and Theory of Mind necessarily unique to 
our species. All three phenomena emerge during early childhood and require social 
input to reach levels that we perceive as uniquely human. This leads to systematic 
variation in the ontogeny of each phenomenon in children across populations.  
Given the importance of overimitation, collaboration, and Theory of Mind as 
key manifestations of human sociality, the question arises whether their ontogeny is 
actuated by similar mechanisms. In the following sections, I will review current 
evidence on potential links between these phenomena in young children. This 
includes both empirical investigations, as well as theoretical arguments on the 
interplay of overimitation, collaboration, and Theory of Mind. Since direct empirical 
evidence is sparse, I will also mention indirect evidence taken from other scientific 
fields, such as clinical psychology.  
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As described above, some researchers have argued that collaborative 
interactions provide an ideal learning ground for Theory of Mind-related skills to 
emerge because of their demands on mental coordination and behavioral 
interdependency (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & 
Schultz, 2012; Tomasello, 2018). This especially applies for peer collaboration given 
that such contexts demand higher coordinative skills than those under adult 
supervision (Brownell et al., 2006). This suggested link is supported by empirical data. 
Infants’ understanding of others’ intentions is linked to their affiliative behaviors 
during peer cooperation (Hunnius, Bekkering, & Cillessen, 2009).  
Such affiliative behaviors may, on the other hand, also be determined by the 
success of previous encounters with the interactant. Children collaborate more 
frequently with their peers after experiencing positive emotions during prior social 
interactions with them (Endedijk, Cillessen, Cox, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2015; 
Schuhmacher & Kärtner, 2015). As such, these studies do not imply that the link 
between collaboration and Theory of Mind is necessarily monocausal. While 
collaboration may foster Theory of Mind by providing children with social experience 
needed to refine their social-cognitive abilities, sophisticated mindreading skills may 
also guarantee and reward successful collaboration. This, in consequence, may lead 
individuals with higher Theory of Mind skills to selectively prefer collaborative 
interactions. 
Imitation and Theory of Mind have also been linked theoretically. For example, 
it has been argued that infant imitation is both an early precursor and a mechanism 
for children’s acquisition of Theory of Mind (Meltzoff, 2007, 2010; Meltzoff & Decety, 
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2003). Accordingly, children learn to distinguish themselves from others through 
imitation before using this distinction to predict others’ behaviors via mental state 
reasoning. Hence, imitation may equip children with necessary skills in self-
recognition, upon which Theory of Mind skills can be consolidated at later ages. 
Recent research challenged this assumption by finding no evidence for ontogenetic 
links between neonatal imitation and social-cognitive skills at later ages (Redshaw et 
al., 2019). However, this finding primarily questions the reliability and validity of 
neonatal imitation per se. Whether imitation at later ages and overimitation in 
particular are linked to children’s emerging skills in the social-cognitive domain is not 
yet clear.  
The affiliative function of overimitation has been hypothesized to facilitate 
social interactions between children and caregivers (Nielsen, 2018; Over & Carpenter, 
2013). Accordingly, overimitation may provide individuals with social experience 
needed to refine their Theory of Mind. At the same time, Theory of Mind may also 
boost children’s overimitation given that copying intentionally modelled actions 
requires the imitator to consider the intentions and knowledge of the model (see also 
Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002).  
Only one study directly assessed the interplay between collaboration and 
overimitation in young children. Nielsen and colleagues (2016) assessed children’s 
overimitation in peer contexts and found that the frequency of peer collaboration was 
linked to children’s overimitation. However, this link was only evident among children 
from an indigenous Australian population, but not for children from a more urban, 
Western context. This suggests that cultural context shapes the interplay of 
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overimitation and collaboration, whereas the contextual variables contributing to 
such effects are yet unknown. 
Indirect evidence for the interplay between collaboration, Theory of Mind, and 
overimitation may also be drawn from participants whose social functioning is 
impaired, such as children being diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). 
Clinical research comparing children with ASD to typically developing (TD) children 
has identified delayed onsets in Theory of Mind reasoning as a central symptom in 
ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1993, 2000). Significant impairments in collaborative behaviors 
have also been observed among children with ASD as compared to TD children (Liebal, 
Colombi, Rogers, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008). Even though these children were 
generally able to engage in dyadic collaboration, they showed less attempts for 
reengaging a collaborative partner into a joint activity indicating an impairment in 
children’s motivation for collaboration to cause this effect. Finally, overimitation has 
been identified as being de-emphasized among children with ASD as compared to TD 
children (Marsh, Pearson, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2013; Vivanti, Hocking, Fanning, & 
Dissanayake, 2017; but see Nielsen, Slaughter, & Dissanayake, 2013).  
The Cognitive and Motivational Underpinnings of Sociality 
In the previous chapters, I described the significance of overimitation, collaboration, 
and Theory of Mind as key manifestations of human sociality. Children from diverse 
cultural contexts become proficient imitators, even though their reliance on 
overimitation differs across situations and cultural contexts (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; 
Clegg & Legare, 2016). Likewise, they learn to collaborate with others and develop a 
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Theory of Mind, even though the ontogeny of both of these phenomena varies 
substantially across populations (Mejía-Arauz et al., 2007; Alcalá et al., 2018; Mayer 
& Träuble, 2013; Dixson et al., 2017). Combined, these three phenomena both shape 
and are shaped by social interactions. From a comparative perspective, it can be 
subsumed that humans are not unique in either of these aspects of sociality. 
Chimpanzees can imitate, they can collaborate, and they can predict others’ mental 
states via Theory of Mind reasoning. The difference between human sociality and 
chimpanzee sociality appears to be (a) a matter of degree rather than kind, and (b) 
founded within social interactions, particular those taking place in early childhood. 
As mentioned above, the socio-cultural input children receive during their first 
years of life is an important determinant of sociality (Keller, 2007; Rogoff, 2003). 
Children should not, however, be conceived as passive recipients of this input. In 
contrast, they are actively involved in choosing when, with whom, and how to interact 
with others.  
Going back to the initial definition of sociality as the tendency to engage in and 
benefit from social interactions, the psychological engines that constitute this 
sociality become ever more relevant to understand social development: Social 
motivation and social cognition (Hobson, 2002; Levinson, 2006; Tomasello et al., 
2005). 
The social-cognitive domain has long been discussed as a key driver of uniquely 
human levels of sociality (Herrmann et al., 2007; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Call & 
Tomasello, 2008). It has been hypothesized that humans have evolved a highly 
specialized social-cognitive skillset enabling them to understand others’ thoughts and 
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beliefs and, as a consequence, to predict their behaviors. As mentioned in the previous 
chapters, Theory of Mind has been interpreted as a key feature of this social-cognitive 
domain. Current evidence taken from comparative, developmental, and cross-cultural 
psychology suggests that Theory of Mind does not emerge in isolation and is neither 
innate, nor specific to our species. It is founded within social interactions and requires 
social experience to be consolidated gradually. 
In light of this remark, it becomes even more important to take a closer look at 
the motivational underpinnings that foster social interactions throughout ontogeny. 
Even though social interactions may often be beneficial for both interactants, humans 
are also capable of and at times willing to navigate the world alone and without 
external interferences. To fully understand human sociality, social motivation and 
social cognition need to be considered in parallel as key constituents of sociality 
(Chevallier et al., 2012; Hobson, 2002; Levinson, 2006; Nielsen & Haun, 2016; 
Tomasello, 2014). To give a first orientation on this research agenda, I will introduce 
the Social Motivation Theory of Autism (Chevallier et al., 2012; see also Grelotti, 
Gauthier, & Schultz, 2002) in the next chapter. Even though Chevallier and colleagues’ 
framework is originated in developmental psychopathology, the researchers offer 
suggestions which can be applied to developmental psychology and anthropology 
more generally. As such, I will also describe how our understanding of the ontogeny 
of overimitation, collaboration, and Theory of Mind can benefit from the framework 
offered by Chevallier and colleagues. Since motivation is a latent construct that 
cannot be observed directly but has to be inferred from behavioral manifestations, I 
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will also briefly describe some empirical approaches that may be useful for assessing 
social motivation in young children. 
The Social Motivation Theory of Autism 
The Social Motivation Theory of Autism treats social motivation as a “set of 
psychological dispositions and biological mechanisms biasing the individual to 
preferentially orient to the social world (social orienting), seek and take pleasure in 
social interactions (social reward), and to work to foster and maintain social bonds 
(social maintaining)” (Chevallier et al., 2012, p. 231). Social motivation is hypothesized 
to be derived from selective pressures that humans faced throughout their 
evolutionary history: In the socio-cultural niche in which humans evolved, an early 
emerging social motivation may have been of adaptive value for the species’ survival. 
The early ontogeny of social motivation can, in the light of the Social Motivation 
Theory of Autism, be conceptualized as a universal disposition that should show little 
to no variation across cultural contexts. 
Throughout this dissertation, I will focus on the early ontogeny of social reward 
following the definition of Chevallier and colleagues (2012, or see above). I do so 
because of the central role of reward as a determinant of motivation more generally 
(Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Touré-Tillery & 
Fishbach, 2014): Experiencing rewards triggers associative learning processes and 
biases individuals to attend to and pursue rewarding stimuli (Godman, Nagatsu, & 
Salmela, 2014). On a conceptual level, social reward may thus facilitate both social 
orienting (e.g., because of the increased salience of socially rewarding input) and social 
maintaining (e.g., in order to invest into socially rewarding input by forming long-
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lasting relationships). This makes the reward aspect of social motivation even more 
interesting with regard to its ontogeny across cultures, since one would expect 
downstream effects of cultural variation in the reward value of social interactions on 
social attention and the formation of social bonds.  
Social Motivation and Imitation 
Around their second year of life, children use imitation to facilitate social exchange 
by displaying similarity with the model (Užgiris, 1981). Doing so can strengthen social 
bonds and increases affiliation between social actors (Nielsen, 2008; Over & 
Carpenter, 2012, 2013). Empirical findings support the increasing role of imitation as 
a “social glue” during child ontogeny (Nielsen, 2018). While children younger than 18 
months of age selectively copy actions they have categorized as causally relevant and 
goal-directed, older children’s imitation is increasingly shaped by affiliative 
motivations. At 18 months of age, children imitate others selectively after being 
primed with third-party ostracism (Over & Carpenter, 2009). They show overimitation 
selectively when being observed by the model (Marsh et al., 2014; McGuigan & 
Robertson, 2015; Nielsen & Blank, 2011) and refrain from doing so in response to a 
model that signals social disinterest (Marsh, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2019). During middle 
childhood, social motives seem to become ever more important for actuating 
overimitation (Clay et al., 2018; Gellén & Buttelmann, 2019). On an individual level, 
children’s overimitation is linked to extraversion, which may indicate that children 
engage in overimitation out of a personal interest for social interactions (Hilbrink, 
Sakkalou, Ellis-Davies, Fowler, & Gattis, 2013). In sum, current evidence suggests that 
the ontogeny of overimitation is actuated by the social motivation to engage in social 
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interactions, and that this motivation may increase with age throughout childhood 
and beyond. 
Social Motivation and Collaboration 
As described above, humans are not the only species that can collaborate with others. 
However, the quality and quantity in which we work with others toward joint goals 
makes us outliers in the field of collaboration. One possible explanation for this may 
be that humans, and children in particular, like and seek to do so. When given the 
choice to obtain rewards alone or via collaborative efforts with a peer, most three-
year-old children prefer to collaborate (Rekers et al., 2011). Children of slightly older 
ages invest more time in collaborative, rather than individual tasks and ascribe such 
activities more hedonistic value (Butler & Walton, 2013). Also, children at preschool 
ages smile more often when working with peers as compared to individually 
(Perlmutter, Behrend, Kuo, & Muller, 1989). The reward value of collaborative 
activities motivates children to rather wait for and reengage an inattentive adult co-
player instead of completing the task individually (Warneken et al., 2006, 2012). 
Overall, children’s liking and seeking of collaborative activities is well-documented in 
the context of social interactions with both peers and adults (Tomasello et al., 2005; 
Tomasello & Hamann, 2012).  
Social Motivation and Theory of Mind 
In their Social Motivation Theory of Autism, Chevallier and colleagues (2012) explicitly 
theorize social motivation as an ontogenetic driver of children’s Theory of Mind. 
Social interactions, especially those that are of collaborative nature (Tomasello, 2018; 
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Tomasello et al., 2005), require individuals to coordinate and adapt to behaviors and 
perspectives of social partners. As individuals need to flexibly shift their point of view 
in order to coordinate themselves with social partners, they learn to understand and 
predict others’ mental states (Tomasello et al., 2005). Theory of Mind is thus 
considered a consequence of such interactions (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). Empirical 
evidence also indicates that the ontogeny of social motivation and Theory of Mind are 
intertwined. For example, children’s orienting toward social stimuli, such as faces and 
biological motion, is linked to their performance on implicit false-belief tasks 
(Burnside et al., 2018). Socially-observant temperament relates to Theory of Mind 
both cross-sectionally (Lane et al., 2013) and longitudinally (Brink et al., 2015; Mink, 
Henning, & Aschersleben, 2014) in that more observant children are solving false-
belief tasks at younger ages. On average, socially anxious children are impaired in 
their Theory of Mind skills as compared to TD children (Nikolić et al., 2019).  
In the context of this dissertation, I hypothesize that social motivation (i.e., 
children’s tendencies to overimitate or collaborate) and social cognition (i.e., their 
Theory of Mind) are ontogenetically linked features of sociality (Levinson, 2006; 
Tomasello et al., 2005). Following the Social Motivation Theory of Autism, I consider 
social cognition to be rooted in social motivation (Chevallier et al., 2012). Yet, this 
perspective does not imply that this relation is necessarily unidirectional. Social-
cognitive abilities may themselves shape social motivation through their coordinative 
function in social interactions (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Roby & Scott, 2016; 
Tomasello, 2018; Tomasello et al., 2005). 
 
 35 
In sum, both theoretical arguments and empirical data suggest that social 
motivation may be an ontogenetic driver of all three phenomena linked to sociality. 
While overimitation and collaboration may be directly conceptualized as 
manifestations of social motivation, Theory of Mind should also be shaped by 
children’s motivation to interact.  
Assessing Social Motivation: Methodological Considerations 
Given the theoretical impact of social motivation in the ontogeny of sociality, 
surprisingly little systematic research has assessed the motivational (in comparison 
to the cognitive) aspects of sociality (Chevallier et al., 2012; Lyons, Phillips, & Santos, 
2005; Tomasello, 2014; Tomasello et al., 2005). Assessing latent phenomena like 
motivation raises methodological concerns that may be particularly relevant when 
dealing with children and non-literate participants (Lyons et al., 2005; Over, 2016).  
In adult research, scientists often utilize participants’ introspection by 
explicitly asking them about motives and inner states (Touré-Tillery & Fishbach, 
2014). For this purpose, surveys and interviews are often used to examine motivation 
among participants that are generally capable to reply adequately to such questions. 
Of course, such approaches can be efficient and valid means for assessing motivation. 
However, they may also suffer from response biases (e.g., social desirability) and a 
potential lack of introspection abilities (but see Measelle, Ablow, Cowan, & Cowan, 
1998). Most crucially in the context of cross-cultural psychology, assessing 
quantitative data via questionnaires may lack validity in traditional, non-Western 
contexts (Chen, Lee, & Stevenson, 1995; Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002). 
Assessing motivation in young children carries even more difficulties because young 
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children’s introspection is not yet fully consolidated, which is why they cannot 
reliably articulate inner psychological states. As a consequence, other means are 
needed to estimate social motivation in young children. Behavioral observations seem 
to be a promising path. In the following section, I will review some phenomena that 
have previously been discussed as behavioral proxies of young children’s social 
motivation. 
Context-Dependency of Behaviors. If certain behaviors are selectively 
performed to initiate social interactions, one would expect these behaviors to be more 
frequently performed in the presence of an audience. As described above, children 
show overimitation selectively in contexts in which the model is physically present 
(Nielsen & Blank, 2011), responsive (Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008), and 
observant (Marsh et al., 2019). Even though overimitation is also shown in the 
complete absence of an audience (Whiten, Allan, et al., 2016), the context-dependency 
of the phenomenon has been interpreted to reflect children’s social motivation to 
affiliate and interact with the model (Marsh et al., 2019; Nielsen, 2008; Over & 
Carpenter, 2012, 2013). 
Reengagement Attempts. Children’s social motivation may also be reflected in 
their tendency to form and adhere to joint activities with others. In one paradigm, 
children engage in a collaborative activity with an adult experimenter (Warneken et 
al., 2006). At some point, the adult withdraws from the joint enterprise for some 
seconds. Instead of continuing with the activity individually, two year-olds from urban 
Germany frequently attempt to reengage the recalcitrant adult (Warneken et al., 
2006). Notably, they do so even though their partner is not needed for completing the 
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activity itself (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Warneken et al., 2012). The researchers 
concluded that children’s reengagement attempts illustrate that they are “motivated 
not just by the goal but by the cooperation itself” (Warneken et al., 2006; p. 559). 
Forced-Choice Preferences. Being motivated to engage in an activity should 
lead individuals to prefer this activity over others when given the choice to select 
between both alternatives. Rekers and colleagues (2011) introduced three-year-old 
children from urban Germany to a game in which they could freely choose whether to 
obtain a reward alone or in collaboration with a peer. Almost four out of five children 
chose to collaborate with their peer, indicating a strong social motivation for the joint 
action. In clinical psychology, two other sets of studies have assessed children’s social 
motivation by utilizing forced-choice paradigms. First, one- to four-year-old children 
were given the choice between social (e.g., peer faces) and non-social (e.g., toy trains) 
images (Ruta et al., 2017). They learned that they could observe images of one or the 
other category by pressing buttons of a specific color on a tablet screen. This approach 
allowed for a systematic assessment of forced-choice decisions across trials. In 
accordance with the Social Motivation Theory of Autism (Chevallier et al., 2012), they 
found typically developing children to choose the social images more often as a group 
of children with ASD.  
The so-called Choose-a-Movie paradigm (Dubey, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2017; 
Dubey, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2018) provides a novel approach for testing social 
motivation in children of older ages. In one study, children up from eleven-years-of-
age onwards could choose between different video stimuli by unlocking them on a 
computer screen (Dubey et al., 2017). Individuals with ASD were less inclined than 
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control groups to invest effort into watching social videos. Again, these results 
supported the idea that social motivation is diminished among individuals with ASD 
(Chevallier et al., 2012). One advantage of this approach is that researchers can modify 
the effort or time participants need to invest in order to observe the video sequence 
of their choice. Utilizing the Choose-a-Movie paradigm to investigate social 
motivation in young children across diverse cultures is, however, challenging due to 
task demands (e.g., attention, memory, use of electronic devices). 
Expressed Emotions. Following Chevallier and colleagues (2012), young 
children should express more positive emotions during social interactions as 
compared to individual activities. Indeed, US-American children aged between four to 
nine years smile more often while solving tasks collaboratively than individually 
(Perlmutter et al., 1989). Perlmutter and colleagues’ approach to count the instances 
in which children express positive emotions (e.g., smiles) in a given period can be 
complemented by assessing the intensity in which children express positive emotions 
when engaging in social interactions. Recently, researchers have established scales for 
coding children’s happiness from video (Aknin, Hamlin, & Dunn, 2012). Such 
approaches correlate highly with other indicators for affect, such as the (Baby) FACS 
system (Oster, 2006) and may thus reflect a more intrinsic, hedonistic component of 
social motivation. However, positive emotions are not only displayed via facial 
expressions. For instance, another way for displaying happiness is by elevating one’s 
body posture. Already at infant age, children do so when expressing positive emotions, 
such as pride (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2015, 2017). 
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One difficulty in assessing social motivation through expressed emotions is 
that emotional displays can also serve other functions. For example, if children smile 
more frequently during collaboration as compared to individual activity (e.g., 
Perlmutter et al., 1989), this may either reflect the positive emotions children 
experience, or it may function as a communicative signal aimed at the interactant. In 
an observational study, Bainum and colleagues documented that about 95% of the 
instances in which U.S.-American preschoolers either smile or laugh, they are 
accompanied by others (Bainum, Lounsbury, & Pollio, 1984). This study illustrates the 
necessity to assess expressed emotions while controlling for the presence and 
visibility of others in order to disentangle affect displays as a communicative signal 
from the expression of emotions. As a second possible confound, it has to be noted 
that emotional expression varies considerably across cultural contexts (Crivelli, 
Russell, Jarillo, & Fernández-Dols, 2016; Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012). 
Yet, the expression of positive emotions via smiles shows only little variation across 
populations (see also Aknin et al., 2015).  
Persistence. If an individual is motivated to engage in social interactions, one 
would expect them to remain in such situations when given the choice to look out for 
alternative occupations. Butler and Walton (2013) found four-year-old children to 
persist longer in a demanding puzzle task after being told that a peer would join them 
later as compared to a condition in which children were told they would work alone 
throughout the study. The mere opportunity to collaborate drove children’s 
persistence even though their social partner was not present yet (see also Master et 
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al., 2017). However, this effect might have been triggered by an obligation felt toward 
the peer rather than a social motivation to interact. 
Other Approaches. Of course, this list is far from comprehensive. Several other 
approaches have been used to assess children’s (social) motivation. These include 
behavioral observations outside experimentally controlled contexts or 
biophysiological methods (e.g., skin conductance, pupillometry, salivary cortisol). 
Moreover, information on children’s social motivation can be obtained via interviews 
with third parties, such as their parents, caregivers, and older siblings. 
To conclude from the aforementioned approaches, current research indicates 
that young children are equipped with a species-typical social motivation, which in 
turn facilitates social interactions and sociality more generally. Social motivation may 
be crucial for understanding why humans overimitate and collaborate, and how they 







In the previous chapters, I described the hypothesis of overimitation, collaboration, 
and Theory of Mind as behavioral manifestations of young children’s sociality. While 
the social-cognitive facet (e.g., Theory of Mind) of sociality has received considerable 
attention as a determinant of how humans make use of social interactions, our current 
knowledge about why humans engage in social interactions is still inconclusive. In the 
following sections, I will outline three systematic shortcomings of previous research 
and will argue how these shortcomings may have led to incomplete and potentially 
inadequate conclusions. Finally, I will explain how I addressed these shortcomings in 
the current dissertation. 
Focus I: The Ontogeny of Sociality 
Focusing on the ontogeny of our experience and behavior is inevitable for 
understanding human psychology as a whole (Apicella & Barrett, 2016; Bjorklund, 
2018; Bjorklund & Blasi, 2015; Legare, 2017; Liebal & Haun, 2018; Nielsen, 2012; 
Tomasello, 2019). Current evidence on the ontogeny of social motivation is, however, 
puzzling. While some studies suggest that socially motivated behaviors increase with 
age (Clay et al., 2018; Gräfenhain et al., 2009), a clear picture of the ontogeny of social 
motivation is still missing. With regard to children’s Theory of Mind, it has also long 
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been assumed that children become better in corresponding tasks with age (Wellman 
et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004). However, recent evidence has suggested that 
developmental trajectories in children’s Theory of Mind acquisition may differ across 
individuals and populations (Liu et al., 2008; Shahaeian, 2015; Shahaeian et al., 2011), 
and other studies have taken the universality of Theory of Mind into question (Mayer 
& Träuble, 2015, 2013). To understand the interplay of social motivation and social 
cognition, one aim of this dissertation was thus to investigate children’s behaviors 
across a broad age range.  
Focus II: Individual Differences in Sociality 
The importance of development for understanding human behaviors suggests that 
different experiences gained throughout ontogeny lead to behavioral variation. The 
degree to which such differences are systematic cannot, however, be answered fully 
by applying developmental perspectives. A consequential step would thus be to assess 
the degree to which these differences in behavior reflect underlying psychological 
dispositions in a systematic way. Applied to the focus of this dissertation, 
understanding social motivation requires a focus on individual differences in how and 
when the phenomenon occurs in young children. If the behaviors previously linked to 
social motivation, such as overimitation or collaboration, are indeed manifestations 
of a shared, underlying disposition (i.e., social motivation), one would expect these 
behaviors to be linked at an individual level. Linking children’s social motivation to 
social cognition can help to shed light on the phenomenon of sociality as a whole.  
However, current evidence on the ontogeny of social motivation and social 
cognition is biased toward the assessment of differences at the level of groups or 
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conditions, rather than at an individual level (Rekers et al., 2011; Nielsen & Blank, 
2011; Ruta et al., 2017; H. C. Barrett et al., 2013; Mayer & Träuble, 2015; but see Lane 
et al., 2013; Brink et al., 2015; Redshaw et al., 2019). Such approaches may be useful 
and efficient for identifying factors that shape child development more generally. 
However, a focus on interindividual differences is needed to reliably identify the 
psychological dispositions underlying child development. 
Focus III: Sociality Across Cultures 
Ontogenetic differences in human behavior do not just occur randomly across 
individuals. Humans live in groups, and these groups differ systematically with 
regards to the experience and information that group members receive through social 
learning. The aim of this dissertation is to generate findings about child development 
that generalize to humans living in various cultural contexts. This necessitates a 
cross-cultural perspective on the ontogeny of sociality (Fernald, 2010; Nielsen & 
Haun, 2016; Nielsen et al., 2017). Considering the role of culture for human 
psychology is particularly relevant in the field of evolutionary psychology. By 
addressing cross-cultural variability, researchers can learn about the interplay of 
biological and cultural evolution in shaping human psychology (Apicella & Barrett, 
2016; Legare et al., 2018; Liebal & Haun, 2012).  
A closer look at the studies leading to hypotheses on social motivation yields a 
lack of cultural diversity in participant samples. The vast majority of studies on 
children’s social motivation were conducted with participants from Western, 
industrialized contexts. As mentioned above, such populations are not representative 
for the variability in which child development occurs around the globe (Henrich et al., 
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2010; Nielsen et al., 2017). To assess the generalizability of previous studies outside 
Western, industrialized populations, I studied children from non-Western, traditional 
communities varying with regard to their socialization goals and practices. 
According to Norenzayan and Heine (2005), participants from at least two 
diverse contexts are required to investigate the universality of human psychology. To 
gain a more thorough understanding of the role of culture in shaping sociality, 
however, such “two-cultures approaches” are not sufficient. Cultural contexts differ 
on a wide array of variables. Ecological and social variables may differ in a given 
cultural comparison, making it difficult to disentangle the potential effects of either 
of them. To capture and isolate the impact of cultural variables, it is thus important to 
include a third cultural context into the scientific inquiry (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). 
Doing so improves the identification of ecological and cultural factors leading to 
observed variability in psychology and behavior.  
Originally, I planned to investigate two populations differing as much as 
possible regarding their socialization goals and practices to address the universality 
of social motivation and social cognition. Thus, I wanted to assess children from an 
urban, Western environment (Leipzig, Germany) with children from a recent hunter-
gatherer community, the ≠Akhoe Hai||om from Farm 6 (Namibia). As I will outline 
below, the cultural contexts of the Hai||om and Germany differ on countless ecological 
and socio-cultural dimensions. Explaining any cultural variation in children’s 
behavior would render conclusions about the underlying causes difficult. During 
participant recruitment in Namibia, I came in contact with the Ovambo of Oshivelo. 
As I will outline below, the Ovambo differ from both German and Hai||om parents in 
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crucial aspects of their social organization. Since Ovambo and Hai||om share an almost 
identical ecological environment, comparing children from these two contexts 
allowed for more systematic inquiry of the cultural differences as a function of 
population-specific socialization practices. 
To test specific hypotheses about the universality of social motivation and 
social cognition by linking variation to distinct socio-cultural variables, I thus 
followed the “three cultures approach” (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). In case of 
homogeneity across these populations, this approach would also be useful by 
documenting the universality of the phenomena across an array of cultural contexts.  
Study Populations 
To summarize and relate important dimensions of each of the three cultural contexts 
that were investigated in this dissertation, I will first characterize each population by 
relying on both ethnographic literature and personal experience. I will also add 
ethnographic sources that describe populations which are comparable to the ones I 
investigated here with regard to their prototypical mode of subsistence. I do so 
because variability in mode of subsistence is typically accompanied by systematic 
variation in socialization goals and parenting practices (Barry et al., 1959; Keller, 2007) 
as well as in strategies for social learning more generally (Glowacki & Molleman, 
2017).  
Furthermore, I will classify each population into an overarching framework—
the ecocultural model (Keller & Kärtner, 2013)—to allow for systematic comparisons 
within and across populations. I will hereby focus on two dimensions of autonomy 
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that have been utilized in the model: Action autonomy and psychological autonomy. 
Action autonomy refers to an “individual’s self-regulated capacity to perform complex 
behavioral necessities […] independently” (Keller & Kärtner, 2013; p. 76) and is 
typically emphasized in populations in which social obligations and responsibilities 
are considered important. In such contexts, childhood is typically conceived as a 
period in which individuals do not yet fully contribute to the household. As a 
consequence, action autonomy is considered as a central socialization goal marking 
developmental progress. 
Psychological autonomy describes the degree to which individuals, and 
children in particular, are perceived as autonomous agents who have their own desires 
and beliefs about the world (Keller, 2012) and whether the awareness and exploration 
of such mental states is emphasized culturally (Keller, 2012; Keller & Kärtner, 2013). 
Typically, populations with strong emphasizes on psychological autonomy also 
socialize their children toward individuality and self-reliance (Kärtner, 2015; Keller, 
2007).  
The ecocultural model supposes cross-cultural homogeneity in children’s 
needs for both psychological autonomy and action autonomy, and, at the other side of 
the spectrum, interpersonal relatedness (see also Ryan & Deci, 2000). While these 
needs are considered cross-culturally recurrent, the socialization goals and practices 
framing the fulfillment of children’s needs differ more substantially.  
The German Context 
German children receive high levels of pedagogical input and scaffolding from their 
parents and other adult caregivers. Formalized education, such as schooling, is 
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mandatory and children typically grow up in small nuclear families of about three to 
five household members in which their learning environment is mostly structured by 
adult caregivers. Social interactions between adults and children are typically child-
centered and embedded in face-to-face settings. Self-fulfillment is a major 
socialization goal. Positive affect in social interactions is often reinforced and 
rewarded by caregivers (Keller, 2007, 2009). According to the ecocultural model, urban 
Germany represents a prototypical milieu in which children’s psychological autonomy 
is highly valued (Keller & Kärtner, 2013). Interpersonal responsibilities are perceived 
as less important than personal choice and children are free to navigate social 
interactions according to their own needs and desires. At the same time, adults mirror 
children’s emotions through “mind-minded” interaction styles and scaffold children’s 
activities to establish a learning environment that is considered optimal (Kärtner, 
2015; Keller, 2007, 2016; Rogoff, 2003). Social interactions between children and both 
peers and adults are highly valued and scaffolded “as long as they are self-chosen and 
not enforced by others” (Kärtner, 2015, p.2; see also Markus & Kitayama, 1994). While 
children perceive high levels of psychological autonomy, they are not required to 
contribute to any ecological income or household chores. Hence, action autonomy is 
comparably low and typically not prioritized until late childhood or adolescence.  
Today, the prevailing subsistence mode in Germany is that of a market 
economy. Henrich and colleagues used the defining characteristics (Western, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) of such cultural milieus to establish an 
acronym that resembles the peculiarities of such populations—they are WEIRD 
(Henrich et al., 2010). From an evolutionary or even historical point of view, WEIRD 
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contexts are a recent phenomenon. The predominant subsistence mode of our species, 
in contrast, has been that of hunting and gathering (also often referred to as foraging).  
The Hai||om Context 
The defining subsistence niche of our species is that of foraging: For more than 90% 
of our evolutionary history, humans lived in mobile family bands relying on hunting 
prey and gathering nuts, plants, and other bushfood from the wild. Interestingly, 
contemporary populations that exhibit this foraging lifestyle typically share a distinct 
set of socio-cultural variables (Hewlett, 2016). According to Hewlett and colleagues, 
these cultural schemata include the appreciation of individual autonomy, 
egalitarianism, and sharing on demand (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017; Terashima & 
Hewlett, 2016). Hunter-gatherers like the Hai||om give comparably little emphasis on 
direct, child-centered pedagogy to structure children’s social learning (Boyette & 
Hewlett, 2017; Hewlett et al., 2011; Hewlett & Roulette, 2016; Lew-Levy, Lavi, Reckin, 
Cristóbal-Azkarate, & Ellis-Davies, 2018; Lew-Levy et al., 2017).  
The Hai||om are an ethnic group living in the dry savannah of northern 
Namibia. Their traditional habitat is the Etosha pan and the surrounding areas. 
Typically, men hunted game and women gathered bushfood. Today, most Hai||om live 
in small farms and villages. As many former hunter-gatherers, they suffer from 
political and societal marginalization. Today, most Hai||om cannot follow their 
traditional lifestyle anymore due to their traditional hunting habitats being owned 
and occupied by third parties.  
Some Hai||om, especially those living in the more remote and rural areas, have 
nonetheless maintained crucial aspects of their cultural identity. Even though some 
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Hai||om in rural areas engage in paid jobs and receive governmental aid (Dieckmann 
et al., 2014), foraging is still practiced commonly. For example, women and children 
gather bushfood on a daily basis. Hunting, although illegal, is said to be practiced 
commonly. This aspect is of particular importance not just because it illustrates that 
the rural Hai||om are not (yet) fully integrated into market economy, but also because 
hunting and gathering are still perceived as major aspects of their cultural identity 
(Dieckmann et al., 2014; Widlok, 1999). The emphasizes on autonomy, egalitarianism, 
and sharing on demand, are crucial elements of Hai||om culture and are still practiced 
today (Schäfer, Haun, & Tomasello, 2015; Widlok, 1999). Given that the cultural norms 
and schemas of the Hai||om are derived from a long history of a foraging lifestyle, and 
since many Hai||om still emphasize foraging as a defining characteristic of their own 
cultural identity, I will refer to the Hai||om as hunter-gatherers throughout this 
dissertation (see also Barndard, 2002).  
In this dissertation, Hai||om children from two populations participated in the 
studies: Farm 6 and Ondera. Children from Farm 6, Mangetti West, were tested in 
study 1 and study 2. Farm 6 is a rural settlement with around 300 Hai||om inhabitants. 
The settlement is situated next to a cattle farm at which some men find seasonal 
employment. At |Khomxa Khoeda primary school, children have the opportunity to 
attend school from grade zero to grade five. School attendance rates are reported by 
local teachers to be low. In order to improve the statistical power of studies 2 and 3, 
children from a neighboring settlement named Ondera were also assessed. Ondera is 
located north-east of Tsumeb in Namibia and was established in 2012 as a 
resettlement project for local Hai||om residents. Although no census is available, 
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village representatives estimate that there are between 500 to 1,200 permanent 
residents at Ondera. Some Hai||om in Ondera find employment at the local vegetable 
farm while others sell handmade crafts at the neighboring Etosha National Park. 
Gathering bushfood and occasional hunting are reported by the people in Ondera. 
Even though the distance between Farm 6 and Ondera is more than 90km, people 
often move between the two villages by foot or via hitchhiking to visit relatives or to 
move temporarily. Children can attend Ondera primary school and a pre-school. 
School attendance is reported by local teachers to be low and infrequent. 
The parental emphasizes on psychological and action autonomy are central 
socialization goals among the Hai||om (Terashima & Hewlett, 2016; Widlok, 1999). 
Hai||om children can freely decide about their activities from an early age and social 
obligations toward peers or adults are given little importance as compared to Western, 
industrialized populations. Importantly, the high levels of both psychological and 
action autonomy with which Hai||om children are equipped with are not 
representative for children from rural-small-scale societies per se. Other modes of 
subsistence, such as pastoralist societies, are often characterized by highly distinct 
socialization goals and practices (Barry et al., 1959; Lancy, 2008). 
The Ovambo Context 
The Ovambo of northern Namibia, are traditionally agro-pastoralists who rely on both 
the cultivation of millet (Omahangu) and corn as well as on herding cattle and goats. 
In Oshivelo, a small town close to Ondera with around 2,000 inhabitants, most 
families rely on a mix between market economy (e.g., paid jobs at the local police 
station, selling food at local markets) and traditional agriculture. In accordance with 
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other farming ecologies (Barry et al., 1959), the Ovambo emphasize interpersonal 
relatedness, obedience to social and behavioral prohibitions, and the adherence to 
social hierarchies as key socialization goals and practices (see also Zimba, 2002; Zimba 
& Otaala, 1993). To enforce these goals, parents typically make use of punitive 
practices and discipline children verbally if they do not behave adequately. Family 
relations are given high importance and children are expected to engage in household 
chores from early on.  
Among the Ovambo, family life is structured through a matrilineal system 
(Brown, 2011; Brown & Bartholomew, 2014). Children are often fostered within their 
broader family system in order to strengthen social ties and to toughen them (Brown, 
2011). While children typically spend their first years of life on rural farms, they are 
often sent to urban areas when reaching preschool ages in order to attend 
institutionalized education at public schools. During school holidays, children 
typically visit farms owned by relatives on which they are tasked with chores to 
contribute to the subsistence of their family (Zimba & Otaala, 1993). Household 
chores and play are considered as interwoven tasks that enable social learning in 
young children (Zimba, 2002). 
The Ovambo value age-related hierarchies, respect, and interpersonal 
responsibilities in their parenting practices (Brown, 2013; Nampala, Shigwedha, & 
Silvester, 2006; Zimba, 2002). Ovambo tribes are traditionally structured into 
kingdoms and subtribes. Even though these kingships are no longer equipped with 
official powers in Namibian politics, kingdom-based family relations are given high 
relevance in everyday life of the Ovambo. Most Ovambo in Oshivelo characterize 
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themselves as either belonging to the tribe of the Oshindonga or the Oshikwanyama. 
Participation and observation are central modes of social learning, while adult-child 
pedagogy is emphasized at an intermediate level in comparison to the Hai||om and 
German parenting practices (Zimba, 2002). 
With regards to the ecocultural model (Keller & Kärtner, 2013), the Ovambo are 
typical representatives of the relational cultural context (Kärtner, 2015). On the 
psychological level, Ovambo children are not perceived as individual beings with 
distinct psychological needs and intentions until they reach adulthood (Brown & 
Bartholomew, 2014). Children’s mental states are not considered as being equal to 
adult-like experience. Instead, child socialization aims at integrating children into a 
broader, hierarchical context of interpersonal relations. On the action domain, 
parenting strategies typically emphasize “self-regulated accomplishment[s] of role-
based obligations and responsibilities” (Keller & Kärtner, 2013, p. 76). Cultural 
emphasizes on psychological autonomy, action autonomy, and child-centered 
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Aims and Approaches 
In this dissertation, I assessed young children’s overimitation, collaboration, and 
Theory of Mind in a set of three studies. I observed these phenomena with regard to 
their ontogeny, interindividual differences, and cross-cultural variability among 
German, Hai||om, and Ovambo children. To combine these approaches, it was 
important to utilize procedures that allow for precise and comparable conclusions 
across participants. I thus chose (quasi-)experimental approaches to observe and 
compare participants’ behaviors under controlled conditions in each of the three 
studies.  
In study 1, I tested the degree to which young children’s overimitation would 
vary across the three populations. I manipulated the attentive state of the model in a 
within-subjects design to estimate whether overimitation would be actuated by the 
attentive state of the model across populations. Using a cross-sectional research 
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design, I assessed overimitation in children between three to eight years of age in 
order to investigate whether the behavior would become more frequent with 
increasing age (which has been observed among WEIRD participants; see Clay & 
Tennie, 2018; McGuigan et al., 2011). Finally, I linked children’s overimitation to their 
reengaging behaviors in a collaborative activity to assess the degree to which 
interindividual differences in social motivation would drive overimitation across 
populations. 
To further explore and extend the results gained from study 1, the second study 
investigated young children’s overimitation using a novel procedure. I minimized 
cognitive and attentional task demands to isolate the social motivation in 
overimitation in three- to seven-year-old Hai||om and German children. Lowering 
cognitive task demands also allowed for a more critical test of the developmental 
increase in the frequency of overimitation, given that the contribution of memory and 
attention on overimitation could be minimized methodologically. Finally, a 
systematic assessment of the interindividual differences in children’s overimitation 
allowed novel insights into the prevalence of overimitation on a population level. 
The third study investigated children social motivation for collaborative 
activities with their peers across all three populations. Three- to eight-year-old 
children were assessed with regard to their tendency to express positive emotions 
during collaboration with a peer, as compared to individual activity. Moreover, the 
same participants were observed in their preferences for either collaborative or 
individual activities in a forced-choice task. The ontogeny of both proxies for social 
motivation was assessed separately for each cultural context. At an interindividual 
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level, I linked both measures to assess the construct validity of social motivation for 
peer collaboration. Finally, I assessed cross-cultural variability in participants’ social 
cognition using a set of Theory of Mind tasks. Children’s performance in this domain 
was analyzed regarding its cross-cultural and ontogenetic variability as well as its 
relation to both their expressed emotions during collaboration and their preferences 
during forced-choice trials. 
Each of the three studies are summarized as individual chapters. To ensure 
that each study can be interpreted in its own right, each of these chapters comprises 
an introduction, sections for methods and results, and a discussion. This may lead to 
redundant definitions and arguments, but allows for an easier comprehension for 
readers interested in the single studies of this dissertation. In the general discussion, 
the findings of all three studies will be embedded into an overarching framework on 
the ontogeny of social motivation and social cognition. 
 Ethics Statement 
All studies tested in this dissertation strictly adhered to the ethical principles of the 
German Psychological Society (DGP) and the American Psychological Association 
(APA). All studies were designed to be non-invasive observations of children’s 
behaviors in experimentally structured scenarios. Children were not exposed to 
physical or psychological harms and risks greater than those they encounter in their 
daily lives.  
Research designs in this form have been approved by the Ethical Committee at 
the Medical Faculty, Leipzig University (title of the approval: “Investigating the non-
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pathological development of social behavior and competences in children and adults 
by using behavioral, peripheral physiological, and psychometric methods”; reference 
number 169/17-ek), the Ministry of Home Affairs and Migration of the Republic of 
Namibia, the Regional Council of Oshikoto Region in Namibia, and the Working Group 
of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA).  
Informed consent of caregivers (verbally or via signature, depending on 
parents’ literacy) and school principals (via signature) were obtained prior to 
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From a young age, children in Western, industrialized societies overimitate others’ actions. 
However, the underlying motivation and cultural specificity of this behavior have remained 
unclear. Here, three- to eight-year-old children (N = 125) from two rural Namibian 
populations (Hai||om, Ovambo) and one urban German population were tested in two 
versions of an overimitation paradigm. Across cultures, children selectively imitated more 
actions when an adult model was present compared to being absent, denoting a social 
motivation underlying overimitation. At the same time, children’s overimitation was not 
linked to their tendency to reengage the adult in a second, independent measure of social 
motivation. These results suggest that, across diverse cultures, children’s imitative 






For good and bad, children imitate (almost) everything. Being confronted with an 
immense number of skills and behaviors they have to learn to grow into fully-fledged 
members of their society, imitation is invaluable. It enables individuals to learn skills 
that are essential for living in human groups. Regardless of whether it is a group-
specific ritual or an important hunting technique, imitators can avoid the costs and 
risks of trial-and-error learning or innovation. Instead, they make use of others’ 
knowledge by copying their behaviors.  
Already infants copy others’ actions with a fidelity that is unmatched by any 
other species (Legare & Nielsen, 2015). Children imitate others even if the model’s 
actions do not fulfill an obvious causal function. This overimitation, defined as the 
faithful copying of visibly causally irrelevant actions, has gained much scientific 
attention in the past decades (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007; Hoehl et al., 
2019). In the standard paradigm, children observe an adult model performing multiple 
causally irrelevant actions on an apparatus before retrieving a reward from it. When 
given the opportunity to manipulate the apparatus themselves, children show 
overimitation by copying these irrelevant actions with high fidelity. Overimitation 
first occurs in children’s second year of life and becomes more frequent with age 
(McGuigan et al., 2011).  
One influential theoretical account holds that overimitation serves a social 
function to affiliate with the model (Marsh et al., 2019; Nielsen, 2008; Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011; Over & Carpenter, 2013). Empirical support for this account comes from 
studies showing that four-year-old children are more likely to show overimitation 
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when an adult model is present compared to when the model is absent or displays 
social disinterest (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; DiYanni, Nini, & Rheel, 2011; Marsh et al., 
2019). This social function of overimitation is assumed to become increasingly 
important with age (Clay et al., 2018; DiYanni et al., 2011). Importantly, the specific 
social motivations underlying children’s overimitation may be manifold. In addition 
to a desire to affiliate, overimitation can also be shown to adhere to social norms 
(Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013) or to conform to others, such as when learning from 
a group of models (DiYanni et al., 2015; McGuigan & Robertson, 2015). Together, these 
accounts converge on the idea that overimitation serves as a “social glue”, facilitating 
social interactions and allowing uniquely human forms of cumulative culture (Legare 
& Nielsen, 2015; Nielsen, 2018; Nielsen & Haun, 2016). 
To date, most studies examined overimitation in children from Western 
populations. This sampling bias limits the generalizability of these findings outside 
such populations. Instead, claims about the universality and evolutionary adaptivity 
of overimitation require both developmental and cross-cultural evidence. To fully 
understand whether and how overimitation varies across cultures, a systematic 
investigation of the social contexts under which the behavior is performed is also 
required (Nielsen, 2018; see also Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). 
The results from previous studies that have systematically investigated 
overimitation cross-culturally are mixed. Some studies documented cross-cultural 
and developmental homogeneity in children from a recent South-African hunter-
gatherer population as compared to children from Western, urban societies (Nielsen 
& Tomaselli, 2010; Nielsen et al., 2014). In contrast, other work revealed low rates of 
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overimitation among hunter-gatherer children from the Central African Republic 
(Berl & Hewlett, 2015). These findings have been discussed with regard to 
participants’ diverging exposure to Western pedagogy and artefacts, as well as in 
reference to procedural differences between the studies (e.g., whether the model is a 
member of the in-group or the out-group; see Berl & Hewlett, 2015). More data from 
hunter-gatherer populations is needed to clarify the prevalence and function of 
overimitation given the informative value of hunter-gatherer populations for our 
understanding of the societal circumstances under which humans have evolved 
(Barndard, 2002; Hewlett, 2016).  
Few cross-cultural studies to date have varied the social context in which 
overimitation was assessed. When task instructions were framed instrumentally (e.g., 
by referring to how to make a necklace), children from rural Vanuatu imitated actions 
with higher fidelity than children from the U.S. (Clegg & Legare, 2016). When the same 
task was framed conventionally (e.g., the model claiming that everyone would make a 
necklace like that), no differences occurred between the two populations. In another 
study, Chinese-American children showed more overimitation than European-
Americans when confronted with actions modelled by a group (DiYanni et al., 2015). 
These findings thus highlight the potential importance of cultural context on the 
social function of overimitation (Heyes, 2012a). However, the attentive state of the 
model, such as whether the model observes the child during the task (Nielsen & Blank, 




In the present study, I tested the “functional universality” (Norenzayan & 
Heine, 2005) of overimitation by investigating its ontogeny and social function among 
young children from three diverse populations. I investigated urban, middle-class 
children from a mid-sized German town as representatives for participants from 
Western, industrialized contexts (Henrich et al., 2010). Further, I assessed 
overimitation in children from two rural Namibian communities: The Hai||om and the 
Ovambo. While the Hai||om have historically relied on hunting and gathering, the 
Ovambo are traditionally agro-pastoralists.  
These different subsistence styles are mirrored in very distinct patterns of 
childrearing. Frequent schemas among hunter-gatherers, such as egalitarianism and 
autonomy (Hewlett, 2016), are highly valued among the Hai||om (Widlok, 1999). 
Children are given high levels of individual autonomy from an early age. Direct 
pedagogy is rare compared to other modes of social learning, such as observation and 
individual learning (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017; Lew-Levy et al., 2017). Children spend 
most of their time in mixed-age peer groups without being closely supervised by 
adults (Salali et al., 2019). Among the Ovambo, assertive and authoritarian means of 
parenting are frequent (Brown, 2011). Parents expect their children to conform and 
obey to elders. In contrast to the Hai||om, Ovambo children are tasked with household 
duties from early on. Similar to the Hai||om, they spend most of their time together 
with peers and gain little experience in dyadic, child-centered pedagogy as compared 
to Western populations.  
Comparing children’s overimitation across these cultural samples allowed me 
to disambiguate previous findings on the occurrence of overimitation among hunter-
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gatherer populations. If overimitation is a culturally-specific adaptation for social 
learning in the context of child-centered pedagogy (Berl & Hewlett, 2015), both 
Hai||om and Ovambo children should show lower levels of overimitation than their 
German counterparts. If, in contrast, individual autonomy would be crucial, one would 
expect Hai||om children to show lower levels of overimitation than both German and 
Ovambo children.  
To further investigate the affiliative function of overimitation cross-culturally, 
I varied whether the model was attentive during children’s overimitation or not. If the 
social function of overimitation was culturally robust, one would expect all children 
to show more overimitation when being observed by the model (functional 
universality hypothesis). If this social function would itself be shaped culturally 
(encultured functionality hypothesis), the autonomous Hai||om should not differ in 
their use of overimitation whether or not the model was attentive. In populations 
emphasizing obedience, such as the Ovambo, children should imitate an adult 
selectively when being observed. 
I tested children from early- to middle childhood (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Nielsen 
& Tomaselli, 2010). This allowed me to investigate whether age-related increases in 
overimitation could be generalized across cultural contexts (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; 
McGuigan et al., 2011). In order to elaborate on the social-motivational function of 
overimitation, I included an additional exploratory measure of social motivation in 
the form of children’s reengagement of a recalcitrant co-player in a collaborative 
social activity (Warneken et al., 2006; Gräfenhain et al., 2009). This allowed me (a) to 
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investigate the cross-cultural variability of this social phenomenon and (b) to examine 
the convergent validity of social motivation in overimitation cross-culturally.  
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-five Hai||om children from Farm 6 (MAge = 5.7, 13 girls, age range = 3 to 8 years), 
thirty-nine Ovambo children from Oshivelo (MAge = 4.4, 21 girls, age range = 3 to 7 
years), as well as fifty-one children from Leipzig, Germany (MAge = 5.5, 25 girls, age 
range = 3 to 7 years) participated in this study. An additional five Hai||om children, one 
Ovambo, and one German child preferred not to participate. Six German children were 
tested but excluded from the data because of experimenter errors (e.g., wrong order 
of irrelevant actions in overimitation tasks). Nine of the Hai||om children were tested 
in Oshivelo to increase the sample size of this cultural context.  
Materials 
Children engaged in a fixed test sequence consisting of four tasks in a within-subjects 
design. Tasks 1 and 3 were two versions of an overimitation-task (Horner & Whiten, 
2005; Nielsen & Blank, 2011) in which an adult experimenter modeled four causally 
irrelevant actions on a transparent box before retrieving candy from it (see Figure 1). 
Children were then given the opportunity to obtain candy themselves in the 
experimenter’s presence (model-observing condition) and in the experimenter’s 
absence (model-unobserving condition; order of conditions counterbalanced across 
participants; henceforth: overimitation box-I and overimitation box-II with reference 
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to the order of tasks). All participants could consume the rewards immediately after 
retrieving them so that further participation in the study was not affected by the 
retrieval of the candy. Candies are well-known to children across all three populations 
(in contrast to, for example, stickers and toys) and were thus chosen to ensure 
comparable value of rewards. In addition, a filler task was included in the study of 
which I did not analyze the data (see Appendix A for details). After the subsequent 
task involving overimitation box-II, children engaged in a reengagement task 
(Warneken et al., 2006; Gräfenhain et al., 2009). Therefore, a wooden toy tower with 8 
separate building blocks was used. As the adult was not needed as a “social tool” for 
building the tower, this task served as a strict test of children’s motivation for 
collaboration (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Warneken et al., 2012). Building blocks had 
varying colors and sizes. 
 




Overimitation I. Children came into the testing room together with the adult 
experimenter and were asked to sit down next to the experimenter and overimitation-
box I. The experimenter said “look” in the child’s mother tongue before performing 
some causally irrelevant actions on overimitation box-I. Acting on the yellow-
transparent box, these actions were as follows: Picking up a stick from the top of the 
box, (i) tapping one’s own hand with the stick (2x), (ii) rubbing the stick on top of the 
box (2x), (iii) drawing a circle around the box with a stick (2x) and finally (iv) lifting a 
small curtain on the front side of the box using the stick (1x) to obtain the reward from 
an indentation behind the curtain. When children were confronted with the blue-
transparent box, the following actions were modeled: (i) Tapping one’s hand with the 
stick (2x), (ii) putting the stick into a top hole on the box (2x), (iii) drawing a circle 
around the box with a stick (2x) and finally (iv) retrieving the candy while using the 
stick to lift the curtain (1x). After the initial demonstration, these sequences were 
repeated once more. The experimenter then put another reward in the box, put down 
the stick on the box and moved the box into the participant’s reach. The experimenter 
then said “now you!” in the mother-tongue of the child. Depending on condition, the 
experimenter either added “I am here and will watch you.” and sat next to the 
participant (model-observing condition) or added “I am not here and will not watch 
you.”, before walking to a corner of the room and turning the back to the child (model-
unobserving condition). Here, the experimenter pretended to write down some notes 
and to not pay attention to the child. Children were given the opportunity to obtain 
the reward for one minute. 
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Overimitation II. After the filler task, overimitation box-II was presented to the 
child by the experimenter. Depending on condition run on trial 1, the experimenter 
was either observing (model-observing condition) or turned away (model-
unobserving condition) when the child was given the opportunity to retrieve the 
reward. 
Reengagement. Hereafter, the child and the experimenter played a 
collaborative game of stacking wooden pieces to form a tower. The experimenter then 
encouraged children to take turns (“now you!”, “now me!”) in building the tower by 
stacking the wooden pieces. The experimenter and the child completed the tower 
twice while the experimenter emphasized the turn-taking nature of the game: (“now 
you!”, “now me!”, “now you!”, etc.). He then put the pieces of the tower on the floor 
and encouraged participants to start building the tower again. This time, the 
experimenter did not engage in the activity but remained looking behind the child in 
an upper corner of the room and remained motionless. Children could either continue 
playing the game, wait for the co-player to re-attend, or attempt to actively reengage 
him. 
Coding 
Overimitation I & II. Children’s actions on the boxes were coded from tape by 
an adult coder blind to hypotheses. For each of those irrelevant actions that were 
modelled twice (i – iii; see Table 2), children could earn a score between 0 and 2. Exact 
imitation (modelling the action precisely as often as the model did) was coded as 2, 
imprecise imitation (modelling the action only once or more than twice) was coded as 
1, and no imitation was coded as 0. Only irrelevant action iv was scored as either 0 or 
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1, since the frequency of children action here (lifting the curtain using the stick) was 
not modelled explicitly2. A child could thus earn a score between 0 (by obtaining the 
reward without copying any irrelevant action) and 7 (by exactly copying each step). I 
also coded the full sample. Overall, interrater agreement was excellent (model-
observing condition: Intraclass correlation coefficient/ICC = .95, model-unobserving 
condition: ICC = .93). 
Reengagement. In the period in which the experimenter was not responsive to 
participants, children’s behavior was coded in one-second-intervals according to the 
following (mutually exclusive) categories: When children waited, did unrelated 
actions (e.g., ambiguous play with blocks), or continued building the tower, they were 
scored as 0. If children tried to reengage the co-player in one or more attempts, they 
were scored as 1 for the respective second. The initial 20 seconds in which the 
experimenter was not responsive to children’s response were coded. Children could 
earn a score between 0 and 20, higher scores indicating more time invested in 
reengaging behaviors. The full sample was coded by a coder blind to hypotheses. This 
data was used to run the statistical analyses. In order to estimate reliability, I also 
coded the full sample. Interrater reliability for reengagement behaviors per 20 seconds 
was excellent (ICC = .89).  
  
                                                   
2Action iv was only scored as irrelevant if participants imitated the model by lifting the curtain with a 
stick. If children used more efficient means (such as lifting the curtain with their hands or reaching 




Task  Score Coding details 






i – iv 
tapping own hand with the stick (1), exact imitation (2) 
rubbing stick on top of the box/putting stick into hole on top of box 
(1), exact imitation (2) 
drawing circle around box with stick (1), exact imitation (2) 
lifting curtain before retrieving reward by using the stick (1) 
no imitation (0) 
RE 0 – 20 Active attempts of child to reengage E (1) or no attempt (0) in 20 second of 
interruption (coded per second; see Appendix A) 
Note. Coding details; Overimitation (OI I and OI II) and Reengagement (RE); “exact 
imitation” refers to copying the irrelevant actions in the exact same quantity as 
modelled by the adult (two times in a row for actions i, ii, and iii) 
Statistical Models and Preliminary Analyses 
All data was analyzed in R (R Core Team, 2018). For the first analysis, I ran a linear 
mixed model (LMM) using the package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2017). 
Statistical significance of each predictor was tested through likelihood ratio tests in 
which a full model was compared to a reduced model without the respective predictor 
variable. For the second analysis, I ran a generalized linear model (GLM) with Poisson 
error distribution to investigate children’s reengagement behaviors. Statistical 
significance of each predictor was tested using likelihood ratio tests in which a full 
model was compared to a null model not containing the respective predictor.  
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Overimitation. I investigated whether children’s overimitation-scores varied as 
a function of three predictors: Condition (model-observing condition vs. model-
unobserving condition), populations (German, Hai||om, or Ovambo), and age entered 
as a continuous variable. Sex was included as a control variable given that its potential 
influence on overimitation has recently been discussed (Frick, Clément, & Gruber, 
2017). I included subject ID as a random intercept to account for within-subject 
variance. Visual inspection of the data indicated normally distributed residuals. Initial 
analyses revealed no statistical effects of box type (χ2 (1) = 0.36, p = .550) or trial 
number (χ2 (1) = 1.85, p = .173). These variables were thus not included in the main 
analysis. In addition, no statistically relevant three- or two-way interactions between 
predictors were found. Results reported below refer to a model including main effects 
only. 
Overimitation and Reengagement. I entered children’s reengagement score (0-
20, see above) as the outcome variable into the model. OI-score in the model-
observing condition (0-7) and population (German, Hai||om, or Ovambo) were 
included as predictors. Sex and age were included as control variables. Visual 
inspection of the data indicated normally distributed residuals. No statistically 
significant two-way-interaction between the predictors was found. Model estimates 
reported below refer to a model including main effects only. 
Results 
Overimitation. Children’s overimitation varied by condition. Children in the 
model-observing condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.82) showed more overimitation than 
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those tested in the model-unobserving condition (M = 3.31, SD = 1.70; χ2 (1) = 6.96, 
p = .008). Children’s overimitation further varied between populations. German 
children (M = 4.30, SD = 1.80) overimitated more than Hai||om (M = 3.30, SD = 1.40) and 
Ovambo children (M = 2.60, SD = 1.51; χ2 (2) = 22.26, p < .001). Overall children’s 
overimitation increased with age (𝛽 = 0.58 +/- 0.08, χ2 (1) = 40.84, p < .001, see Figure 
2). There was no significant effect of sex on children’s OI, χ2 (1) = 0.62, p = .430. 
To further explore the robustness of the effect of condition across populations, 
I ran separate models for each cultural group. Regression estimates suggested similar 
effects of condition across groups (𝛽Germany [95%-CI] = 0.36 [−0.14; 0.86]; 𝛽Hai||om = 0.44 
[−0.14; 1.03]; 𝛽Ovambo = 0.51 [−0.07; 1.10]). To account for unequal sample sizes in the 
current data, I ran bootstrap simulations with 20,000 iterations (n = 51 for each 
population, given that this was the number of participants in the largest subsample). 
Bootstrapped intervals suggested robust effects of condition when running the main 






Figure 2. Overimitation within each population as a function of age and condition; 
Solid lines represent the fitted values of a linear model containing predictors and 
controls of the statistical models described in the method section 
Overimitation and Reengagement. Children’s reengaging behaviors were not 
significantly related to their overimitation, χ2 (1) = 0.14, p = .710. At the same time, 
children’s reengagement varied across populations. German children (M = 12.35, 
SD = 5.69) showed more reengaging attempts than both Hai||om (M = 6.67, SD = 4.53) 
and Ovambo children (M = 7.08, SD = 4.75; χ2 (2) = 59.74, p < .001). There was no 
significant effect of sex (χ2 (1) = 2.51, p = .113) or age (χ2 (1) = 1.10, p = .294) on 
children’s reengagement behaviors. 
Discussion 
In the current study I investigated the prevalence and social modulation of 
overimitation in children from three diverse populations. While German children 
generally showed more overimitation than their Hai||om and Ovambo counterparts, 
participants across populations engaged in higher levels of overimitation when they 
were observed by the adult model. I thus find support for the functional universal 
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hypothesis in that, despite cross-cultural variability in its prevalence, overimitation is 
actuated during social interactions across diverse populations.  
Overall, German children showed more overimitation across both experimental 
conditions than children from the two Namibian populations. These results lend 
support to accounts suggesting overimitation to be a learning bias that is itself shaped 
culturally (Berl & Hewlett, 2015). One plausible explanation for why German children 
showed more overimitation than their Namibian counterparts is the role of dyadic, 
child-centered pedagogy in these populations: German children’s overimitation 
emerges within pedagogical, child-directed interactions and becomes pervasive early 
in ontogeny. Among both Namibian populations, where children rely more on self-
directed, observational learning, children’s reliance on overimitation is markedly 
smaller. Even though this study thus shows that the developmental onsets and the 
frequency of overimitation vary across populations, it also supports previous studies 
documenting the flexible use of (over)imitation in populations in which child-
directed pedagogy is practiced less frequently (see also Shneidman, Gaskins, & 
Woodward, 2016).  
An alternative explanation for the cross-cultural differences in overimitation 
may be that, for both Namibian populations, the Western model was perceived as an 
out-group member. Previous research among Western participants has shown that 
children copy more actions if the model belongs to the in-group, rather than an out-
group (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013; Gruber, Deschenaux, Frick, & 
Clément, 2017; Wilks, Kirby, & Nielsen, 2018). Whether and how group affiliation 
affects imitation outside Western contexts is an important avenue for future research. 
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In the study by Nielsen and Tomaselli (2010), the authors report comparable levels of 
overimitation among their participants irrespective of whether actions were modelled 
by a member of their in-group or not. Berl and Hewlett (2015), however, argue that 
Western experimenters may actually boost overimitation in some non-Western 
populations because such models may be perceived as high in social status. To which 
extent peculiarities of the model increase or lower overimitation in non-Western 
children needs to be investigated in future studies. 
Even though overimitation was lower among both Hai||om and Ovambo than 
among German children, the current data shows that it was well within their 
repertoire. One factor that may have driven overimitation across populations is 
children’s exposure to modern schooling and market economy. Such factors are known 
to alter social learning among children in indigenous communities (Correa-Chávez & 
Rogoff, 2009) and have previously been hypothesized to shape overimitation (Berl & 
Hewlett, 2015). To which extent such factors contribute to children’s use of 
overimitation as a social learning strategy needs to be addressed by future research. 
These findings support the functional universal hypothesis claiming that 
children’s overimitation is actuated by social motivation even though levels of 
overimitation may vary across populations (Nielsen, 2008, 2018; Nielsen & Haun, 
2016). This does not imply that overimitation only reflects a social motivation to 
affiliate and interact. Although the current approach to let an adult turn his/her back 
to the child has recently been shown to be most efficient to trigger social motivation 
in young children (Marsh et al., 2019), children in this study showed overimitation 
even when the model was not observing them (see also Lyons et al., 2007). 
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Furthermore, overimitation has also been found robustly in situations outside 
experimental contexts in which the model was not present at all (Whiten, Allan, et al., 
2016). It is thus likely that other factors, such as cognitive biases (Lyons et al., 2007), 
contribute to children’s overimitation. If so, memory and attentional capabilities 
might additionally be relevant for deciding whether to overimitate. Reducing task 
demands (e.g., modelling only one irrelevant action instead of a sequence) may shed 
light on how such cognitive factors affect overimitation. While this study does not 
inform about the cognitive biases underlying overimitation, these results suggest that 
overimitation is robustly actuated by the presence of the model, suggesting a social 
motivation being relevant for the behavior across diverse populations.  
In contrast to other cross-cultural studies on overimitation (Berl & Hewlett, 
2015; Nielsen et al., 2014; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010), I observed a cross-culturally 
recurrent increase in children’s overimitation with age. Children become more skillful 
members of their community during middle childhood and may receive child-centered 
learning opportunities more frequently with increasing age in order to learn more 
complex behaviors (e.g., Boyette & Hewlett, 2017). This may facilitate the use of 
overimitation as an adaptive strategy for social learning. The developmental increase 
in overimitation may further reflect age-related changes in memory capability and/or 
motor skills. Again, one possible avenue for future research is to investigate whether 
the effects of age and populations persist once children are confronted with tasks 
demanding lower cognitive abilities. Notably, Berl and Hewlett (2015) document 
overimitation in Aka adults even though the behavior was almost absent among young 
children. Although the accessibility and ontogeny of overimitation vary across 
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populations, the behavior is principally available and more frequent in the presence 
of the model across cultural contexts and can thus be considered functionally 
universal (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). 
This study is, to my knowledge, the first to empirically assess construct validity 
of the social motivation in overimitation across diverse populations. Overimitation 
did not predict reengagement behaviors in a separate task, questioning whether the 
social motivation for interacting with others is what drives overimitation in the 
presence of the model. In contrast, children may have shown overimitation selectively 
in order to conform to the model (DiYanni et al., 2015; McGuigan & Robertson, 2015) 
or to adhere to a perceived social norm (Keupp et al., 2013). Different social demands 
of the tasks may also explain the missing relation between overimitation and 
reengagement behaviors. Shy children, for example, may display high levels of social 
motivation in an overimitation context (e.g., copying the model exactly) in order to 
obey and because social initiative is not required in such situations. At the same time, 
they may appear less socially motivated in other contexts (e.g., not reengaging a 
recalcitrant adult in dyadic interaction) due to social inhibition.  
With regard to the reengagement task, the different levels of reengagement 
across populations need to be handled with caution. The Western experimenter was 
an out-group member in both Namibian populations. Local habits for approaching 
out-group members in social activities may thus have also been relevant for the 
cultural differences observed here. Again, more cross-cultural work is needed to 
understand whether and how such manipulations affect children’s social behaviors. 
Regardless of the missing relation between both phenomena linked to social 
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motivation it is important to note that both behaviors were more frequent among 
German as compared to both Hai||om and Ovambo children. This illustrates the 
necessity for testing children outside Western contexts in order to draw conclusions 
about the universality of human behaviors. 
In sum, the current study provides novel insights into the ontogeny, function, 
and universality of children’s overimitation. Children in three diverse populations 
showed a social motivation to overimitate an adult by copying more actions when the 
model was observing them as compared to being non-observant. Although it may be 
most common in Western contexts, the function of overimitation is inherently social 
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Children from Western, industrialized societies tend to copy actions modelled by an adult 
with high fidelity even if these actions are causally irrelevant. This so-called overimitation 
has been argued to be an important driver of cumulative cultural learning. However, cross-
cultural and developmental evidence on overimitation is controversial, likely due to 
diverging task demands regarding children’s attention and memory capabilities. Here, 
three- to seven-year-old children from a recent hunter-gatherer society (Hai||om/Namibia) 
were compared with urban Western children (Germany) using an overimitation procedure 
with minimal cognitive task demands. While the proportion of children engaging in 
overimitation at some point during the study was similar across the two populations, 
German overimitators copied irrelevant actions more persistently across tasks. These 
results suggest that the influence of culture on children’s overimitation may be one of 





Imitation is an important social learning strategy that helps children to accumulate 
knowledge and skills they could never compensate for by innovation alone (Heyes, 
2012a; Legare & Nielsen, 2015). From their second year of life onwards, children start 
to imitate actions which are visibly irrelevant for achieving an instrumental goal. This 
so-called overimitation (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons et al., 2007) has been 
suggested as a pervasive driver of cultural learning among humans (Legare & Nielsen, 
2015; Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 2015; Nielsen, 2012; Over & Carpenter, 
2013), as it allows the transmission of ritual-like behaviors that display affiliation with 
group members. If so, one would expect that overimitation is universal across a broad 
range of cultural contexts. Of particular relevance for understanding the significance 
of overimitation in social learning is the cultural context of contemporary hunter-
gatherers, given that this form of subsistence most closely resembles the social 
organization under which modern humans evolved.  
However, only few studies have assessed overimitation among hunter-gatherer 
populations. Evidence taken from these studies is contradictory with regards to 
whether and how much hunter-gatherer children overimitate (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; 
Nielsen et al., 2014; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Initial cross-cultural studies 
documented similar rates of overimitation among children from South-African 
hunter-gatherer populations as compared to urban children from urban Western 
populations (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010; Nielsen et al., 2014, 2016). Accordingly, the 
authors hypothesized overimitation as a “universal human trait” (Nielsen & 
Tomaselli, 2010, p. 1) that drives social learning across cultural contexts (Legare & 
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Nielsen, 2015; Nielsen, 2018). Recent findings challenged this assumption by 
documenting considerable variation in overimitation among hunter-gatherer 
children. While children from an Aka hunter-gatherer community in the Central 
African Republic showed almost no overimitation at all, adults from the same 
community did so more frequently (Berl & Hewlett, 2015). In support of a more 
gradual difference between Western children and those from a more traditional 
hunter-gatherer community, rural Hai||om children from Namibia showed less 
overimitation than urban Germans (see study 1, this dissertation). Given these 
findings, the universal importance of overimitation for social learning is at question.  
To fully understand the evolutionary significance of overimitation on shaping 
social learning in human populations, developmental approaches are important to 
understand when and how the behavior is acquired throughout ontogeny (Apicella & 
Barrett, 2016; Liebal & Haun, 2018). Again, recent evidence is inconsistent. In 
Western, industrialized societies, children’s overimitation typically increases from 
their second year of life onwards (Clay et al., 2018; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 
2011). Among non-Western societies, the evidence for such a developmental 
trajectory is mixed. In study 1 of this dissertation, I found an age-related increase in 
children’s overimitation across four- to eight-year-old Hai||om children. In contrast, 
Berl and Hewlett (2015) report no developmental increase in overimitation among Aka 
hunter-gatherer children of similar ages. Aka adults, however, showed overimitation 
more persistently. Other cross-cultural studies did not find age-related increases in 
overimitation among hunter-gatherer populations (Nielsen et al., 2014, 2016; Nielsen 
& Tomaselli, 2010). 
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Several aspects have been discussed as potential drivers of these 
inconsistencies in cross-cultural and developmental evidence on overimitation. First, 
cognitive and attentional task demands may have led children from Western 
communities to overimitate at higher levels than their non-Western counterparts, 
while also fostering age-related increases in some studies. In most overimitation tasks 
described previously, sequences of irrelevant actions have to be noticed, remembered, 
and exhibited in order to score high on overimitation. Western pedagogy may have 
helped those children to recall every irrelevant action, whereas the comparably low 
levels of direct pedagogy among hunter-gatherer children (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017) 
may have resulted in a lower focus on these actions among participants. Second, 
children’s exposition to functionally opaque artifacts, such as novel toys, may further 
explain cultural differences (Berl & Hewlett, 2015). In a typical overimitation 
paradigm, children are exposed to transparent boxes from which they then are given 
the opportunity to obtain rewards themselves. While Western children may have 
learned that even such objects may reveal hidden functions that are not visible at first 
glance (e.g., electronic sounds), children with less exposure to such artefacts may have 
little reason to expect such functions (Berl & Hewlett, 2015). Third, typical 
instructions, such as “your turn!” (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010) 
and “now you!” (see study 1) may have been perceived as a pedagogical request for 
imitation selectively in Western populations where such instructions are common. 
Fourth, characteristics of the model may have driven overimitation whenever Western 
experimenters conducted studies with non-Western participants (see also Berl & 
Hewlett, 2015). Finally, the variety of tasks used to assess overimitation is immense 
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(Hoehl et al., 2019). Depending on the specific procedure and coding scheme, 
overimitation scores may either reflect participants’ tendency to show overimitation 
at all (whether overimitation occurs per se; e.g., Berl & Hewlett, 2015) or how accurate 
and persistent they would do so (how much individuals rely on overimitation, e.g., see 
study 1).  
Accounting for these explanations, I designed a set of overimitation tasks with 
limited task demands. I kept normative language at minimum and actions were 
modelled by local experimenters. I investigated three- to seven-years-old children 
from a contemporary hunter-gatherer population (Hai||om/Namibia) and a Western, 
urban community (Germany). I used transparent lunch boxes from local shops in 
Namibia to minimize object novelty for the Hai||om children. I assessed four different 
tasks, each involving only one irrelevant action to minimize effects of task demands 
on children’s overimitation and in order to give children four independent choices in 
choosing whether and how persistently to overimitate.  
Following previous cross-cultural work (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; study 1 of this 
dissertation), I expected German children to show more overimitation than their 
Hai||om counterparts. If so, an exploratory question was whether such differences 
would manifest in whether or how much children would overimitate across the tasks. If 
the developmental increase observed in study 1 was due to an age-related increase in 
the social motivation for overimitation, I would expect children to show increasing 
levels of overimitation in both kind and persistence. In contrast, the absence of age 
effects would indicate that task demands, rather than an increasing reliance on 





42 Hai||om children were tested in Ondera (MAge = 6.06 years, range = 3.58 – 7.76, 21 
girls) and 80 German children in Leipzig (MAge = 5.77 years, range = 3.54 – 7.40, 40 girls) 
in the experimental condition. An additional 20 children of similar ages (10 per 
population) were tested in a control setup to assess whether children would show the 
irrelevant actions without observing a model performing them. The study was 
conducted at local school buildings. 
Materials 
Children were confronted with four boxes from which they could obtain candy 
(skittles; one per box). First, a transparent box (length = 10cm, width = 10cm, 
height = 5cm) with a transparent cover, having four flaps unfolded, was used together 
with a red pen (length = 17cm; see Figure 3a). Second, I used a brown cylindrical box 
(diameter = 7cm; height = 10cm) with a transparent cover (see Figure 3b). Third, a 
transparent box (length = 8cm, width = 11cm, height = 11cm) with a green-transparent 
cover and a lid covering a top hole was used (see Figure 3c). Finally, a blue box 
(length = 10cm, width = 29cm, height = 4cm) with 14 indentations and a white plastic 
spoon (length = 12cm) were presented to the participants (see Figure 3d). All boxes 
were ordinary containers designed for storing food and were bought in local shops in 
Namibia. Instructions were given in children’s respective native language. 
Translations and back-translation of the instructions were done by two independent 




Figure 3. Overimitation boxes used in the study 
Procedure 
Children entered the study room together with a male experimenter. First, both child 
and experimenter sat down facing each other at approximatively 1m distance. The 
experimenter took a paper bag and stated that both of them could use these to collect 
candy for themselves. He then took the first container and placed it between the 
participant and himself. Now, the experimenter took a candy out of the container and 
presented it to the child before putting it back into the container. He said “look” to 
direct the child’s attention toward the container and started with the modelling 
sequence. He then performed an irrelevant action on the box before obtaining the 
reward. Now, he took the candy from the box, showed it to the child and put it into his 
paper bag. Next, he took another candy, showed it to the child and put it into the box. 
After directing the child’s attention (“look”), he again performed the irrelevant action 
and took the candy from the box. This time, he showed the candy to the child and put 
it back into the box. He pushed box and pen within child’s reach and stated: “Now you 
can take the candy”. After children took the candy, the experimenter took the box 
aside und introduced the second container. This procedure was repeated 4 times, 
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allowing children to obtain candy from 4 transparent containers presented in a fixed 
order. 
For the first box, modelled actions included using the pen to tip each flap of the 
box, circling the box two times (irrelevant) before opening the cover and retrieving 
the candy (relevant). For the second box, he rattled the box next to his head 4 times 
(irrelevant) before obtaining the cover and retrieving the reward (relevant). On box 
three, the experimenter opened and closed the lid three times (irrelevant) before 
extracting the reward by turning the box upside down (relevant). Finally, the 
experimenter moved the candy, originally located in the indentation most distant 
from him, from one indentation to the other using the plastic spoon (irrelevant) and 
obtained the candy (relevant).  
In the control setup, children found themselves in an identical scenario as in 
the original experiment. Here, the experimenter pushed the boxes within the 
participant’s reach without modelling any action while asking them to take the 
rewards using identical instructions as in the experimental condition.  
Coding 
I coded children’s imitative behavior across the four trials. If children replicated the 
irrelevant action when confronted with a box, they received a score of 1. If they opened 
the box without performing the irrelevant action, they received a score of 0. A sum 
score was calculated by adding children’s scores per task resulting in an overimitation 
score between 0 and 4. A research assistant not involved in the study and unaware of 




Statistical Models and Preliminary Analyses 
In the control setup, no child in either community performed any of the irrelevant 
actions that were shown during experimental trials. Overimitation in the test 
situation is thus due to imitation of the model rather than innovation or any other 
strategy for obtaining the candy. Thus, all statistical analyses exclusively focused on 
children’s behaviors in the experimental condition. 
In the statistical model, I wanted to estimate whether children’s overimitation 
would vary with age, population, and the interaction between the two. Further, sex 
was included as a predictor since previous research has documented boys to 
overimitate more than girls (Frick, Clément, & Gruber, 2017). To assess whether and 
how much children would show overimitation, I ran a zero-inflated model. Since 
overdispersion was not an issue in the data (dispersion parameter = 0.91), the model 
was run with Poisson error structure. This approach allowed us to investigate the 
effects of the predictors on the outcome by using two regression analyses in parallel. 
First, a binomial logistic model estimated whether children’s overimitation would 
differ from zero. Second, a Poisson count model estimated whether the predictors 
would explain how much children would overimitate. Models were fitted in R (R Core 
Team, 2018) using the function zeroinfl from the package pscl (Zeileis, Kleiber, & 
Jackman, 2008). The same predictors were included into both the count- and zero-
inflation part of the model. To estimate the impact of each predictor, I compared a 
model comprising the interaction between the predictors with a model consisting of 
main effects only using a likelihood-ratio test. 
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Significance of the predictors was estimated by running likelihood-ratio tests 
comparing the model with a reduced model not containing the respective predictor 
either in the count or in the zero-inflation part using a function provided by Roger 
Mundry (personal communication). Since the interaction between age and population 
did not reach statistical significance, I dropped this term from the model to investigate 
the main effects of the two predictors. 
Results 
Overall, German children (M = 2.46, SD = 1.76) overimitated more persistently than 
Hai||om children (M = 1.57, SD = 1.56; count model: χ2 (1) = 9.93, p = .002). However, 
population did not predict whether children would show overimitation per se (zero-
inflation model: χ2 (1) = .06, p = .801; see Figure 4a). The likelihood of whether children 
would show overimitation at least once was similar across communities (Hai||om: 
31/42, 74%; German: 59/80, 74%). However, more than half of the German children 
showed overimitation in all four tasks (41/80), whereas only about one fourth of 
Hai||om children did so (10/42). Among Hai||om, the most common behavior was to 
show overimitation in only one of the four tasks (14/42), while such low persistence 
on overimitation was rarely observed among German children (9/80). The majority of 
German children showed overimitation across all tasks, whereas most Hai||om 
children did so only during tasks 1 and 4 (see Figure 4b). Age did neither affect whether 
(zero-inflation model: χ2 (1) = 0.29, p = .589) nor how much (count model: χ2 (1) = 0.27, 




Figure 4. Overimitation across populations; a) Overimitation per population (%); b) 
Overimitation per task and population (%) 
Discussion 
In this study, I investigated cross-cultural differences in children’s overimitation. I 
minimized cognitive and attentional task demands, introduced familiar objects, and 
gave instrumental instructions by local experimenters to optimize comparability 
across populations. Under these circumstances, children’s overimitation did not vary 
across ages. German children showed overimitation more persistently than Hai||om 
children, which replicates previously documented differences between urban Western 
and rural hunter-gatherer children (Berl & Hewlett, 2015). Importantly, this does not 
imply that overimitation did not occur among Hai||om children. The difference 
between children across cultures was in how much, not whether, children would show 
overimitation during the study.  
More than half of the German participants showed overimitation in all four 
tasks. In contrast, only about one in four Hai||om children overimitated with similar 
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persistence. At first glance, these result support claims on overimitation as a by-
product of Western pedagogy rather than an evolutionary commonality among 
humans (Berl & Hewlett, 2015). However, overimitation was clearly within the 
behavioral repertoire of most children in either population. In both populations, 
around three out of four children overimitated at least once throughout the study. 
Accordingly, interindividual variation was substantial: Around a quarter of the 
children in either population showed emulation instead of overimitation across tasks 
by retrieving the rewards without copying irrelevant actions at all. It thus appears that, 
even though absolute rates of overimitation and emulation vary between populations, 
the variation within populations may be cross-culturally recurrent. Interestingly, such 
stable ratios in social learning strategies on population levels may be functionally 
adaptive for the group as a whole (Yu & Kushnir, 2019). Accordingly, establishing and 
maintaining cumulative culture requires that faithful imitation (e.g., overimitation) 
and novel behaviors (e.g., innovation, emulation) are kept in balance. More research 
is needed to understand why some children engage in overimitation persistently, 
occasionally, or not at all. Personal dispositions, such as children’s social motivation 
to affiliate (Nielsen & Blank, 2011) and conformity (DiYanni et al., 2011) are promising 
candidates to interact with cultural input in shaping children’s preferred strategies for 
when and how to learn from others. 
The current data suggests that children across cultures differ in how much, but 
not whether, they engage in overimitation. Hai||om children can and do engage in 
overimitation. The persistence and ubiquity of overimitation among Western contexts 
may, however, lead to an overestimation of its relevance outside such populations. 
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Other strategies, such as observation, emulation, and learning through trial-and-
error, do also contribute to when and how individuals acquire skills and knowledge 
(Hewlett, 2016). Taken together, I thus argue that the capacity for and use of 
overimitation in pedagogical settings is shared across cultures and consequently 
functionally universal (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005).  
Most German children showed overimitation pervasively. Hai||om children, in 
contrast, did so only selectively. Five Hai||om children showed overimitation on trial 
1 but ceased to do so afterwards. Eight children showed overimitation only in trial 4. 
Notably, in both of these trials, a tool (trial 1: pen; trial 4: plastic spoon) was used for 
performing the irrelevant action. Recent research suggests that using tools increases 
overimitation in children (Taniguchi & Sanefuji, 2017), making it plausible that 
overimitation is particularly prevalent during the acquisition of behaviors involving 
tool-use. Interestingly, anthropologists have described teaching among hunter-
gatherers to occur primarily in the acquisition of complex and/or social skills (Boyette 
& Hewlett, 2017; Salali et al., 2019). It is thus plausible that the dyadic, child-centered 
context in which overimitation was assessed in this study triggered overimitation 
among the Hai||om participants because they expected the model to display complex 
or socially-important information (such as rituals or norms; see Csibra & Gergely, 
2009, 2011). Realizing that the actions were neither complex nor socially meaningful, 
they may have switched to emulation instead. Germans children at the age range 
tested here may increasingly overgeneralize overimitation as a useful strategy due to 
the ubiquity of direct, child-centered pedagogy in their daily lives.  
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In contrast to other studies (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan 
et al., 2011; Nielsen, 2006), children’s overimitation did not increase with age. This 
result is surprising because such an effect was previously shown in Hai||om children 
from a neighboring community (see study 1 of this dissertation). The developmental 
stability in overimitation once cognitive and attentional task demands are lowered 
indicates that children’s inclination for overimitation is acquired early in ontogeny 
and may remain more stable than thought previously. Future studies will need to 
assess children’s cognitive abilities (e.g., memory skills or executive functioning) and 
their social motivation in parallel in order to disentangle the effects of both variables 
on triggering whether and how much children overimitate. 
In sum, this study argues that it is the persistence on, rather than the capacity 
for, overimitation that is shaped culturally. German children engaged in more 
overimitation than Hai||om children, even though task demands were kept minimal. 
Compared to their Western counterparts, it thus seems that rural hunter-gatherer 
children flexibly use overimitation as one out of many strategies for learning from 















                                                   




Children’s social motivation to interact with peers is hypothesized to boost the frequency 
and quality of social interactions and, in consequence, their emerging Theory of Mind. I 
investigated three- to eight-years-old children’s social motivation and social-cognitive 
skills in three diverse populations (German, Hai||om, Ovambo; N = 240). In all three 
populations, children displayed more positive emotions during collaborative as compared 
to individual activity. In contrast, the preference to collaborate or to work alone varied 
across populations: German children preferred collaboration, whereas Hai||om children 
chose individual over collaborative activity. While younger Ovambo children preferred 
collaboration, they favored individual activities increasingly with age. Crucially, at an 
individual level, children’s positive emotions during collaboration predicted their Theory 
of Mind skills in a separate task. These results indicate that while cultural context strongly 
shapes children’s explicit choices whether to collaborate with peers, the positive emotions 






Ranging from small hunter-gatherer bands to industrialized urban societies—humans 
depend on social interactions with others (Henrich, 2015). Consequently, children 
need to learn how to navigate and benefit from social interactions with adults and 
peers. For this learning process, collaborative interactions, in which two or more 
agents are interdependently working toward a joint goal for mutual benefit, are 
particularly relevant. The interdependence between collaborating agents demands 
mental perspective-taking and coordination, because individuals have to monitor and 
adapt their own actions, perspectives, beliefs, and goals with those of their 
interactants (Chevallier et al., 2012; Tomasello, 2018). Engaging in collaboration thus 
offers a unique learning context for Theory of Mind. 
It has been suggested that the early emergence of collaboration in human 
ontogeny relies on children’s intrinsic motivation to interact (Chevallier et al., 2012; 
Levinson, 2006; Tomasello et al., 2005). In support of this claim, four- to eleven-year-
old U.S.-children display more positive emotions (e.g., intensity and frequency of 
smiles) when solving problems in collaboration with a peer as compared to doing so 
individually (Perlmutter et al., 1989). Furthermore, three-year-olds from urban 
Germany prefer to work collaboratively in contrast to solitarily in order to obtain 
rewards (Rekers et al., 2011).  
Thus far, the social motivation underlying children’s collaboration has almost 
exclusively been studied in Western, industrialized populations. This sampling bias 
renders generalizations about the motivational underpinnings of children’s social 
interactions inadequate (Henrich et al., 2010; Nielsen et al., 2017). In Western 
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societies, children’s social interactions are typically scaffolded by parents and other 
caregivers. Adults support children’s learning from and within social interactions by 
praising them for socially competent behaviors. Children are free to approach others 
depending on their preferences (Keller, 2007). Children learn to collaborate with 
others under adult supervision (Brownell et al., 2006; Tomasello & Hamann, 2012). By 
the age of two years, they begin to flexibly coordinate activities themselves and 
increasingly engage in peer collaboration without adult supervision (Brownell et al., 
2006; Eckerman, Davis, & Didow, 1989). From this age onwards, peer collaboration is 
ubiquitous in children’s everyday social interactions in Western, industrialized 
societies.  
However, this practice to actively shape and reward children’s social 
interactions with peers is not representative for children’s socialization outside urban 
Western populations. In traditional farming communities, for example, parents 
neither routinely engage in collaborative activities with their children, nor do they 
supervise or reward children’s peer interactions in the way Western parents do. 
Instead, caregivers value hierarchical relatedness, obedience, and conformity (Barry 
et al., 1959; Keller & Kärtner, 2013). The Ovambo, an ethnic group of Namibian agro-
pastoralists, emphasize these values in their socialization goals and practices (Brown, 
2011; Nampala et al., 2006; Zimba, 2002): Children’s dependence on and relatedness 
to the social group is emphasized using directive, assertive communication between 
parents and their offspring (Brown, 2011; Keller, 2007). Even young children are 
frequently tasked with household duties and are required to do so autonomously and 
without the help of others. Peer interactions are rarely supervised by adults. 
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In hunter-gatherer communities, such as the Hai||om of northern Namibia, 
caregivers value autonomy as a primary socialization goal (Hewlett, 2016; Widlok, 
1999). In such contexts, children are free to structure their activities without strong 
obligations toward others, enabling higher levels of individual, rather than 
collaborative learning. Adults and children actively avoid subordination and 
dependence between individuals (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017). Similar to the Ovambo, 
receiving direct instruction and supervised collaboration from adults is rare among 
Hai||om parents because such parenting contradicts cultural emphasizes on 
egalitarianism and autonomy. In contrast to Western parenting practices, caregivers 
rarely praise young children for socially competent behaviors but rather rebuke them 
when children do not adhere to social norms (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017; Terashima & 
Hewlett, 2016). 
In sum, there is strong evidence that the quality and quantity of young 
children’s social interactions and collaboration activities differs substantially across 
populations. It is, however, unclear whether and how such differences also affect 
children’s motivation to engage in social interactions. Given the importance of social 
motivation for fostering children’s social-cognitive development (Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2004; Chevallier et al., 2012; Tomasello, 2018; Tomasello et al., 2005), it is also 
unclear whether this link can be generalized as a cross-culturally recurrent 
mechanism in children’s social-cognitive development. Finally, the exact 
determinants and construct validity of children’s social motivation are currently 
unclear. Various measures have been put forward as proxies for children’s social 
motivation, including their positive emotional expressions (Aknin et al., 2012; 
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Perlmutter et al., 1989) and their preferential choices (Rekers et al., 2011; 
Schuhmacher & Kärtner, 2015). Whether these phenomena are reflective of the same 
underlying motivation or whether they indicate distinct, unrelated components of 
reward processing (Berridge & Robinson, 2003) has yet to be examined. 
To address these issues, I assessed three- to eight-year-olds’ social motivation 
for collaboration utilizing both their emotional expressions and their more explicit 
preferential choices. To account for the role of culture in shaping children’s social 
interactions, I tested participants from an urban German population (Leipzig) and 
children from two rural and culturally-diverse Namibian populations (Hai||om, 
Ovambo). Dyads of children (matched for sex and age) played a game in which they 
could obtain balls from three apparatuses by pulling ropes. In a within-subject design, 
children retrieved the balls either through individual action or through collaborative 
efforts with their peer (eight trials in total). As a first measure of children’s social 
motivation, their positive emotional expressions during each activity were coded from 
video. In addition to gaming context (individual or collaborative), I manipulated the 
objective value of the balls (high reward or low reward). This was done to validate 
whether the coding scheme could reliably identify changes in children’s emotional 
expressions as a function of objective rewards. As a second measure of social 
motivation, I investigated their explicit preferences by letting them choose to play 
either individually or collaboratively in a final trial.  
To assess whether interindividual differences in children’s social motivation for 
collaboration would relate to their social-cognitive abilities, participants also 
completed a culturally adapted Theory of Mind scale in a separate task (Wellman & 
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Liu, 2004) in which they were asked questions about the mental states of fictive 
characters. A composite score of children’s performances across tasks was used as a 
proxy for their Theory of Mind skills. 
I hypothesized that if children’s social motivation to collaborate is a universal 
driver of social interactions, children across all three populations should be biased to 
express more positive emotions during collaboration as well as to prefer collaboration 
during the subsequent forced-choice trial. If, in contrast, this motivation is culturally 
variable, the three populations should show different patterns: German children 
should show high social motivation due to the parental scaffolding of collaborative 
behaviors and the praise received in social interactions (Perlmutter et al., 1989; Rekers 
et al., 2011). Hai||om children, in contrast, should show a lower (or even reversed) 
motivation to collaborate due to their cultural emphasis on child autonomy (Boyette 
& Hewlett, 2017). My expectations regarding Ovambo children were mixed. On the 
one hand, the limited supervision and praise for socially competent behaviors by 
Ovambo caregivers might reveal a similar pattern as predicted for Hai||om children. 
On the other hand, the local emphasis on interpersonal responsibilities and social 
relations might also foster children’s motivation to collaborate. In the case of 
revealing cross-cultural variability in children’s social motivation, I further predicted 
that such differences should become more pronounced with increasing age (Blake et 
al., 2015; House et al., 2013). With regard to the construct validity of social motivation 
across measurements, I further expected children’s positive expressed emotions 
during collaboration to predict their preferential choice in a subsequent forced-choice 
trial because of the increased reward value of collaboration following positive 
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experience with their peers (see also Schuhmacher & Kärtner, 2015). To further 
explore this potential effect, I was also interested in whether such links between 
socially motivated behaviors would be affected by children’s age and their cultural 
background. Finally, I expected interindividual differences in both positive emotional 
expressions and explicit choices to be linked to children’s Theory of Mind regardless 
of population and age, since the interplay between social motivation and social 
cognition has been assumed to be universal across populations (Chevallier et al., 2012; 
Tomasello, 2018).  
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 240 children (120 dyads, MAge = 5.87 years, SDAge = 1.18, age range = 3.54 to 
8.35) participated in the study. Each participant was paired with a same-sex peer of 
approximately similar age (MAge Difference = 0.45 years, SDAge Difference = 0.58). Participants 
came from three different populations: Forty German dyads (n = 80, 42 girls, 
MAge = 5.77, SDAge = 1.22, MAge Difference = 0.30) from Leipzig, 40 Hai||om dyads (n = 80, 40 
girls, MAge = 6.11 years, SDAge = 1.02, MAge Difference = 0.68) from Ondera and Farm 6, and 40 
Ovambo dyads (n = 80, 38 girls, MAge = 5.73 years, SDAge = 1.26, MAge Difference = 0.37) from 
Oshivelo. Five additional dyads were tested in Oshivelo but excluded from further 
analyses because children were later found to be older than the initially targeted 
maximum age of 8 years (3 dyads) or because one or both children were later found 
growing up in a non-Ovambo household (2 dyads). Among Hai||om participants, one 




Collaboration task. Each child sat on a cushion (diameter = 34cm) placed on 
the floor in approximately 2m distance from the apparatuses. Instructions came from 
a 35-slide multimedia presentation (Microsoft PowerPoint) that was presented on a 
laptop screen (MacBook Air, 13”). Audio-files were translated from English into the 
respective language (Oshivambo, Hai||om, and German) by native speakers and the 
translation was double-checked by another native speaker. Disagreements between 
translations were minor and were solved through discussion among the two 
translators. Audio files of the final translations were subsequently recorded and 
embedded in the videos. The arrangement of apparatuses presented on the laptop 
screen was identical to that in testing room. Two types of wooden apparatuses (30cm 
x 15cm x 11cm) were used to manipulate either collaborative or individual efforts for 
obtaining rewards (following Hamann et al., 2011). Within each apparatus, children 
could move a wooden block (5cm x 10cm x 5cm; colored either blue or red) by pulling 
a same-colored rope to release a ball down a ramp. For the two individual apparatuses 
used in the study, each participant could retrieve one ball by pulling the rope 
individually. Both ends of the rope were accessible on the collaboration apparatus, so 
that participants needed to pull together, each on one end of the rope, to retrieve balls. 
On both types of apparatuses, the ends of each rope were wound around a wooden 
stick (height = 16cm) in front of the apparatus. Two types of balls (diameter = 3cm) 
were used as rewards in the study: High-rewarding balls were colorful (red or blue) 
with rattling plastic balls inside a transparent and shiny round cover. Low-rewarding 
balls were plain wooden balls with similar colors. Participants could drop the balls into 
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different types of containers. Children could place the low-rewarding balls in a green 
plastic box (10cm x 6cm x 4cm) and put the high-rewarding balls into the snout of a 
golden colored toy elephant, producing attractive jingle sounds. A white curtain (70cm 
x 70cm), placed in central position in front of the apparatuses, was used as a visual 
barrier between participants.  
Theory of Mind. I used an adaption of the original five-point scale (Wellman & 
Liu, 2004) to assess Theory of Mind in children across populations. This scale includes 
tasks on the concepts of Diverse Desires, Knowledge Access, Contents False Belief, 
Diverse Beliefs, and Hidden Emotions. Children were also tested with an additional 
task on Explicit False Belief. However, due to an experimental error in one population, 
I did not include data on this task in the statistical analyses but used the original five-
point scale instead. I adapted the original scale as outlined below to meet the 
requirements of cross-cultural research. All modifications closely mirrored the 
original equivalent. Only minor changes in stimulus material were implemented to 
guarantee cultural appropriateness and familiarity.  
I used toy figurines with common appearance and names for each population. 
In the task on Diverse Desires, I implemented images of nuts and candy. For the task 
on Knowledge Access, I used a matchbox as a container and a toy cat as further 
stimulus material. I further utilized an empty fish tin as a container to test Contents 
False Belief together with a cow figure. To assess Diverse Beliefs, I used comic images 
of a green bush and a wooden hut. I assessed Hidden Emotion using the original 
emotion scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004) as well as drawings of the back view of a child. 
Native speakers translated all task instructions and questions from English into each 
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language. Another native speaker double-checked these translations. Disagreements 
were minor and were resolved through discussion between translators. 
Procedure 
Collaboration task: Training trials. Participants entered the study room with 
an adult male experimenter and sat down on the cushion next to a laptop from which 
instruction were given. Children were told that they could obtain balls from 
apparatuses. Next, they saw how low-rewarding balls could be dropped into the 
respective container. Each child received a low-rewarding ball to put it into the 
container herself. The same procedure was repeated for high-rewarding balls 
afterwards. In the following video sequence, an adult model appeared next to the left 
individual apparatus and received a low-rewarding ball from it by unravelling and 
pulling the rope individually. A similar video started in which a second adult model 
retrieved a low-rewarding ball from the right individual apparatus. Each child could 
practice the retrieval of balls from the two apparatuses themselves. Subsequently, 
children saw both models on the laptop screen acting in the collaboration condition. 
Each model unraveled the rope before both pulled the rope collaboratively. Again, 
children could retrieve the balls from the collaboration apparatus themselves.  
Collaboration task: Test trials. Following training trials, each dyad engaged in 
eight test trials. The first four test trials consisted each of a combination of reward 
(high vs. low) and condition (individual vs. collaboration), presented in a 
counterbalanced order. The order of conditions was then repeated for test trials five 
to eight. Each child thus participated in each scenario twice during the test phase. 
Every trial was introduced by a video in which children were explicitly informed about 
 
 106 
the next trial. Participants then saw a video sequence showing a model retrieving the 
ball either alone or collaboratively, depending on condition. Meanwhile, the 
experimenter baited the apparatuses allowing children to be confronted with a similar 
situation to that previously seen on the laptop screen. Besides baiting the apparatuses, 
the experimenter kept interactions with participants at minimum throughout the 
study. During individual trials, only one individual apparatus was baited at a time and 
participants thus pulled one after another. Here, the left apparatus was always baited 
first to avoid confusion in participants. 
Collaboration task: Forced-choice trial. After eight test trials, a last forced-
choice trial was announced from tape. The experimenter baited all apparatuses with 
high-reward balls. Children decided on their own whether to retrieve a ball from either 
the collaborative or the individual apparatus. Each action resulted in a similar 
outcome and children were free to talk to each other to coordinate their behaviors. 
Following this trial, children received candy (Skittles) for their participation (see 





Figure 5. Experimental set-up, baited apparatuses are marked with rewards of 
respective color; (a) individual trials; (b) collaboration trials; in the beginning of each 
trial children sit next to each other facing the apparatuses, depending on condition, 
one (a) or both (b) participants then move toward the apparatuses and pull the rope(s) 
either alone or collaboratively; (c) forced-choice trial with all apparatuses baited 
(here: both participants choose collaboration) 
Theory of Mind. Task manipulation and coding instructions were similar to the 
original study of Wellman and Liu (2004). Tasks were introduced to children in a fixed 
order (Diverse Desires — Knowledge Access — Contents False Belief — Diverse Beliefs 
— Hidden Emotions). Children were tested individually. Children were sitting on a 
chair next to the experimenter. Study materials were presented on a table between 
child and experimenter. Assessments of Theory of Mind and social motivation were 




Collaboration Task: Positive Emotional Expressions. Children’s behavior was 
recorded using a camcorder placed approximately 1.5m in front of the apparatuses. 
For coding children’s emotional expressions, videos were cut for each test trial 
separately. Each such sequence began when children started moving to the apparatus 
and the video sequence lasted until children picked up their respective ball. One video 
sequence was approximately ten seconds in duration and was coded without sound. I 
coded each video with regards to children’s most positive expressed emotions in the 
situation on a scale from 0 (neutral affect) to +4 (super happy). Using similar 
approaches, previous research reports good to excellent interrater-reliability between 
raters from different populations (Aknin et al., 2015), since display rules of happiness 
are performed and recognized robustly and reliably across cultural contexts (Crivelli 
et al., 2016). Such ratings from tape are also reported to correlate almost perfectly with 
those of other, standardized measurements for affect, such as Baby FACS (Oster, 2006). 
Initially, I also implemented a code of -1 (negative affect) in the coding scheme, but 
did not make use of this because participants did not show signs of such negative 
affect during test trials. Statistical analyses and data illustrations are thus given in the 
range from 0 to 4. A second German coder, blind to hypotheses, coded a randomly 
selected sample of 20 participants per population (25% of the full data). Interrater 
reliability for the affect data was high (ICC = .73). 
Collaboration Task: Forced-Choice Preferences. Finally, I coded children’s 
behavior on the forced-choice trial as a categorial variable. When deciding to pull 
individually, children received a score of 0. When choosing the collaboration 
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apparatus, children received a score of 1. If children tried to pull both ropes 
simultaneously, they were scored as 0.5. Reliability of the coding system assessing 
forced-choice preferences was excellent (κ = .94).  
Theory of Mind. To code children’s Theory of Mind, children’s behaviors and 
verbal utterances were first transcribed. From these transcriptions and the matching 
videos, each task was rated one by one according to the coding instructions of the 
original task battery (Wellman & Liu, 2004). That is, children’s correct answers were 
scored as 1, whereas incorrect answers were scored as 0. I calculated a Theory of Mind 
score by adding all correct answers in the tasks on Diverse Desires, Knowledge Access, 
Contents False Belief, Diverse Belief, and Hidden Emotions. Children could thus gain 
a Theory of Mind score between 0 and 5, with higher scores indicating better Theory 
of Mind abilities. A second coder rated all transcriptions. Interrater agreements were 
excellent both on task level (κDiverse Desires = .95; κKnowledge Access = .95; κContents False Beliefs = .90; 
κDiverse Beliefs = .97; κHidden Emotions = .96) and with regards to overall Theory of Mind score 
(ICC = .98). 
Statistical Models and Preliminary Analyses 
I analyzed the data in R (R Core Team, 2018) and the statistical analyses can be 
grouped into three separate parts. To analyze children’s social motivation across 
populations, I ran models on children’s emotional expressions (Model 1) and their 
forced-choice decisions (Model 2). I further investigated whether children’s Theory of 
Mind abilities could be predicted by children’s emotional expressions and their 
forced-choice decisions (Model 3). I fitted the models using the package lme4 (Bates 
et al., 2017) and tested statistical significance of the predictors by using likelihood 
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ratio tests comparing the full model to a reduced model not containing the respective 
predictor. Each effect is described by reporting means and standard deviations for each 
level of the categorical predictors or by naming model estimates and standard errors 
for each metric predictor. Interactions between predictors were tested but excluded if 
they did not reach statistical significance. In order to control for the effects of the 
experimentally controlled variables color of apparatuses (red vs. blue), position of 
participant (left vs. right), and trial (1–4; z-standardized), I ran pre-analyses with 
models containing these control variables as predictors. Whenever these variables had 
a marginally significant effect on the outcome (p < .1), they were included into the 
final model as a control variable. All assumption checks including variance-inflation-
factor, normality distribution of residuals (for the linear models), and overdispersion 
revealed no issues for any of the three models. 
Collaboration Task: Positive Emotional Expressions. I investigated whether 
participants expressed different degrees of positive affect after retrieving the balls 
depending on population, condition, reward, and age (z-standardized) by calculating 
a linear mixed model with Gaussian error distribution. I averaged both trials of each 
combination of reward (high vs. low) and condition (collaboration vs. individual) as a 
dependent variable to get a reliable indicator of children’s emotional expressions 
across experimental manipulations. Sex was included as a control variable. A prior 
analysis showed that trial, position of the child, and color of collaboration apparatus 
were marginally related to children’s affect (χ2Trial (1) = 3.67, p = .055; χ2Position*Population 
(2) = 9.53, p = .008; χ2Color (1) = 3.09, p = .079). All variables were thus included in the 
model as controls. In addition, I included the random effects of condition, reward, 
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their interaction, and trial for both dyads as well as each subject in the model. Trial 
was further included as a random intercept. Preliminary analyses revealed that, in 
contrast to the other predictors, reward did not interact with any other predictor. It 
was thus included as a main effect into the final model. 
Collaboration Task: Forced-Choice Preferences. Here, I focused on whether 
children’s behavior during forced-choice trials was influenced by the predictors 
population, age, and children’s positive expressed emotions during collaboration. For 
this purpose, I calculated an affect index by subtracting participants’ mean affect 
scores across individual trials (high & low reward) from the mean scores of the 
collaboration trials. An index of 0 thus indicated that children’s affect did not vary 
between conditions. Positive values indicated more positive emotions during 
collaboration. Negative values indicated more positive emotional expressions when 
pulling individually. To test the research hypotheses, I ran a generalized linear mixed 
model with binomial error distribution. Before running the model, those children who 
did not show a clear preference for either individual activity or collaboration in this 
trial by pulling both ropes simultaneously were excluded (N = 16). The frequency of 
these choices did not differ between populations (nGerman = 6; nHai||om = 6; nOvambo = 4). Sex 
was included as a control variable. Finally, dyad was included as a random intercept. 
To test whether children’ choices differed from chance level, binomial tests were run 
for each group separately. 
Theory of Mind. Running a linear mixed model, I investigated whether 
children’s Theory of Mind could be predicted by their affect index and their forced-
choice behaviors in the pulling game. The dependent variable was children’s Theory 
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of Mind scores. Forced-choice decisions and affect index were included as predictors. 
Further, populations, age (z-standardized), and sex were included as controls. To 
account for the dyadic situation in which the predictors were assessed, dyad was 
included as a random intercept.  
Results 
Collaboration Task: Positive Emotional Expressions. Children across 
populations showed higher positive affect during collaborative, as compared to 
individual trials. German children showed the strongest bias for collaboration 
(MCollaboration = 1.68, SDCollaboration = 0.76; MIndividual = 1.21, SDIndividual = 0.78), followed by 
Ovambo children (MCollaboration = 1.49, SDCollaboration = 1.00; MIndividual = 1.28, SDIndividual = 0.99). 
Among Hai||om children, this tendency was markedly smaller (MCollaboration = 1.37, 
SDCollaboration = 1.09; MIndividual = 1.31, SDIndividual = 1.04; Populations*Condition: χ2 
(2) = 31.61, p < .001; see Figure 6). 
With age, children tended to show an increasing bias for collaborative activities 
in their positive affect displays (Condition*Age: χ2 (1) = 3.84, p = .050). Further, there 
was a main effect of reward in that children displayed more happiness on trials with 
high rewards (M = 1.44, SD = 0.97) as compared to trials with low reward (M = 1.34, 




Figure 6. Expressed emotions — (a) effect of population and condition on expressed 
emotions, bubble sizes are proportional to data points; boxes indicate quartiles; bold 
horizontal lines indicate group medians; dotted horizontal lines indicate group 
means; (b) effect of age and population on expressed emotions selectively during 
collaboration (affect index) (fitted values of Linear Models containing the same 
predictors and controls as the original model are plotted) 
Collaboration Task: Forced-Choice Preferences. Across population and ages, 
children differed in their preferences whether to choose collaboration or individual 
activity (Population*Age: χ2(2) = 9.09, p = .011). Only German children showed a 
preference for collaboration (49/74; p = .007). Hai||om children, in contrast, preferred 
the individual option over collaboration (22/74; p < .001). Among both of these 
populations, these tendencies appeared to consolidate with age (see Figure 7a). 
Overall, Ovambo children showed no preference for either option (41/76; p = .567). 
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However, while younger Ovambo children preferred collaborative activities, this 
tendency reversed among older children as those preferably chose to pull individually.  
The effect of the affect index on children’s preferences varied across ages in 
that it was only linked positively among younger children, whereas the two proxies of 
social motivation were dissociated or even linked negatively among older children 
(Expressed Emotions*Age: χ2 (1) = 4.43, p = .035; see Figure 7b). 
 
Figure 7. Preferential choices (1 = collaboration, 0 = individual) — (a) effect of age and 
population on forced-choice decisions (fitted values of Generalized Linear Model 
containing the same predictors and controls as the original model are plotted); (b) 
effect of expressed emotions (affect index) on forced-choice decisions (fitted values 
of Generalized Linear Model containing the same predictors and controls as the 
original model; for illustrative purposes age was categorized into 3 groups) 
Theory of Mind. Across populations, children’s Theory of Mind skills could be 
predicted by their emotional expressions (χ2(1) = 7.60, p = .006). That is, children who 
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selectively expressed more positive emotions during collaboration as compared to 
individual activity scored higher on the Theory of Mind scale (Estimate ± SE: 0.41 ± 
0.15, see Figure 8). Children who preferentially chose collaboration during forced-
choice trials showed considerable, but not significantly higher Theory of Mind skills 
than those who preferred individual activity (MCollaboration = 2.39, SDCollaboration = 1.51; 
MIndividual = 2.03, SDIndividual = 1.34; χ2(1) = 2.95, p = .086). I also observed a strong and 
recurrent effect of age on children’s Theory of Mind such that older children showed 
better Theory of Mind skills (0.46 ± 0.07; χ2(1) = 37.58, p < .001). Theory of Mind scores 
were also affected by culture (χ2(2) = 99.10, p < .001). That is, German children 
(MGerman = 3.43, SDGerman = 1.22) had higher scores than Hai||om (MHai||om = 2.03, 
SDHai||om = 1.06), whereas Hai||om children scored higher than Ovambo children 
(MOvambo = 1.15, SDOvambo = 0.95). 
 
Figure 8. Theory of Mind — Effect of expressed emotions selectively during 
collaboration (affect index) on Theory of Mind scores (fitted values of Linear Models 




The current results reveal both cross-cultural continuity and variability in children’s 
social motivation for collaboration. Across populations, children expressed more 
positive emotions when obtaining a reward collaboratively as compared to doing so 
individually. This effect was strongest among German, attenuated among Ovambo, 
and weakest among Hai||om children. Children’s explicit choices of collaboration 
varied more strongly between populations: German children preferred peer 
collaboration over solitary activity. Among Ovambo children, this preference was only 
evident among younger participants, whereas older participants preferred individual 
activities. Hai||om children preferred the solitary activity across ages. Both measures 
of social motivation were positively linked among younger children. Finally, children’s 
positive emotional expressions during collaboration predicted their Theory of Mind 
skills on an individual level. Together these results indicate that the cross-culturally 
recurrent tendency to experience positive emotions during collaboration is linked to 
their children’s emerging social-cognitive skills across diverse populations.  
The current results lend partial support to universalists’ claims regarding the 
role of social motivation in child ontogeny (Chevallier et al., 2012; Tomasello et al., 
2005). According to this view, children experience and express positive emotions 
during social interactions. These emotions, in turn, can be at the base of a multitude 
of species-typical levels of (ultra-)sociality (Tomasello, 2014). For example, 
experiencing positive emotions through collaboration may boost children’s prosocial 
behaviors by motivating them to join and help in adults’ activities (Carpendale, 
Kettner, & Audet, 2015) or to build positive reputations with potential collaborators 
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(Engelmann & Rapp, 2018). With regard to social-cognitive skills, this emotional 
aspect of social motivation might facilitate the ontogeny of Theory of Mind which, in 
turn, enables profitable behavioral coordination between social partners.  
In contrast to children’s emotional expressions, their choice of collaboration 
varied more substantially across populations. This heterogeneity increased with age, 
resonating with previous work documenting that culturally-specific social behaviors 
emerge over middle childhood (Blake et al., 2015; House et al., 2013; van Leeuwen et 
al., 2018). Around this age, cultural practices give rise to normative obligations and 
external rewards resulting from collaborative activities. The robust preference for 
collaboration among German children may be a cumulative result of typical 
pedagogical interventions in Western populations, such as praise for collaborative 
efforts, underpinned by a species-typical intrinsic motivation to collaborate. The 
preference for individual activity among older Ovambo and Hai||om children may, in 
contrast, be best explained by the impact of parental cultural models focusing on 
autonomy, possibly attenuating children’s intrinsic motivations to collaborate. The 
Hai||om emphasize child autonomy from early childhood onwards (Widlok, 1999). 
Given the choice between collaboration or individual work in order to reach a similar 
goal may have led Hai||om children to prefer individual action in order to avoid being 
dependent to the collaborative partner (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017). Among the 
Ovambo, children’s preference for the individual activity emerged only later in 
ontogeny. While interdependent values are emphasized in Ovambo parenting, older 
children may be increasingly requested to act autonomously in the context of 
household chores. This action autonomy marks a central socialization goal among the 
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Ovambo. A conceivable explanation for these findings is that children preferred 
individual activities to demonstrate their action autonomy. Interestingly, prior studies 
on children’s social learning preferences document similar ontogenetic shifts toward 
autonomy among some rural, non-Western contexts. For example, majority influence 
on children’s social learning preferences declines over middle childhood, an effect 
that may be driven by increasing egocentrism around this age (van Leeuwen et al., 
2018). However, it remains unclear to which degree the developmental trends in the 
current study are specific to the context of collaboration or whether they reflect 
ontogenetic shifts in social motivation per se.  
To assess the construct validity of social motivation, children’s expressed 
emotions were linked to their preferences for collaboration. In younger children, both 
phenomena were linked positively, supporting claims on the homogeneity of social 
motivation in early ontogeny (Chevallier et al., 2012). Procedural aspects of this study, 
such as the assessment of emotional expressions prior to the forced-choice trial, 
indicate that the experience of positive emotions may have led children to like the 
collaborative activity, which therefore led them to seek this behavior during forced-
choice trials. In line with this finding, Schumacher and Kärtner (2015) found children 
of slightly younger ages than those tested here to prefer collaborative activities with 
peers after experiencing positive social interactions with them in a previous activity. 
Taken together, these results highlight the importance of emotional experience for 
young children’s behavioral preferences in the context of peer collaboration. 
Among older participants, however, the two phenomena dissociated from one 
another or even became linked negatively. Although this finding may appear 
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surprising at first glance, two explanations may be helpful for classifying this 
ontogenetic shift in the internal consistence of social motivation. First, cross-cultural 
differences in children’s social behaviors often get consolidated and more pronounced 
during middle to late childhood (Blake et al., 2015; House et al., 2013). This drift in 
the data was most evident in children’s explicit preferences to choose collaboration 
or individual activity. Such explicit decisions may be particularly affected by 
culturally-specific socialization goals, such as the emphasis on action autonomy. 
Given that, with age, children’s explicit preferences differed more across populations 
than their (intrinsic) emotional expressions, the dissociation between the two 
phenomena may need to be interpreted as a side effect of the impact of culturally-
specific socialization goals in shaping children’s explicit and implicit social behaviors. 
Secondly, it is important to note that previous research has already dissected different 
components of reward processing, such as liking (e.g., positive emotional expressions) 
and seeking (e.g., preferential choices) based on their evolutionary origins and the 
neural circuits in which they are typically processed (Berridge & Robinson, 2003; 
Berridge et al., 2009). Again, these findings demand for more scientific work 
combining developmental and cross-cultural approaches together with a focus on 
interindividual differences to understand the scope and construct validity of social 
motivation throughout ontogeny. 
Individual differences in children’s emotional expressions during collaboration 
predicted their performance in a battery of Theory of Mind tasks. I thus propose that 
the positive emotions experienced during collaboration function as reward and might 
consequentially facilitate children’s quality and frequency with which they engage in 
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such interactions. Since engaging in collaborative activities provides a particularly 
valuable learning context to foster Theory of Mind abilities due to their inherent 
demands for mental coordination and perspective-taking (Tomasello, 2018; 
Tomasello et al., 2005), an increase in quality and frequency of social interactions 
might provide children with increased opportunities for social-cognitive 
development. A second (reverse) interpretation would be that children’s emerging 
Theory of Mind enables successful coordination with others during collaboration, 
which, in turn, might make collaborative activities more enjoyable and rewarding. I 
argue that a combination of both mechanisms is most plausible: Social motivation and 
social cognition build on one another through the experience children gain in 
collaborative activities. Future studies need to investigate whether this link is specific 
to collaborative activities, or whether it applies to social interactions more generally 
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Chevallier et al., 2012).  
In the current study, I found that children’s tendency to choose collaboration 
over individual action varies across three diverse cultural contexts. At the same time, 
I found that children across populations expressed more positive emotions during 
collaboration, as compared to individual activity. This cross-culturally recurrent 
positive emotionality during collaboration predicts social-cognitive development 
across all three populations. I propose that an enhanced positive emotionality in 
response to collaboration increases the quality of children’s early social interactions, 






This dissertation examined the ontogeny of social motivation and social cognition as 
two facets of sociality from a cross-cultural perspective. Therefore, both constructs 
were assessed in children from three diverse cultural contexts. Study populations were 
chosen to reflect a broad range of socialization goals and practices that are typically 
observed among different modes of subsistence economy (Barry et al., 1959). First, 
German children were investigated as a proxy for Western, industrialized populations 
in which children are equipped with high levels of psychological autonomy, whereas 
action autonomy is given little precedence as a developmental outcome (Keller & 
Kärtner, 2013). Second, Hai||om hunter-gatherer children were assessed with regards 
to their cultural emphasis on individual autonomy in both action and psychology, as 
well as their priority on social learning taking place within peer interactions 
(Barndard, 2002; Hewlett, 2016; Lew-Levy et al., 2017). Third, Ovambo children were 
examined given that their emphasizes on interpersonal relatedness and action 
autonomy are typically stressed among subsistence-based farming populations (Barry 
et al., 1959; Keller & Kärtner, 2013). To better understand the ontogeny of social 
motivation and social cognition, I tested children across a broad age range and 
assessed interindividual differences in their behaviors.  
In particular, I was interested in whether children’s overimitation, as a strategy 
for socio-cultural learning, would be similarly actuated by a social motivation across 
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the three populations (study 1 and study 2) and whether children’s imitation would 
relate to their reengagement of co-players during a collaborative activity (study 1). 
Next, I investigated the degree to which children’s tendency to like and seek peer 
collaboration varies across cultural contexts (study 3). Finally, I linked interindividual 
differences in social motivation for peer collaboration to children’s Theory of Mind 
skills (study 3). 
In study 1, I showed that children from diverse populations engage in more 
precise overimitation when being observed by the adult model as compared to being 
unobserved. Children from all three populations also became more precise and 
frequent in their overimitation with age. However, regardless of whether or not 
participants were observed by the model, German children scored higher on 
overimitation than both Hai||om and Ovambo children. This suggests that across 
populations, children’s overimitation serves a social function and should hence be 
actuated by social motivation. On an individual level, overimitation did not predict 
children’s reengagement of an adult co-player, which may indicate that their social 
motivation may be rooted in distinct, context-specific motives that do not necessarily 
converge on one common, homogenous factor.  
In study 2, I documented that German children overimitate more persistently 
than their Hai||om counterparts, which is in line with the cultural variation in 
overimitation observed in the first study. Notably, this effect was present even though 
I utilized a paradigm in which the causally irrelevant actions were clearly marked as 
such by the (in-group) adult model, the instructions highlighted the instrumental goal 
of the model’s actions, and the containers’ functionality was made obvious. Regardless 
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of the cultural differences in young children’s persistence on overimitation, a similar 
proportion of children in either population indicated that overimitation was 
principally within their behavioral repertoire.  
Combined with the insights gained from study 1, these results indicate that 
overimitation can indeed be perceived as a functionally universal driver of socio-
cultural learning (Nielsen, 2018). Interestingly, the proportion of children showing 
overimitation at least once throughout the study and of those who did not make use 
of this behavior at all were similar across cultural contexts. These results thus lend 
initial support to the idea that variation within populations serves an important 
function in the interplay of innovation and imitation as drivers of cumulative cultural 
evolution (Legare & Nielsen, 2015; see also Yu & Kushnir, 2019).  
Importantly, this does not mean that culture is not relevant in the ontogeny of 
overimitation: German children copied irrelevant actions more persistently than their 
Hai||om counterparts. Even though overimitation is well within the capacity of 
children from diverse populations, the persistence on overimitation as a strategy of 
choice appears less robust than previously thought. A further insight gained from 
study 2 was that, unlike in study 1, overimitation did not vary with age. This finding 
hints at overimitation and social motivation being more ontogenetically stable than 
previously thought. Differences concerning age effects between the current and 
previous results may be best explained by the cognitive task demands in the current 




Results from study 3 showed that across populations, children expressed more 
positive emotions when collaborating with a peer as compared to doing the same 
activity alone. This effect was strongest among German children and markedly smaller 
among Ovambo and Hai||om participants. When given the choice between the 
collaborative and the individual activity, German participants were the only 
population who preferred to collaborate across the complete age range tested. 
Younger Ovambo children also preferred collaboration, whereas older Ovambo 
children preferred the individual activity. Across ages, Hai||om children preferred the 
individual activity over collaboration.  
Positive expressed emotions predicted children’s subsequent preferences only 
among younger children. With age, the two aspects of social motivation became 
dissociated from one another. While both children’s liking (emotional expressions) 
and seeking (preferential choices) of peer collaboration seem to be ontogenetically 
rooted in a similar social motivation, both aspects of reward are parsed at older ages 
where culture shapes children’s choices more than their emotional expressions. It 
thus appears that different indicators of social motivation are shaped by an 
ontogenetic interplay of children’s predispositions and culturally-specific 
socialization goals and practices. 
With regards to the social-cognitive domain, children’s skills in the domain of 
Theory of Mind increased with age across populations. Regardless of age and 
population, interindividual variation in children’s expressed emotions predicted their 
Theory of Mind abilities. This recurrent link between social motivation and social 
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cognition supports claims that both phenomena are developmentally intertwined 
facets of sociality (Chevallier et al., 2012; Tomasello, 2018).  
In sum, the current set of studies documents both homogeneity and variability 
in the early ontogeny of social motivation and social cognition. Across populations, 
children were motivated to interact with their social partners. Among younger 
children, different indicators of social motivation were linked at individual levels (e.g., 
expressed emotions and forced-choice preferences). Differences in sociality across 
populations recurred across studies and phenomena. Expressed emotions even 
predicted children’s Theory of Mind across populations and ages, suggesting that 
social motivation and social cognition work in tandem throughout child development. 
To elaborate on the importance of culture on shaping social motivation and 
social cognition, I will now subsume some key findings gained from the current 
studies separately for each population before trying to integrate these patterns into 
an overarching framework. 
The German Context 
In all three studies of this dissertation, German children were outliers with regards to 
sociality. They showed higher levels of overimitation than their Namibian 
counterparts (studies 1 and 2), expressed more positive emotions during collaboration 
and preferred collaboration during forced-choice trials (study 3), and scored highest 
in Theory of Mind tasks (study 3). With increasing age, German children’s social-
motivational and social-cognitive dispositions became more pervasive. These studies 
thus replicate and extend claims on the ubiquity of social motivation and social 
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cognition in Western children (Tomasello, 2014, 2019). However, it is important to 
note that the generalization of such claims outside Western populations does not do 
justice to the immense variability in social motivation and social cognition between 
and within the populations observed here.  
As described above, German childrearing practices implement and focus on 
culturally-specific socialization goals (Keller, 2007; Keller & Kärtner, 2013). First, 
German children are equipped with high levels of psychological autonomy. They are 
free to navigate social interactions with peers and adults according to their own 
preferences, which may likely increase the reward value of social interactions to them 
both prospectively and retrospectively. In the urban German context, social 
interactions are rarely perceived as interpersonal obligations given the emphasis on 
psychological autonomy and the broad range of play-like activities children are 
offered in their daily lives (e.g., playing with toys, watching movies, or stories being 
read to them). Children are also given the opportunity for privacy, such as by being 
equipped with personal space and time for individual play (Keller, 2007; Kärtner, 
2015). Such opportunities may lead German children to de-evaluate the opportunity 
for individual play when given the opportunity for social interactions. 
In combination with the cultural emphasis on child-centered pedagogy among 
German parenting practices, the high relevance of psychological autonomy is also 
reflected in parents’ monitoring and paraphrasing of their children’s desires and 
beliefs (Kärtner, 2015). Doing so enables children to theorize and converse about their 
own and other’s subjective mental states, resulting in social-cognitive skills that are 
already refined early in ontogeny. In this context, it is commonly assumed and 
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expected that behavior is caused by mental states. This idea is often implemented into 
child pedagogy through conversations about mental states and mind-minded 
language (Meins et al., 2002; Kärtner, 2015). In line with this assumption, child-
directed conversations about mental states have been found to predict mindreading 
abilities, such as false belief reasoning, among Western children (Laranjo, Bernier, 
Meins, & Carlson, 2014; Meins et al., 2002).  
At the same time, children in Germany are rarely tasked with household chores 
until adolescence. Instead, their learning typically takes place under the supervision 
of adult caregivers. Socially adequate and prosocial behaviors are often supported 
through praise and other forms of positive feedback, which may function as external 
incentives that reward affiliative behaviors (Köster, Cavalcante, Vera Cruz de Carvalho, 
Dôgo Resende, & Kärtner, 2016). Situations in which children can explore their 
environment in a playful manner within social interactions are perceived as optimal 
learning opportunities. Instead of strong social obligations for interactions, children 
can choose freely between social partners (Keller & Kärtner, 2013). This 
conceptualization of social interactions as a voluntary, joyful learning opportunity 
may foster social motivation, leading to the exceptionally high levels of overimitation 
and collaboration among German children when compared to other populations. 
The Hai||om Context 
Similar to their German counterparts, Hai||om children engaged in overimitation, 
expressed more happiness during collaborative activities, and predicted others’ 
mental states. However, they showed less overimitation than their German 
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counterparts (studies 1 and 2). They also expressed fewer positive emotions during 
peer collaboration than both Ovambo and German children. Moreover, Hai||om 
children consistently preferred individual work over collaboration during forced 
choice trials (study 3) and performed intermediate between Germans and Ovambo on 
Theory of Mind tasks (study 3). 
What might be the cultural drivers of this pattern of results? Among the 
Hai||om, children are equipped with high levels of both psychological and action 
autonomy from early on (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Konner, 2005; Terashima & Hewlett, 
2016; Widlok, 1999). At the same time, opportunities for social learning are typically 
not child-centered (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017; Lancy, 2008). Instead, learning instances 
are diverse, short, spontaneous, and integrated into daily social life and subsistence 
activities (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017). 
If the low levels of action autonomy in combination with the emphasis given to 
child-centered pedagogy biases Western children toward socially motivated 
interactions and collaboration, the emphasis on action autonomy and observational 
learning among the Hai||om may have caused the behavioral patterns observed for this 
population. Choosing to complete a task individually and without the support of 
others may be preferred as doing so displays autonomy and competence. Even though 
action autonomy does not imply that social interactions are actively avoided, this 
emphasis may facilitate a more nuanced social motivation in Hai||om children as 
compared to Western populations. Such differences may be particularly pronounced 
whenever individuals can solve a task by themselves (such as in the simple 
collaborative task manipulated in study 3). Whenever approaching novel or difficult 
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tasks in which social support may be required, one might expect Hai||om children to 
prefer social over individual means. Additionally, Hai||om children are accompanied 
by their peers during most of their daily activities, which could have also driven them 
to prefer individual activities in the context of study 3. Given the cultural emphasizes 
on egalitarianism and sharing on demand, children may have used the opportunity to 
engage in the activity alone by themselves to avoid behavioral dependence on their 
interactants. 
The low levels of child-centered pedagogy may have also impacted children’s 
socially motivated behaviors. The rates of overimitation were markedly lower among 
the Hai||om than among German children. Instances of direct, child-centered 
pedagogy, such as the context in which overimitation is typically assessed, are rare 
among hunter-gatherer populations such as the Hai||om (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017; 
Hewlett, 2016; Lew-Levy et al., 2017). Typically, hunter-gatherer children learn novel 
behaviors through the observation of others, are free to explore objects, and modify 
their actions gradually over time. As a consequence, these children may be more 
flexible in choosing between overimitation, emulation, and innovation when facing 
the opportunity to learn from others.  
Importantly, this does not imply that Hai||om children only emulated or 
innovated. They showed overimitation selectively in the presence of the model 
(study 1) and irrespective of instructions depicting an instrumental, rather than a 
social goal (study 2). These results thus indicate that while the persistence on 
overimitation is lower among Hai||om children (as compared to German children), the 
majority of children use overimitation and do so to affiliate with others. 
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Socialization goals regarding psychological autonomy may have been a key 
determinant of Hai||om children’s performance in Theory of Mind tasks. Even though 
children’s social motivation was linked to their performance across Theory of Mind 
tasks, the comparatively low levels of social motivation among Hai||om children did 
not result in lowest scores on the social-cognitive domain. Instead, Hai||om children’s 
scores laid between those of German and Ovambo children. It may thus be that an 
interplay between social motivation, child-directed pedagogy, and psychological 
autonomy together shape children’s Theory of Mind throughout ontogeny. That is, a 
focus on action autonomy, together with the low levels of explicit mental state talk 
between adults and children may explain why Hai||om children scored lower than 
German children on the Theory of Mind tasks. The psychological autonomy with 
which Hai||om children are equipped with may compensate this partially by 
emphasizing and acknowledging different perspectives on the world. Again, a complex 
interplay of contextual factors causes cross-cultural and interindividual variation in 
the ontogeny of social motivation and social cognition. 
The Ovambo Context 
Ovambo children showed overimitation at comparable levels to their Hai||om 
counterparts (study 1). However, they scored higher than Hai||om participants on 
measures of social motivation during peer collaboration (study 3), even though older 
children became more biased toward individual activities. At the same time, Ovambo 
children scored lower than same-aged Hai||om and German children on Theory of 
Mind tasks. Again, these patterns may be best explained by considering cultural 
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emphasizes on psychological autonomy, action autonomy, and the role of child-
centered pedagogy in this context. Among the Ovambo, parents typically stress action 
autonomy as an important socialization goal. That is, one central task in child 
development is that children learn to pursue and fulfill tasks independently and 
without external advice or help. This perspective may have led older children to prefer 
individual means over collaboration during study 3 to signal their action autonomy.  
At the same time, Ovambo children grow into a system where age-related 
hierarchies, respect, and social responsibilities are given high importance (Zimba, 
2002; Zimba & Otaala, 1993). Children are thus reared toward high levels of 
psychological relatedness. In this context, children’s consideration of subjective 
mental states as a driving force of human behavior may be of lower relevance than 
among Hai||om and German children: Ovambo children’s behaviors are embedded in 
a dense system of social relations, hierarchies, and obligations. This may lead to a 
lower emphasis on individual desires and beliefs as determinants of behavior as 
compared to children that are equipped with higher levels of psychological autonomy 
(Kärtner, 2015). Furthermore, participation and observation are key sources for social 
learning among the Ovambo, and conversations between adults and children about 
mental states are rare as compared to Western, industrialized contexts (Zimba, 2002). 
Another factor that may shape Ovambo children’s social-cognitive 
development is that parents often use authoritarian parenting practices and 
emphasize obedience in raising their children (Brown, 2011; Zimba, 2002). Such 
parenting styles have been argued to possibly delay the capacity to engage in explicit, 
verbal mindreading abilities in other societies (Kuntoro et al., 2013; Vinden, 2001). It 
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is, however, plausible that low levels of psychological autonomy often go hand in hand 
with authoritarian parenting practices (such as in the case of the Ovambo). Systematic 
assessments of both factors in parallel warrant a more precise understanding of the 
socialization goals and practices shaping the ontogeny of Theory of Mind.  
As an additional constraint, the task demands of the Theory of Mind battery 
implemented in study 3 may have also restricted Ovambo children’s performance in 
this domain. Here, we used an adaption of a frequently used set of story vignettes 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004) in which children reply to an adult’s question verbally and in a 
playful manner. Such answer probes resemble adult-child interactions in Western 
populations much more closely than those among hierarchically structured societies 
like the Ovambo (and the Hai||om, too). Here, children predominantly learn through 
participation and observation, rather than direct, child-centered pedagogy (Zimba, 
2002). Given children’s limited exposure to such scenarios, procedural aspects utilized 
here may have evoked confounding effects, such as nervousness and shyness in some 
participants. As a consequence, children’s social-cognitive competences may have 
been masked systematically (see also Ojalehto & Medin, 2015; for a similar argument). 
Novel approaches assessing children’s social-cognitive skills in more naturalistic 
interactions are a promising avenue to overcome this limitation. For example, 
children’s use and anticipation of deception in peer communication may be an 
ecologically valid means to assess false-belief reasoning given the conceptual 
interdependence between the two phenomena (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Sher, Koenig, 
& Rustichini, 2014; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007). 
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An Integrative Model of Social Motivation and Cognition  
The results of the three studies in this dissertation reveal both cross-cultural 
variability and homogeneity in the ontogeny of social motivation and social cognition. 
In Figure 9, the main conclusions drawn from the current dissertation are combined 
into an overarching framework. This integrative model of social motivation and 
cognition (henceforth: SMC) combines elements of the ecocultural model from Keller 
and Kärtner (2013) with conceptualizations of social motivation and social cognition 
borrowed from the cognitive sciences and developmental psychology (Chevallier et 
al., 2012; Hobson, 2002; Levinson, 1995; Tomasello et al., 2005). Culturally-specific 
socialization goals and practices are illustrated in the upper background of the figure. 
Accordingly, cultural contexts differ in how children’s experience and behavior are 
shaped toward autonomous or relational socialization goals. These goals are typically 
reflected in culturally-specific socialization practices. For example, these include 
whether and how caregivers actively attempt to modify child behavior via child-
centered pedagogy or child-directed speech (e.g., mind-mindedness). Given that 
child-centered pedagogy provides children with useful opportunities for social 
learning, such practices may increase the motivational value of social interactions 
directly through associative learning processes. At the same time, such practices 
provide children with opportunities to reflect upon their own and others’ minds, 
facilitating the development of social-cognitive abilities. 
The interplay of culturally-specific socialization goals (e.g., psychological 
autonomy and action autonomy) and practices (e.g., child-centered pedagogy) shapes 
the co-development of social motivation and social cognition on a “Conceptual Level” 
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(visualized in the upper part of Figure 9). These two facets of sociality are 
developmentally intertwined and manifested in children’s behaviors in social 
interactions. As such, it is the interplay between culturally-specific socialization goals 
and practices as well as a co-development of social motivation and cognition that 





Figure 9. An integrative model of social motivation and cognition (SMC); larger bubble 
sizes indicate population-specific emphasizes on the respective socialization goals 
and practices; “+” and “−” indicate whether pathways between concepts are typically 
positive/promotive or negative/inhibitive; dotted frames reflect variables that are 
external to the child; solid frames indicate intrinsic processes or behaviors 
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The interplay of social motivation and cognition determines the behavioral 
repertoire children make use of within social interactions (“Behavioral Level”; lower 
part of Figure 9). A variety of behaviors enable children to engage in and benefit from 
social interactions. These include some of the phenomena assessed thoroughly in this 
dissertation (e.g., overimitation, reengagement, predicting others’ actions using 
Theory of Mind), but also other phenomena that support them in navigating social 
interactions (e.g., conformity; see below).  
To account for the importance of external demands on shaping children’s social 
behaviors within a given situation, “Contextual Factors” and “External Incentives” are 
presented in the lower background of Figure 9. Depending on the situation, external 
incentives may increase the reward value assigned to either social or individual 
activities. For example, social activities may be externally rewarding whenever they 
can lead to material benefits that could not be achieved otherwise. At the same time, 
individual activities may be incentivized whenever individual action is associated with 
the opportunity to learn more efficiently. Characteristics of the interactant (e.g., 
affiliative behaviors are more likely when interacting with friends, as opposed to 
strangers) and situational demands (e.g., the degree to which social initiative is 
needed to affiliative with others) are important contextual factors that affect young 
children’s social behaviors within social interactions. 
While the SMC primarily builds on the cross-cultural evidence gained from the 
current dissertation, it may also be helpful for understanding and predicting 
interindividual variability in young children’s sociality. In the following paragraphs, I 
aim at integrating this perspective into the SMC.  
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First, one conclusion that can be drawn from this dissertation is that 
interindividual variation in social motivation and cognition is substantial and 
meaningful. In study 2, for example, the proportions of non-overimitators and 
overimitators were almost similar among Hai||om and German participants. Such 
variation patterns on population levels may be highly functional by fostering the 
interplay of innovation and imitation in the accumulation of cultural information (Yu 
& Kushnir, 2019). While a stable proportion of children copies and transmits cultural 
information with high fidelity, others chose different strategies, such as emulation or 
innovation. More research is needed to assess the degree to which interindividual 
variation in behavior reflects unsystematic noise or, in contrast, whether it entails 
informative value about the composition of behaviors at a population level that may 
itself be derived from selective pressures on a macro-level (see also Mesoudi, 2011). 
As a second conclusion with regard to individual differences in social 
motivation and cognition, this dissertation shows that behavioral manifestations of 
either facet can, but not necessarily must, be linked on an individual level. Study 1 did 
not find support for the hypothesis that frequent overimitators would also show more 
reengaging attempts in the context of collaboration. Even though both behaviors were 
most pronounced among German children as compared to both Hai||om and Ovambo, 
they appeared to be conceptually distinct. A more mixed finding was observed in the 
domain of collaboration. Here, interindividual links between children’s positive 
expressed emotions during collaboration and their preferences during forced-choice 
trials were only evident among younger children. With increasing age, the link 
between both proxies for social motivation in the context of collaboration weakened. 
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According to the SMC, the absence of such links may be caused by contextual 
factors varying between paradigms. While the active reengagement of a recalcitrant 
co-player requires an individual to show social initiative, overimitation does not. 
Interindividual differences in shyness or extraversion may have thus covered 
potential links between the two phenomena. In study 3, children’s preferred choices 
during collaboration may have dissociated from their expressed emotions among 
older children because of their (external) reward value. While emotional expressions 
may predominantly reflect an intrinsic motivation to engage in an activity, the more 
explicit choice of either collaboration or individual activity may be increasingly 
shaped by societal emphasizes on action autonomy.  
Importantly, contextual factors are also likely to be shaped by culturally-
specific socialization goals and practices. For example, reserved, yet socially attentive 
temperament dispositions are typically emphasized among collectivistic societies 
(Chen & French, 2008; Lane et al., 2013). Western populations, in contrast, value social 
initiative and extraversion as important socialization goals in child development. 
Cultural contexts emphasizing social initiative may thus lead to different social 
behaviors than those emphasizing more reserved behaviors, irrespective of children’s 
social motivation per se. 
The same applies to the characteristics of the potential interaction partner for 
eliciting affiliative behaviors. Among Western populations, young children 
predominantly rely on adult pedagogy as a source of information. It is thus no wonder 
that, among such contexts, children prefer testimony from adults over that of peers 
(Jaswal & Neely, 2006). In contrast, social learning among other, non-Western 
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populations often takes place within peer groups (Boyette, 2016; Boyette & Hewlett, 
2017; Lew-Levy et al., 2017). Here, one may even expect children to prefer information 
provided by their peers over that of adults under certain circumstances, especially if 
previous encounters with their peers were successful (see also Schuhmacher & 
Kärtner, 2015). 
As such, the SMC suggests that contextual factors can in part account for the 
observed heterogeneity in the behavioral proxies for social motivation and social 
cognition in various ways. Given the aforementioned interplay between factors at the 
conceptual level (e.g., socialization goals and practices) and those at the behavioral 
level (e.g., contextual factors, external incentives), future research will need to 
consider both levels in parallel in order to understand and predict ontogenetic, cross-
cultural, and interindividual variation in social motivation and social cognition.  
Many Facets of Social Motivation 
Irrespective of the exact impact ascribed to contextual factors in shaping children’s 
sociality, one conclusion derived from the SMC is that sociality, and social motivation 
in particular, should not be conceived as stable, trait-like set of dispositions. 
Children’s social motivation for engaging in social interactions depends on multiple 
determinants working in parallel.  
As a first factor, individual predispositions in the responsiveness to social 
stimuli may be an early determinant of social motivation at later ages. For example, 
social temperament has previously been indicated as an important and stable factor 
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in shaping young children’s social interactions (Asendorpf & Meier, 1993; see also 
Lane et al., 2013). 
Second, social motivation co-develops with children’s social-cognitive skills in 
that both facets are required for successful participation and coordination in social 
interactions (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Roby & Scott, 2016; Tomasello, 2018). Next, 
development itself can be an important factor in shaping social motivation. For 
example, typical ontogenetic trajectories in children’s social learning preferences 
indicate that children’s reliance on social information and social interactions follows 
recurrent trajectories (Boyette & Hewlett, 2017; Lew-Levy et al., 2017; van Leeuwen 
et al., 2018). Depending on the type of social learning that is of interest, these 
trajectories may show more or less variation across cultural contexts (van Leeuwen et 
al., 2018). 
Finally, contextual factors, such as task difficulty, interdependency (Warneken 
et al., 2012), or whether joint efforts can lead to higher payoffs (Bullinger et al., 2011), 
may also trigger the expression of social motivation in a given context. For example, 
individuals may be differently affected based on whether a social interaction implies 
behavioral interdependency between actors (such as in the context of collaboration), 
or whether social ties are rather loose (such as when deciding whether to be in spatial 
proximity with others). Those who are equipped with high levels of autonomy may 
show fewer attempts to engage in collaborative activities in order to avoid behavioral 
interdependency. At the same time, children may show socially motivated behaviors 
whenever the circumstances do not imply interdependence, such as in the context of 
imitation. Additionally, other forms of interdependence (such as competition or 
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cooperation within competition) may trigger different motivations than those 
investigated in this dissertation (Deutsch, 1949). 
Other Phenomena Linked to Sociality 
One main goal of this dissertation was to gain insights into the ontogeny of sociality 
with a particular focus on the development of social motivation. I focused on two 
phenomena as proxies for children’s social motivation, as well as one indicator for 
social cognition. Of course, this subset is far from comprehensive to reflect the scope 
of human sociality (Tomasello, 2014, 2019). To fully understand the ontogeny of social 
motivation and cognition, several other aspects of human sociality need to be 
addressed in future research.  
For example, social motivation has previously been discussed as an ontogenetic 
driver of children’s prosocial behaviors (Carpendale et al., 2015; Dahl & Brownell, 
2019; Paulus, 2014, 2018). Accordingly, children start to help others because of their 
interest in joining and attending social interactions during their first two years of life. 
This social interest is only transformed into a more prosocial motivation for the 
welfare of others at later ages. While children’s tendency to provide help for others is 
robustly found across diverse cultural contexts (Callaghan et al., 2011), their 
motivation for doing so is shaped by socialization goals and practices (Giner Torréns 
& Kärtner, 2017; Köster et al., 2016). Moreover, prosocial behaviors have been linked 
to other aspects of sociality, such as Theory of Mind (Imuta, Henry, Slaughter, Selcuk, 
& Ruffman, 2016) and imitation (Yu & Kushnir, 2019; but see Warneken & Tomasello, 
2007). Since I did not assess children’s prosocial behaviors in this dissertation, I can 
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only refer to theoretical arguments on the interplay of social and (pro)social 
motivations in shaping prosociality (Carpendale et al., 2015; Paulus, 2014, 2018). 
While the link between imitation and social motivation has received most 
attention in this dissertation, other social learning strategies may also be linked to 
children’s social motivation (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Hanayama & Mori, 2011; Haun 
& Tomasello, 2011; van Leeuwen et al., 2018). Western children show conformity by 
copying the behavior of a majority even if this implies that they need to abandon their 
initial tendencies (Haun et al., 2014; Haun & Tomasello, 2011). The fact that children 
adapt their behaviors to meet those of the majority is particularly pronounced 
whenever the response is made in public suggests conceptual links between 
conformity and social motivation (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Nielsen & Haun, 2016). 
Accordingly, conforming to others may serve an affiliative function similar to that 
discussed for overimitation (Nielsen & Haun, 2016; Whiten, 2019). Again, cross-
cultural investigations assessing whether conformity can be conceived as a behavioral 
manifestation of social motivation are needed to gain a better understanding of the 
origins of human sociality (Clegg, Wen, & Legare, 2017; see also van Leeuwen et al., 
2018; Wen & Legare, 2017). Such attempts may also reveal how social learning itself 
is learned and shaped through social interactions (Heyes, 2012b). In one recent study, 
van Leeuwen and colleagues documented an age-related decrease in children’s 
reliance on social information, although this effect varied substantially across 
populations (van Leeuwen et al., 2018). In the same study, the researchers also 
documented an ontogenetic trajectory in which children’s preferences for the 
strategies displayed by the majority of models first decreased around middle 
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childhood before becoming more influential at later ages. Accordingly, children’s 
social learning strategies need to be conceptualized as the result of a complex 
interplay of cultural context, age, and characteristics of the specific learning context.  
The Role of Social Orienting and Social Maintaining 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Social Motivation Theory of Autism defines social 
motivation in a much broader sense than what I operationalized in this dissertation. 
Here, I almost exclusively focused on Social Reward, or the tendency to seek and like 
social interactions. Chevallier and colleagues (2012) also theorize Social Orienting and 
Social Maintaining as central components of social motivation. How do these 
components relate to the main conclusions of this dissertation? 
Social Orienting—the attentive bias to attend and orient to social stimuli—may 
support children’s seeking and liking of social interactions by ensuring that 
individuals can benefit from opportunities for social interactions. This may be 
especially relevant in non-Western populations in which direct, child-centered 
pedagogy is rare. Individual dispositions to attend social interactions (Atkinson, 
Simpson, & Cole, 2018), paired with an intrinsic motivation to like these interactions, 
may be a powerful combination enabling children to orient to and learn from social 
interactions. Notably, as a consequence of the reward value children attach to social 
interactions, they may “become ever more oriented to the social world” (Godman et 
al., 2014; p. 575).  
Cross-cultural studies indicate that parenting practices among traditional, 
non-Western populations foster children’s social orienting from early on. For 
example, Hewlett and Roulette (2016) describe the socialization practice of 
 
 144 
“distribution parenting” among the Aka hunter-gatherers of central Africa. 
Accordingly, parents place their infants facing away from themselves such that the 
infants can observe others’ daily interactions and activities. Such manipulations and 
practices may equip children with important opportunities for social learning by 
utilizing their social attention. At the same time, cultural emphases on children’s 
autonomy are granted since infants can freely choose to attend to the social input they 
prefer. 
Social Maintaining—the tendency to establish long-lasting social bonds with 
significant others—is also considered a cross-culturally recurrent manifestation of 
social motivation (Chevallier et al., 2012; Over, 2016). Accordingly, children invest 
into long-lasting social relationships and form friendships to fulfill their need to 
belong. In the light of children’s tendency to seek and like social interaction, Social 
Maintaining may be highly adaptive by maximizing the quality and quantity of social 
interactions through forming temporarily stable opportunities for social interactions. 
Again, doing so may be conceived as a consequence of the reward value children 
ascribe to social interactions.  
These dynamics may be of particular relevance outside Western, industrialized 
contexts. In traditional, small-scale populations, the need to establish and maintain 
positive relationships with other members of the community can be of central 
importance given that the number of potential interaction partners is limited. 
Especially in times of scarce resources, it may have been particularly beneficial to 
establish long-lasting relationships even with individuals outside own family bands 
or communities. !Xun/!Kung hunter-gatherers, for example, practice a system in 
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which gifts are transferred within individual social networks (Wiessner, 1977, 1982). 
The social bonds between individuals that are established within this hxaro system 
offer security in times of scarcity. Individuals can rely on their hxaro partners to 
receive material gifts whenever they are in need of help (Wiessner, 1977). As such, 
Social Maintaining may be deeply rooted in human psychology. More research 
investigating the potential links between Social Reward, Social Maintaining, and Social 
Orienting is needed to fully understand the development of young children’s social 
motivation. 
Limitations and Outlook 
The current set of studies suggests that sociality is a complex, multi-faceted 
phenomenon that is ontogenetically founded within children’s social interactions. 
The motivational and cognitive prerequisites to engage in and benefit from social 
interactions are consolidated throughout early childhood and lay the ground for our 
species-typical reliance on social learning.  
One explanation for the heterogeneity of social motivation in this dissertation 
is that this pattern is mainly caused by systematic limitations of the studies 
themselves. First, limited sample sizes among the small-scale populations, combined 
with substantial behavioral variability due to broad age ranges and cultural 
heterogeneity, may have lowered the statistical power of the studies presented here. 
To reliably observe interindividual patterns in social motivation across populations, 
future studies will need to assess children’s social motivation in larger samples.  
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Another limitation lies in the cross-sectional research designs of the studies in 
this dissertation. First, such approaches do not allow for definite conclusions about 
the causality of developmental pathways, such as whether social motivation causes 
social-cognitive development, or vice versa. A second drawback of cross-sectional 
approaches is that that they can identify intrapersonal links between phenomena only 
at specific ages. However, some socially motivated behaviors may be most pronounced 
in early childhood, whereas others may only become relevant at later ages. Assessing 
these phenomena only concurrently may thus fail to find conceptual homogeneity in 
social motivation. Children’s motivation for showing overimitation, for example, may 
undergo a complex developmental trajectory. Around two years of age, they may show 
the behavior primarily because they do not yet fully understand the causal irrelevancy 
of some actions, thus preferring a “copy all, refine later”-strategy in order to avoid 
missing opportunities for social learning (Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2011). 
Following this, the social motivation to do so may increase during middle childhood 
when children learn about the affiliative function of overimitation (Clay et al., 2018; 
Gellén & Buttelmann, 2019). Later, this social motivation may be transformed into a 
more normative stance based on which children imitate (Gellén & Buttelmann, 2019; 
Keupp et al., 2013). Longitudinal approaches are needed to fully understand how 
behavioral variability and motivations are shaped throughout ontogeny and to assess 
the degree to which developmental pathways vary across and within populations.  
A third limitation concerning this dissertation is the limited age range tested 
across studies. Future research will need to assess children of markedly younger ages 
than those investigated here (e.g., children’s first three years of life). Enculturation 
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takes place up from, or even before, birth and the social input children receive in their 
first years of life is central for understanding concurrent and later development. For 
instance, local patterns in the contingency of caregivers to infants’ behaviors has 
significant effects on social development already at three months of age (Kärtner et 
al., 2008; Kärtner, Keller, & Yovsi, 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to study children as 
young as of infant age in order to understand the developmental and cultural origins 
of social motivation and social cognition. 
Originally, I aimed at assessing cross-cultural differences in social motivation 
among infants as well. However, I was not able to obtain valid data from children of 
such ages due to several issues. First, sample sizes in the rural populations were often 
too small for drawing statistically reliable conclusions. Second, children at such ages 
were often afraid to act in the presence of foreign adults and did not want to 
participate in the studies. Novel and innovative approaches are thus needed to assess 
interindividual differences in the ontogeny of social motivation and social cognition 
during children’s first years of life cross-culturally. These may include the use of 
systematical observations of children’s daily experiences or the acquisition of data via 
modern technology, such as through automatized movement tracking via GPS or 
Beacon technology (Migliano et al., 2017), (mobile) eye tracking devices (Hepach & 
Westermann, 2016; Hepach & Herrmann, 2019), depth sensor imaging technology to 
assess body posture (Hepach et al., 2015, 2017), and audio recordings (Bergelson et al., 
2019).  
The (quasi-)experimental approaches I followed in conducting the current 
studies were chosen because I aimed at relating children’s behaviors on an individual 
 
 148 
level. While experimental rigor and internal validity are basic demands for drawing 
such conclusions, such approaches may cause problems concerning the external 
validity of research findings. Ethnographic and qualitative approaches are needed to 
estimate how the current results can be used to understand population-specific 
trajectories in the ontogeny of social motivation and social cognition. Implementing 
different perspectives into a research agenda, such as by combining quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, will be helpful for improving the ecological validity of 
scientific findings while also ensuring the precision, objectivity, and generalizability 
gained through (quasi-)experimental procedures (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). One 
promising approach hereby is that of summarizing and analyzing qualitative data 
(e.g., ethnographical information) by utilizing quantitative protocols and methods 
(see Boyette & Hewlett, 2017; Lew-Levy et al., 2017, 2018; for such meta-ethnographic 
approaches). 
Using a combination of these approaches, one may be able to test hypotheses 
that can be derived from the SMC. As a first prediction, one would predict socially 
motivated behaviors to be linked not only concurrently, but also longitudinally. This 
would include those phenomena assessed in this dissertation (e.g., overimitation, 
positive emotional experience, preferences), but also other potential indicators of 
social motivation (e.g., persistence and effort invested, physiological arousal, 
conformity). Again, longitudinal designs are needed to identify whether early 
emerging behaviors (e.g., emotional expressions, overimitation) predict and precede 
those that are refined later in ontogeny depending on cultural input (e.g., effort, 
explicit choices). While such a hypothesis would imply systematic trajectories in 
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social-motivational development, it would not necessarily predict cross-cultural 
homogeneity in social motivation: Depending on cultural emphasizes on the role of 
action autonomy, social motivation should vary systematically across populations. It 
would be interesting to see whether predictions drawn from the SMC will hold true 
when tested among cultural contexts focusing on low levels of action autonomy (such 
as in urban Germany) while emphasizing observational learning, rather than direct, 
child-centered pedagogy (such as among the Hai||om and Ovambo).  
With regard to children’s social-cognitive development, the SMC would also 
predict that children from populations emphasizing psychological autonomy would 
develop a fully-fledged Theory of Mind at younger ages than children growing up in 
populations in which hierarchical relatedness and authoritarian parenting practices 
are stressed (Kärtner, 2015; Kuntoro, Peterson, & Slaughter, 2017). As a potential 
confound, social-cultural beliefs concerning “opacity of mind” have also been argued 
to constitute cultural variation in the ontogeny of Theory of Mind (Dixson et al., 2017; 
Mayer & Träuble, 2013). Unravelling the interplay of such doctrines with the role of 
psychological autonomy offers a promising agenda to understand the ontogeny of 
social cognition within social interactions.  
Revealing this interplay will also be relevant for our understanding of other 
phenomena linked to uniquely human sociality. For example, the importance of 
Theory of Mind (e.g., concerning others’ intentions) on moral judgements is known to 
vary systematically across populations (Barrett et al., 2016) as a function of socio-
cultural beliefs regarding opacity of mind (McNamara et al., 2019). To which degree 
socialization goals and practices regarding psychological autonomy contribute to 
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such patterns will be an interesting question to address while utilizing the SMC as a 
theoretical framework. 
A third prediction derived from the SMC concerns intra-cultural variability in 
action autonomy, psychological autonomy, and dyadic pedagogy. Following the SMC, 
one would expect interindividual variability in caregivers’ use of direct pedagogy to 
affect the reward value of adult-child interactions which should lead to downstream 
effects on social motivation and cognition. Interindividual variation in socialization 
goals and practices may be assessed using questionnaires, such as the Socialization 
Goals Questionnaire (SGQ; Kärtner, Keller, & Chaudhary, 2010; see also Fonseca, 
Cavalcante, Kärtner, & Köster, 2018), structured interviews, or behavioral 
observations of children’s daily lives. Such data may then be linked to children’s social 
motivation and cognition in order to assess whether and how the SMC can be applied 
to explain variation in sociality within populations.  
Finally, based on the SMC one would expect that the developmental 
mechanisms observed among humans would also be observable among non-human 
primates, such as among chimpanzees and bonobos. Although there is little evidence 
on systematic interindividual differences in sociality among chimpanzees (Herrmann 
et al., 2007), other studies have revealed distinctive, population-specific patterns in 
sociality across chimpanzee groups (Cronin, van Leeuwen, Vreeman, & Haun, 2014; 
van Leeuwen, Cronin, & Haun, 2018). The SMC proposes social motivation and 
cognition as recurrent drivers of social development. Comparisons between and 
within species may reveal important insights into the phylogenetic significance and 
generalizability of this framework among other taxa (Amici & Widdig, 2019). To assess 
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the importance of social interactions on shaping social cognition among chimpanzees 
and other species, a combination of developmental approaches and comparative 
perspectives is highly needed (Bard & Leavens, 2014; Gerson, Simpson, & Paukner, 
2016). This demands for systematic, collaborative efforts from scientists from 
different laboratories and countries that have the potential to address scientific 
questions that could not be answered without such an infrastructure (e.g., Many 
Primates et al., 2019). 
Conclusion 
In sum, the studies conducted within this dissertation indicate both cross-cultural 
homogeneity and diversity in young children’s sociality. Even though the cultural 
contexts I investigated vary substantially in their socialization goals and practices, the 
basic social-motivational and social-cognitive phenomena underlying sociality were 
pervasive across all populations: Children learn to imitate others and use imitation to 
strengthen social ties. They experience positive emotions during collaboration and 
understand and predict others’ mental states by utilizing their Theory of Mind. The 
ontogenetic mechanisms shaping this sociality appear universal: Sociality emerges 
early in ontogeny and is refined through social interactions. As a consequence, 
children’s social motivation and social cognition vary substantially across 
populations. At the same time, cultural differences are founded within social 
interactions and are thus shaped by sociality. The interplay between culture and 
sociality constitutes child development and lays the foundations for the immense 
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Appendix A — Additional Information on Study 1 
Task on Preference for Collaboration — Design 
After the first overimitation task, participants engaged in an assessment of their 
explicit preference for collaboration (Task 2). Children retrieved balls one-by-one 
from a marble run containing 16 balls painted with different colors (three yellow, 
three green, ten two-tone/ambiguous). Children sorted these balls according to color 
(yellow vs. green) into one of two wooden boxes with matching colors. Crucially, one 
of the boxes could be opened collaboratively, the other individually (color and 
location of boxes were counterbalanced across participants). While the distribution of 
balls was unambiguous for one-colored balls, two-tone balls could be sorted freely. 
Instructions were given from videos. 
Task on Preference for Collaboration — Materials 
Two wooden boxes (28cm x 28cm x 28cm) were used as containers for sorting in balls. 
The containers looked similar with exception of their color (green vs. yellow). Both 
containers could be opened by pulling a rope attached to the top of the box, moving a 
polycarbonate platform so that a round hole in the top (diameter = 10cm) gave access 
to the inner of the container. On one of the boxes, there was a single rope 
(length = 50cm) attached that could be pulled individually in order to open the box 
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(Individual Box). The other container was slightly different in that two ropes (each 
length = 60cm) had to be pulled by both coplayers in order to open it (Collaboration 
Box). To underline these differences in the opening mechanisms, wooden Pictograms 
of either one (Individual Box) or two characters (Collaboration Box) were attached to 
the front side of the containers. 
A marble run (50cm x 12cm x 11cm) was used for enabling children to obtain 
the balls one after another. By pulling a rope (length = 5cm) attached on top of the 
marble run, one marble at a time could be obtained. Since the marble run was secretly 
rigged by the experimenter, it was guaranteed that participants had access to only one 
ball at a time while receiving the balls independently of the experimenter. The marble 
run was baited with 16 wooden balls (diameter = 3cm) which were dropped in a fixed 
sequence: The first four balls were single-colored (green; yellow; green; yellow). 
Afterwards, three ambiguously-colored balls were loaded in the marble run, followed 
by a single-colored ball (green), three ambiguous balls, a single-colored ball (yellow), 
and four ambiguous balls. In sum, the marble run was baited with six unambiguous 
and ten ambiguous balls. 
Task on Preference for Collaboration — Procedure 
After children got the reward from the first overimitation task, they were led to a 
corner of the room in which there was a marble run in between two wooden boxes 
(Individual Box and Collaboration Box). The experimenter attracted the attention of 
the child to a laptop screen on the floor. On screen, children saw a scenario in which 
two actors played a game using two similar boxes and a similar marble run. One of the 
actors retrieved a ball from the marble run. He then checked whether the color of the 
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ball (i.e., green) fitted to that of the Individual Box (i.e., yellow). He then moved to the 
Collaboration Box with the matching color (i.e., green) and nodded. The actor then 
put the ball on top of the Collaboration Box and finally opened the box together with 
the second adult by pulling a rope attached to the box simultaneously. The ball fell 
down into the box. He then retrieved a second ball from the marble run (e.g., yellow), 
again compared the color of the ball with that of one box (Collaboration Box; e.g., 
green) and finally matched the colors with the other box (Individual Box; e.g., yellow). 
Here, the actor put the ball on the box and pulled the rope alone by himself. The ball 
fell down into the box. The next ball (e.g., green) was retrieved from the marble run 
and put into the Collaboration Box collaboratively before finally retrieving and sorting 
in a fourth (e.g., yellow) ball into the Individual Box individually. Afterwards, the 
laptop was put aside by the experimenter and participants were asked to play the game 
themselves. 
The first four balls were presented one after another in a fixed order (green — 
yellow — green — yellow) and children learned the rule of sorting the balls according 
to their color either collaboratively with the experimenter or alone. After these four 
trials, children were suddenly confronted with an ambiguous ball (half green, half 
yellow). Children were signaled that here they could decide on their own where to sort 
them. Children were subsequently confronted with ten ambiguous balls and two more 
unambiguous balls in order to remind them of the general rules of the game. 
Task on Preference for Collaboration — Discussion 
During both testing and coding the data, I found that most children in either 
population followed a specific strategy in their box choices: They tended to alternate 
 
 204 
between the Individual Box and the Collaboration Box. This behavior made it difficult 
to interpret their choices as preference scores. Thus, I did not conduct further 
statistical analyses (see discussion). 
In constructing the task, our main aim was to build on former findings on this 
construct (Rekers et al., 2011; Schuhmacher & Kärtner, 2015) by specifically focusing 
on inter-individual differences in collaborative preferences. Children appeared to 
interpret the game’s video instructions (in which two adult models distributed the 
balls in an A-B-A-B logic) in a normative manner and played in alternating fashion 
even when being faced with ambiguous balls. Another possibility is that children had 
difficulties in understanding the instruction from videos given to them on a laptop 
screen. However, such methods have been used in other cross-cultural studies before 
(van Leeuwen et al., 2018). Future studies examining children’s preference for 
collaboration are needed to fully understand social motivation with regards to its 
individual, situational, and cultural variation. One important means would be to avoid 
using alternating behaviors during instruction videos (e.g., by using an A-B-B-A logic) 
or to counterbalance these behaviors on video. Another possibility would be to allow 
participants to engage in only one forced-choice trial (such as in Rekers et al., 2011; 
Schuhmacher & Kärtner, 2015). Alternative paradigms to investigate children’s 
preference for collaboration may also include their positive affect displays (Perlmutter 
et al., 1989) or the time they spend working on collaborative, as compared to 
individual tasks (e.g., Butler & Walton, 2013). 
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Procedural Information — Test Environment and Warm-Up 
In Germany, children were asked in their day care groups whether they would want to 
participate in a study. If they agreed, they were led into the testing room by the 
experimenter without an additional warm-up. On Farm 6, children were recruited in 
the village whether they would want to participate in the study. If so, they were asked 
to come to the local school, in which the testing took place. After arrival at school, no 
further warm-up phase was made use of. In Oshivelo, children were asked during their 
free-play at the kindergarten yard whether they would want to participate. If so, they 
were led into the testing room without additional warm-up. 
Procedural Information — Instructions during Overimitation Tasks 
Given that conventional, as compared to instrumental instructions have been 
identified as drivers of children’s overimitation (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Keupp et al., 
2013), and since the populations I tested differ strongly with regard to the 
assertiveness with which adults communicate with children, I chose to use a short 
”Now You!” as a neutral instruction. In the studies by Berl and Hewlett (2015) and 
Nielsen and Tomaselli (2010) the model stated “Your turn”, which may be interpreted 
as a demand for repeating the sequence, whereas “Now You!” may allow for more 
variability in children’s choice whether to focus on the model’s actions or the 
outcome. In other studies, instructions are often starting with “Now you” before 
giving participants more detailed instructions to then highlight instrumental or 
conventional rules (e.g., “Now you can have a go and dax” vs. “Now you can have a go 
and ring the bells”; Keupp et al. 2013; see also Hoehl et al., 2019). The instructions 
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were discussed with the Namibian translators and were perceived as culturally 
appropriate for all three populations. 
Procedural Information — Choice of Boxes 
I used mostly similar boxes across both overimitation because I was trying to confront 
children with boxes of similar difficulty. In both tasks, children should potentially be 
able to produce overimitative behaviors at similar rates on either box. At the same 
time, I wanted to avoid that children would either show more or less overimitation in 
the second phase because they would already know the box from phase 1. I thus 
decided to use two slightly different boxes (with regards to color, moves on boxes), 
while keeping significant details constant (e.g., shape, moves that were non-related 
to the box, such as clapping stick in hand).  
Procedural Information — Behavior during Overimitation Tasks 
Direct eye gaze between the experimenter and the participant was avoided during the 
demonstration phase of the overimitation tasks. Further, facial affect was kept neutral 
throughout the demonstration phase and the time in which children were given the 
opportunity to retrieve the reward 
Procedural Information — Coding of Reengagement  
Children’s behaviors were coded as “active attempts” for reengagement if children did 
not engage in the activity, but tried to re-establish the collaborative activity with the 
experimenter through one of the following communicative signals:  
- establishing direct eye gaze with the experimenter and following the 
experimenter’s eye gaze 
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- touching the experimenter with their hands or feet 
- creating any form of noise addressed at the experimenter, such as clapping 
hands or whistling 
- talking to the experimenter 
- directing gestures or facial expressions at the experimenter  
Procedural Information — Materials  
Overimitation I & II. Two transparent polycarbonate boxes (15cm x 15cm x 
15cm) were used as study apparatuses. Edges of the boxes were either blue or yellow. 
Laid on top of the blue box, there was a blue wooden stick (length = 29cm). On the top 
side of the box, there was a round hole (diameter = 3cm) giving access to an 
indentation in the box separated of the rest of the box through a transparent barrier. 
On the left side of the box, there were six polycarbonate sticks in a row forming an 
area that could be used for producing a rasping sound when rubbing the stick on it. 
On the front side of the box, there was a small curtain (7cm x 7cm) in front of a second 
hole (diameter = 3cm) that offered access to a candy (Smarties) hidden in a niche 
behind it. The yellow box was built such that the rasping area was on top of the box as 
well as a yellow wooden stick (length = 29cm). Here, the round hole (diameter = 3cm) 
leading to an isolated chamber was located on the left-hand side of the box. On the 
front side, a small curtain (7cm x 7cm) covered the niche with the reward. All actions 
produced with the wooden stick, the rasping area, and the separated area, were 
causally irrelevant for obtaining the reward. This could simply be done by lifting the 
curtain by hand or reaching through it. 
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Reengagement. A colored tower (height = 19cm) with eight round, wooden 
pieces was used for the reengagement paradigm. 
Information on Results — Overimitation 
Model-Observing vs. Model-Unobserving (First Trial Only). 
Table A1 
Population Condition 
 Model-Observing Model-Unobserving 
Hai||om 3.29 (1.53) 2.64 (1.12) 
German 4.46 (1.94) 3.75 (1.85) 
Ovambo 3.41 (1.73) 2.12 (1.05) 
Note. Means (SD) of children’s overimitation between conditions — data from the first 
trial 
 
Overimitation — Model-Observing vs. Model-Unobserving. 
Table A2 
Population Condition 
 Model-Observing Model-Unobserving 
Hai||om 3.52 (1.48) 3.07 (1.30) 
German 4.48 (1.83) 4.12 (1.76) 
Ovambo 2.88 (1.67) 2.32 (1.30) 












Note. Means (SD) of children’s reengagement behaviors. 
Additional Analyses — Note on Coding Systems 
Copying action iv was coded as overimitation because this action (lifting the curtain 
before retrieving the reward) was causally irrelevant in that the reward could be 
retrieved easier by using the hand instead of the stick for lifting the curtain or by 
simply reaching through the curtain.  
To assess the robustness of our findings, I conducted similar statistical analyses 
than those reported in the main document, with the only modification of using 
overimitation scores that did not include action iv (range 0 to 6). Regarding our first 
hypothesis, the main results did not change. I find main effects of condition (χ2 
(1) = 9.07, p = .003), culture (χ2 (2) = 21.29, p < .001), and age (χ2 (1) = 33.47, p < .001), but 
not of sex (χ2 (1) = 1.38, p = .240). No three- or two-way interaction were found between 
predictors.  
The same picture appears regarding Hypothesis 2: I do not find a link between 
reengagement behaviors and children’s overimitation (χ2 (1) = 0.76, p = .383), 
Population Condition 
Hai||om 6.66 (4.53) 
German 12.35 (5.69) 
Ovambo 7.08 (4.75) 
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confirming the results from the manuscript. The effect of culture appears robust (χ2 
(2) = 52.70, p < .001).  
Additional Analyses — Note on Sample Sizes 
I tested more German children than either of the two Namibian populations. I did so 
to enable more reliable examinations of individual differences (Hypothesis 2). Since 
both Namibian samples differed in mean age, testing a larger sample in Germany 
allowed us to relate this population to both Namibian samples across the age range 
tested. 
In order to analyze whether the difference in sample sizes would impact the 
conclusions drawn from our data, I ran an additional analysis with the first 40 German 
participants only. Main results do not change. I still document a main effect of 
condition (χ2 (1) = 6.37, p = .012), culture (χ2 (2) = 18.89, p < .001), and age (χ2 (1) = 35.31, 
p < .001), but no effect of sex (χ2 (1) = 0.88, p = .348; Hypothesis 1). Neither do I not find 
any additional three nor two-way interaction between the predictors.  
The same picture appears regarding Hypothesis 2: I do not find a link between 
reengagement behaviors and children’s overimitation (χ2 (1) = 0.54, p = .464), 
confirming the results from the manuscript. The effect of culture remains the same (χ2 
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